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Abstract 
My thesis engages with the question about what it means to 
treat each other as equals, as this has been approached by luck and 
social egalitarians. Luck egalitarians maintain that luck inequalities 
should be equalized, while inequalities that are due to people’s 
choices should be left as they stand. This further implies that the scope 
of egalitarian justice is universal. Social egalitarians criticize luck 
egalitarianism for failing to provide a proper understanding of the 
value of equality. Equality is a relational ideal regarding how people 
should relate to each other as social and political equals, which 
properly understood requires that they relate to each other in a non-
dominating way. Given this, they argue, first, that luck egalitarian 
principles of justice violate the requirements of non-domination, since 
responsibility may conflict with the latter; and secondly, that strongly 
egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of morally significant forms 
of existing relationships, thus the scope of egalitarian justice is not 
universal. 
In my dissertation, I argue that Dworkin—who has traditionally 
been considered to be a luck egalitarian—shares the two social 
egalitarian commitments, namely that equality is a relational value 
and that strong egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of morally 
significant forms of existing relationships. Given this I defend two 
theses, both of which constitute an original contribution to our better 
understanding of the demands of social and political equality.: a) 
Dworkin’s theory of equality properly understood is not only attentive 
to the social egalitarian requirement of non-domination, but it 
provides a better understanding of it precisely because it builds upon 
a conception of personal and consequential responsibility that is 
constitutive of non-domination. b) I challenge both Dworkin’s and 
social egalitarians’ view of the scope of egalitarian justice by arguing 
that properly understood the ideal of social and political equality tells 
us that we should relate to each other as equals, not that existing 
relationships are necessary for justice-based duties to be triggered. 
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Introduction 
Since John Rawls’ work A Theory of Justice (1971) much of the 
focus of political philosophy turned to the value of equality. There are 
at least two fundamental questions within this debate. The first 
concerns the question “why equality”, that is, what, if anything, 
justifies treating people as equals. The second concerns the question 
about what it means to treat people as equals. My thesis engages with 
the second question, as this has been approached by the liberal 
egalitarian tradition. The discussion over it has largely been 
dominated by two groups of liberal egalitarian thinkers, luck 
egalitarians and social egalitarians. 
Briefly, luck egalitarianism developed in an effort to 
rehabilitate Rawls’ perceived failure to properly incorporate in his 
theory of justice, and especially his difference principle, his own 
diagnosis that people’s fates should not be influenced by morally 
arbitrary factors, such as their innate endowments and social position 
into which they are born, since people are not responsible for how 
they are born. The most prominent early luck egalitarian thinkers are 
Dworkin, Arneson and Cohen, with Dworkin being the first to 
introduce the idea that a theory of equality properly understood 
should be responsibility-tracking. Their underlying common 
commitment has been that if luck is an arbitrary factor from a moral 
point of view with respect to how a person’s life goes, then 
inequalities stemming from luck should be somehow equalized, at 
least as much as possible, while inequalities that are due to people’s 
choices should be left as they stand. This is so, since choice, as 
opposed to luck, is properly responsibility conferring. Thus, a theory 
of equality properly understood should take this into account by trying 
to mitigate (or erase if possible) the effects of luck on people’s lives 
on equal terms, while it should leave inequalities arising due to
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responsible choice as they stand. Given their shared commitment, the 
debate within the luck egalitarian camp has focused on how we should 
make sense of the responsibility (or choice, if you like)/luck distinction 
and further what the best equalizandum is, that is, what it is that we 
should equalize, given how we should understand the 
responsibility/luck cut. 
The incorporation of the principle of responsibility within 
egalitarian theories has also provided an answer to the anti-
egalitarian objection to egalitarianism that it makes people bear the 
cost of other people’s choices and thus violates their freedom to act 
according to their will.1 As Cohen has famously noted “Dworkin has, 
in effect, performed for egalitarianism the considerable service of 
incorporating within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the 
anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility” (1989: 
933). Yet, left liberalism, as understood by luck egalitarians, has 
received massive criticism, this time not for being too faithful to the 
idea of equality, thus compromising the idea of liberty, as the anti-
egalitarian objection has it against egalitarianism, but for being 
unfaithful to the true essence of the value of equality. Such criticism 
has been generated by social or democratic egalitarians. 
           Social egalitarians have challenged luck egalitarianism. 
Anderson in her seminal article “What is the Point of Equality?” (1999) 
accused luck egalitarians of failing to provide a proper understanding 
of the value of equality. Equality is first and foremost a relational ideal 
regarding how people should relate to each other as social and 
political equals, which properly understood requires that they relate 
to each other in a non-dominating way. Although equality so 
understood has certain distributive implications, it is not itself a 
distributive ideal, as luck egalitarians have wrongly assumed. 
Moreover, social egalitarians objected to luck egalitarian accounts of 
 
1 See Williams (2006).
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equality, since, according to their view, the latter violate the 
requirements of non-domination. This is so, mainly because holding 
people consequentially responsible for their choices, as luck 
egalitarian accounts demand, may have as a result that some people 
having made imprudent or foolish choices may be vulnerable to the 
arbitrary will of others. Social egalitarians, thus, maintained that the 
proper question for an egalitarian to begin theorizing equality is what 
equal relations should look like. Based on how we answer this, we can 
then theorize what distributive arrangements are compatible with or 
promote the requirements of a society of social and political equals. 
So, according to social egalitarians, the point of equality is to 
relate to each other as social and political equals. If this is so, then 
principles of justice should be justified in virtue of the requirement of 
non-domination. This implies that failing to treat each other as equals 
constitutes injustice. According to this view, then, justice concerns 
actions, whether individual or institutional, which as such are possible 
only when people relate to or interact with each other. This further 
points to what generates justice-based duties. According to social 
egalitarians, the existence of certain—most notably social and 
political—relationships between people matters in a morally 
important way for people’s duties to one another, and so strong 
egalitarian duties are justified on the basis of some form of interaction 
or relationship between people. This contrasts with the luck 
egalitarian view, according to which we have strong egalitarian duties 
to each other in virtue of unchosen natural inequalities, independently 
of whether we relate to or interact with each other. Social egalitarians 
argue that this is an implausible view, since natural differentiation 
cannot itself be just or unjust; nature is not a moral agent. So, our 
egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of our interaction not in 
virtue of how luck is dealt to us. In this sense, social and institutional 
arrangements that permit some members to fall below the threshold 
of what is required to be able to act as social and
11 
 
political equals are unjust. Thus, considerations relating to whether 
someone is responsible for her plight or not are irrelevant with respect 
to the kind of duties we owe to her as our social and political equal. 
My aim in this dissertation is, first, to challenge the social 
egalitarian view that responsibility is incompatible with or only of 
secondary moral importance to the demand of non-domination; 
instead, I shall argue that responsibility is constitutive of non-
domination. And, secondly, to argue that properly understood the 
ideal of relating to each other as social and political equals does not 
demand that strongly egalitarian duties are generated only in virtue 
of existing morally significant forms of interaction or relationship, but 
rather it requires that we establish relationships of equality, even in 
the absence of existing relationships or interactions. 
With respect to my first claim, I shall argue that Dworkin’s 
theory of equality properly understood is not only attentive to the 
social egalitarian demand that people should relate to each other as 
social and political equals, but provides a better understanding of non-
domination than the proposed social egalitarian accounts precisely 
because it builds upon a conception of personal and consequential 
responsibility that is constitutive of equal social and political 
relationships. As such my argument proceeds from a weaker to a 
stronger claim. 
The weaker claim is that, properly understood, Dworkin’s 
theory of equality shares the two basic social egalitarian 
commitments, namely that equality concerns how we should relate to 
each other as equals and that strong egalitarian duties are generated 
in virtue of morally significant forms of existing interaction or 
relationships (chapter 1). In the light of this, I shall consider what are 
the most plausible objections social egalitarians can raise against 
Dworkin’s theory so understood (chapter 1) and then argue 
why these objections fail in showing that his theory is not faithful to 
the non-
12 
 
domination commitment (chapters 2 and 3). This is a modest claim in 
that it only points to Dworkin’s theory being attentive to the 
requirement of non-domination. The stronger claim I shall defend is 
that it provides a better conception of non-domination than 
influential social egalitarian accounts. In order to defend this, I shall 
first examine and critically evaluate what I think the most prominent 
social egalitarian accounts of what it means to relate to each other as 
equals are and argue that each fails to give an attractive conception 
of non-domination (chapters 4 and 5). I shall afterwards propose that 
Dworkin’s theory of equality provides a better account of what 
non-domination requires by making responsibility properly 
understood constitutive of non-domination (chapter 6). 
With respect to my second claim, I shall argue that both 
Dworkin and social egalitarians are wrong in thinking that the 
existence of morally significant forms of interaction is a necessary 
condition for strongly egalitarian duties to be triggered. Instead, I shall 
argue that properly understood the ideal of social and political 
equality tells us that we should relate to each other as equals not that 
we must already relate or interact with each other in order for justice 
demands to arise (chapter 7). 
 
The structure of my thesis 
My thesis is structured chapter by chapter as follows. 
In Chapter 1, I give a somewhat detailed account of Dworkin’s 
theory of equality of resources and then I examine how this differs 
from what I shall call the control-based account of luck egalitarianism, 
defended by Cohen and Arneson. I argue that their differences with 
respect to how they interpret the responsibility/luck distinction as 
well as what the best equalizandum is should be seen in the light of a 
more fundamental disagreement between them, which rests on how 
each understands the point of equality and justice. Based on this, I 
then maintain that in order for the social egalitarian criticism to be
13 
 
plausible against Dworkin, social egalitarians should first recognize 
how Dworkin’s view differs fundamentally from Arneson’s and 
Cohen’s and that the former shares the social egalitarian 
commitments that equality is a relational value and that strong 
egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of morally significant forms 
of existing relationships. In the light of this, I argue that social 
egalitarians can then object to Dworkin’s theory on the ground that 
although it aims to interpret what it means to relate to each other as 
equals, his equality of resources violates—rather than gives substance 
to— the social egalitarian demand of non-domination and this failure 
is mainly due to it being responsibility tracking. Such criticism can be 
advanced in the form of two objections: the objection from the point 
of view of power equality and from the point of view of egalitarian 
motives/incentives/attitudes. However, I argue that there is a third 
objection—the objection from the point of view of the scope of 
equality—that can be raised from the point of view of the ideal of 
social and political equality properly understood against both Dworkin 
and social egalitarians. 
In Chapter 2, I examine the objection from the point of view of 
power equality and argue that, in its best form, it can be understood 
to point to mainly two reasons why equality of resources is vulnerable 
to it. First, in non-ideal circumstances, some people’s preferences are 
the outcome of unjust norms and processes, so that holding people 
fully responsible for the consequences of their choices that are the 
outcome of such preferences is itself unjust. An example of this is 
women’s “preference” for dependent caretaking, which also points to 
a second problem, namely that equality of resources improperly 
assigns the status of preference to certain duties, such as the duty of 
dependent caretaking, and thus places its burdens on those who take 
it up. This results in those people becoming dependent on wage 
earners or low state-subsidies and are thus vulnerable to the latter’s 
arbitrary will. Secondly, even if it were the case that circumstantial
14 
 
luck has been mitigated and that objectionable structural inequalities 
have been eliminated, equality of resources permits victims of bad 
option luck to become vulnerable to the arbitrary wills of others. 
Equality of resources can prevent such morally objectionable 
outcomes only by adopting paternalistic, thus disrespectful, policies. 
I then defend the view that the first part of the objection is 
inattentive to the fact that Dworkin actually acknowledges that some 
people’s preferences are partly shaped by unjust social norms and 
that equality of resources has reason to call for the required remedies 
as well as policies that aim at changing such norms, since the latter 
violate the two principles of dignity. I also argue that equality of 
resources requires us to provide the necessary social benefits to both 
kinds of dependents on account of our duty to treat them as equals 
and to dependent caretakers on account of the fact that dependent 
caretaking is a duty we all have. Finally, I argue that equality of 
resources is not vulnerable to the second part of the objection, by 
showing that it is constitutive of equality of resources that people do 
not lose access to insurance coverage. In doing so, I propose that the 
principle of authenticity can be consistently modified to account for 
compulsory insurance in a way that is faithful to Dworkin’s concern 
about ambition-sensitivity and that this is justified not on paternalistic 
but on egalitarian grounds. 
In Chapter 3, I examine the social egalitarian objection that the 
motivations, attitudes and incentives that people develop under 
equality of resources are inappropriate from the point of view of social 
egalitarianism because they diminish people’s equal status. I argue 
that a more nuanced defence of the social egalitarian position is 
required in order for social egalitarians to persuasively make their case 
and I propose how they can provide such a defence. Yet, I argue that 
even the more nuanced version of the objection under consideration 
cannot be sustained with respect to equality of resources. More 
specifically, I examine the role of envy in equality of
15 
 
 
resources. I argue that social egalitarians can motivate their envy 
objection against equality of resources better by drawing on Rawls’ 
elaboration of the problem of envy. Based on this, they can ask 
whether the principles of justice prescribed by equality of resources 
are expressive of envy or can generate what Rawls calls excusable 
general envy. However, I argue that both these strategies fail to show 
that Dworkin’s theory is vulnerable to the envy objection. I then 
examine the role of pity in equality of resources. I first consider how 
we can make better sense of the pity objection and propose that social 
egalitarians can make a moderate claim, namely that luck egalitarian 
principles of justice can possibly be expressive of pity—an attitude or 
motivation that is, however, morally objectionable when acting on 
principles of justice—and that to the extent social egalitarianism 
blocks this possibility, it is a better alternative to luck egalitarianism. 
However, I argue that this moderate claim fails if advanced against 
equality of resources. Finally, I consider two reasons that social 
egalitarians may invoke in order to raise the humiliation objection 
against luck egalitarianism. On the one hand, they can refer to the fact 
that in non-ideal circumstances, people would be vulnerable to 
humiliation and shame by being required to reveal their “inferior” 
capacities to qualify for social subsidy. On the other hand, they can 
refer to the idea of opacity respect advanced by Carter. I argue that it 
is the second form of the objection that seems to be more persuasive. 
Yet, I argue that Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources would not 
be vulnerable to it. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I examine the main social egalitarian 
proposals for how we should make sense of what it means to relate to 
each other as equals. I have classified the different suggestions in 
basically two categories: the attitudinal conception and the 
democratic participatory conception of social equality. Within the first 
category I list and study the proposals of Miller, Fourie, Schemmel and 
Scheffler, while in the second, Young’s ideal of “city life” and
16 
 
Anderson’s “democratic equality”. Although, these thinkers share 
common ground, their classification into two distinct categories is 
helpful for reasons of analyzing and evaluating what I think the most 
powerful social egalitarian arguments are. 
I argue that advocates of the attitudinal account insist that 
social equality properly understood is concerned with the right 
egalitarian attitudes we should have towards each other and that 
distributive issues (widely understood) are not part of the 
interpretation of social equality, but are rather determined by it. Given 
this, I maintain that the attitudinal account supposes that egalitarian 
dispositions, attitudes and so on are a sufficient condition for bringing 
about the right outcome. But, I argue that although an egalitarian 
ethos is necessary, it is insufficient to inform us about what we should 
do if we are to respect each other as social and political equals. 
Moreover, this argument for the sufficiency of an egalitarian ethos to 
bring about the right outcome does not refute the claim that the 
rightness/fairness/justice of an outcome is such not because people 
with egalitarian motives produce it, but because people who aim at it 
are acting in an egalitarian manner. In this sense, the attitudinal 
conception fails to give us an attractive conception of what non-
domination consists in. In contrast, Dworkin’s thought is that people 
show equal respect and concern for each other if in their economic 
arrangements, for example, they strive for equality of resources. But 
according to Dworkin, equality of resources is not just because well-
disposed people strive for it. Instead people should strive for it if they 
are to show equal respect to each other. 
Young’s ideal of “city life” was meant as an alternative to what 
she calls the liberal distributive paradigm more generally, not 
specifically to luck egalitarianism. Her criticism thus is against liberal 
egalitarian theories more generally, within which social egalitarians 
usually situate themselves. However, her analysis of domination and 
oppression has strongly influenced social egalitarians, especially her
17 
 
argument that the distributive paradigm ignores the institutional 
structure that determines distributive arrangements, while it wrongly 
theorizes in distributive terms non-material goods such as decision-
making power, rights, opportunities and self-respect. Social 
egalitarians share Young’s criticism, although they raise it against luck 
egalitarianism specifically. This is why I examine whether Young’s 
arguments provide a successful account of non-domination. I argue 
that from a liberal point of view they do not, precisely because Young 
rejects the basic liberal theoretical tenets, especially as developed by 
liberal egalitarians and more specifically by Rawls. Moreover, I argue 
that her criticism against the distributive paradigm rests on her having 
misconceived how liberal egalitarians make sense of distributive 
justice. From a liberal egalitarian point of view, distributive justice 
concerns how institutions are organized and what people can do in 
relation to one another, if they are to respect each other as equals. As 
such, I argue, Dworkin’s theory is attentive to this demand, while it 
does not face the kind of problems that Young’s theory of domination 
faces. 
Finally, I argue that Anderson’s ideal of “democratic equality” 
is more promising in that, unlike her fellow social egalitarians, it seems 
to give determinate content to the demand that people should relate 
to each other in a non-dominating way. However, I maintain that she 
is ambivalent with respect to the role of responsibility within her 
democratic equality. This is so, for she seems to be oscillating between 
two different strategies each of which has unfortunate implications 
given her overall commitments to the ideal of social equality and given 
this, her “democratic equality” fails to be an attractive account of non-
domination. 
In Chapter 6, I argue that Dworkin’s account provides a better 
understanding of non-domination than the proposed social 
egalitarian accounts exactly because it builds upon a conception of 
responsibility that is constitutive of equal social and political
18 
 
relationships. I argue that in order for people to lead their lives in a 
non-dominating way, they need to be personally responsible for how 
their lives go. For this to be so, certain conditions should be available 
that make the exercise of their personal responsibility possible on 
equal terms with others. Consequential responsibility is an essential 
part of it. I thus examine how we should make sense of consequential 
responsibility, that is, under what conditions we should hold people 
consequentially responsible for their preferences, choices and so on. I 
argue that there are justice-relevant and agent-relevant conditions 
that are jointly necessary and sufficient for ascribing consequential 
responsibility, which I examine more closely. 
Understood in this way, Dworkin’s account gives a determinate 
content to the otherwise vague idea that people should relate to each 
other in a non-dominating way, something that certain social 
egalitarian accounts have failed to provide. Non-domination has been 
traditionally understood as freedom from arbitrary interference in 
one’s actions by the will of others and the state. But as such it is an 
abstract idea and it has to be explained. This is to say, we cannot 
account for what arbitrary interference is, unless we have an account 
of what a fair choice structure is. Dworkin’s account, unlike social 
egalitarian ones, provides such an explanation, by accounting for what 
a fair choice structure is, which can be used as our yardstick against 
which we can judge what arbitrary interference consists in, that in this 
way takes a determinate form. 
In the final chapter, Chapter 7, I question the social egalitarian 
and Dworkinian requirement that for justice-based duties to arise, 
some form of morally significant relationships or interaction should 
already exist. I argue that the ideal of social equality properly 
understood regards morally significant forms of relationships or 
interactions as constitutive of justice, not as merely triggering justice 
considerations. To do so, I get into the international/cosmopolitan 
justice debate, since the conclusions drawn from the latter are
19 
 
relevant to the debate about the scope of egalitarian duties that is of 
concern to social and luck egalitarians. 
In the light of this, I suggest that there are two main strands 
within the social egalitarian camp that try to justify egalitarian duties 
on account of some form of interaction. The first I call statist 
egalitarianism, the second non-statist egalitarianism. I, first, present 
the arguments offered by statist egalitarians and consider some 
objections raised against them by the non-statist egalitarian 
standpoint. I then proceed to the arguments offered by non-statist 
egalitarians and suggest why they are unsatisfactory in justifying their 
claim that justice demands are triggered in virtue of existing 
interaction or relationships. My aim is not to diminish the general 
social egalitarian commitment that equality is a relational ideal 
regarding how we should relate to each other; but rather to maintain 
that the ideal of social and political equality is more demanding. I 
argue that the best conception of the social egalitarian ideal is the 
ideal of the good polity. Roughly, this requires that all people are 
entitled to the goods of citizenship and justice, which are 
interdependent: it is through membership in a political association 
that people can realize their moral nature as free and equal, by way of 
each living according to her own conception of the good according to 
public principles of justice, principles that accord each equal concern 
and respect. Being a citizen in the good polity means living according 
to common principles of justice. If all people are entitled to the goods 
of the good polity, then they are entitled to them independently of 
whether there exists any kind of relationship, interaction, or form of 
impact. If this is so, then strongly egalitarian duties cannot be assumed 
to be triggered only in virtue of existing relationships, interactions, 
practices and so on, but they obtain independently of them.
20 
 
By the end of my dissertation, I hope to have provided a significant 
and original contribution to the literature by offering a better 
understanding of the demands of social and political equality. In doing 
so, I take seriously Mill’s remark that “[a] doctrine is not judged at all 
until it is judged in its best form”.2 
In the light of the Millian requirement, then, I try first to 
present the most plausible way of interpreting Dworkin’s theory of 
equality of resources vis-à-vis his fellow early luck egalitarians’ 
accounts. I do so by contrasting the common interpretation of equality 
of resources, on which his luck egalitarian critics have relied, with my 
interpretation. Based on my suggestion about what the best 
interpretation of equality of resources is, I then try to present the most 
plausible interpretation of the social egalitarian criticism against 
equality of resources. This is crucial, for if we are to reject the social 
egalitarian criticism against Dworkin, we should reject its best form. 
On the other hand, social egalitarians have violated Mill’s dictum, I 
argue, for they have not properly clarified how the luck egalitarian 
accounts differ so as then to proceed to make a sound case against 
each of them presented in its best light. I try to fill in this gap with 
respect to Dworkin’s theory and then I go on to offer new answers to 
the best form of the social egalitarian criticism. I also make a 
contribution to the social egalitarian literature by clarifying the 
different social egalitarian interpretations of equality (i.e. the 
attitudinal and the democratic participatory account). Once presented 
in their best light or most convincing way, I argue that they fail to give 
an attractive understanding of non-domination. My dissertation also 
aims to shed new light on our understanding of consequential 
responsibility within the wider Dworkian theoretical context—by 
taking seriously his 
 
2 Cited in Freeman (2007a: xii-xiii).
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fundamental commitment to the ideal of treating each other with 
equal concern and respect—which so understood is constitutive of 
non-domination. Non-domination in this way takes a determinate 
form and according to my view, the best form. This is an original claim 
given that responsibility and non-domination have been taken to be 
incompatible within the social egalitarian tradition. Finally, my claim 
that the scope of social equality properly understood is universal can 
be understood to suggest a way of integrating the universalist luck 
egalitarian view and the relational social egalitarian view that makes 
each more plausible and as such it constitutes a contribution to the 
debate about equality as well as to the cosmopolitan/international 
justice debate. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Dworkin, Luck Egalitarianism and Social Egalitarianism 
 
 
The term “luck egalitarianism” was first introduced by 
Elizabeth Anderson (1999: 289)1 to characterise a group of 
egalitarian theories of distributive justice that were developed 
after and were inspired by Rawls’ work A Theory of Justice (1971).2 
As is well known, Rawls has forcefully argued against 
certain theories of justice on account of the fact that they make 
people’s fate rely too much on morally arbitrary factors, such as 
on natural lottery outcomes (1971: 72), something that is unfair. 
Luck egalitarianism has taken stock from Rawls’ thought about the 
moral arbitrariness of people’s circumstances and focused on 
giving substance to it. So, the basic idea of luck egalitarian theories 
is that luck is an arbitrary factor from a moral point of view with 
respect to how a person’s life goes. If that is so, then people’s 
inequalities stemming from luck should be somehow equalized. 
On the other hand, inequalities that are due to people’s 
choices 
 
1 Rakowski (1991) calls luck egalitarianism “equality of fortune”. Anderson also 
calls luck egalitarianism “equality of fortune” (1999: 289). 
2 Kymlicka suggests that Rawls is the first to introduce the familiar luck 
egalitarian ideal but that his difference principle violates it (2002: 58, 74). Yet, 
Scheffler (2003, 2005) disputes the view that Rawls were really interested in 
preserving the luck egalitarian concern over ambition sensitivity and 
endowment insensitivity in his theory of justice, when he introduced the idea 
that natural lottery outcomes are morally arbitrary. For similar views see also 
Freeman (2007b: ch. 4), Mandle (2009), Matravers (2007: ch. 3).
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should be left as they stand. This is so, since choice, as opposed to 
luck, is properly responsibility conferring. Thus, a theory of 
equality properly understood should somehow take this into 
account by trying to mitigate (or eliminate if possible) the effects 
of luck on people’s lives on equal terms, while it should leave 
inequalities arising due to responsible choice as they stand. This is 
how we should make sense of what it means to treat people as 
equals. 
So, at the core of luck egalitarian theories of justice is the 
principle of responsibility, which, in its abstract form, stipulates 
that people are responsible for whatever can be counted as their 
choice.3 This implies that though it is just that the consequences 
of our choices fall upon us, it is unjust when the consequences of 
what are not our choices fall solely upon us, but rather should be 
shared in an appropriately egalitarian manner. This latter kind of 
consequences is attributed to luck, hence the name luck 
egalitarianism. Although this is the fundamental shared 
commitment within the luck egalitarian camp, there has been 
wide controversy over how we can best make sense of the 
distinction between choice and luck, which has further 
implications with respect to what the best equalizandum is. 
The luck egalitarian interpretation of equality has received 
massive criticism by the so called social egalitarian camp. Wolff, 
 
3 Alternatively, it could be said that the principle of responsibility asserts that 
people are responsible for what they have (full) control. However, I think using 
the notion of choice in the abstract formulation of the principle of responsibility 
seems to me to be more appropriate, since choice is a broader notion than 
control. For example, some argue that an agent makes a genuine choice only if 
she has full control over the factors that have led to her having this choice. 
Nevertheless, according to others control is not necessary for making an agent 
responsible for her choice.
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Anderson and Scheffler are among the first most prominent 
figures of social egalitarianism to have initiated this criticism, 
which has been followed up by more recent attempts to specify in 
a more nuanced way the aim of equality properly understood. 
According to social egalitarians, the luck egalitarian paradigm fails 
to give a proper account of what the point of equality is. They 
claim that equality is a relational value, that is, it is fundamentally 
concerned with how people relate to each other as equals not 
with what a fair distribution should look like, as luck egalitarians 
insist. Distribution matters to the extent it upholds equal social 
relations, not independently of them. So, the proper question for 
an egalitarian to begin theorizing equality is what equal relations 
should look like. 
I share the social egalitarian understanding of equality as a 
relational value and I think that certain aspects of the social 
egalitarian critique against responsibility-sensitivity are not 
groundless. However, it is crucial for social egalitarians, for their 
criticism to be forceful, to acknowledge the different ways in 
which each luck egalitarian theory understands the principle of 
responsibility and then to make a sound case against each of 
them. In my view, social egalitarians have failed to give proper 
consideration to Dworkin’s theory of equality, which they have 
classified as a luck egalitarian theory.4 This failure seems to be due 
 
 
4 Dworkin himself has renounced the term luck egalitarian as a proper 
description of his theory (2002: 107, 2003: 192). Also, later Arneson prefers to 
call his theory “responsibility-catering prioritarianism” (2000). In the same 
sense, some call luck egalitarian theories responsibility-catering egalitarianism 
(Blake and Risse 2008), responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (Knight 2011: 
152) or choice egalitarianism (Smilansky 2003).
25 
 
to the fact that social egalitarians have not properly 
acknowledged the different role responsibility is meant to play 
within Dworkin’s theory. They rather focused on the principle of 
responsibility in abstraction of the wider context that Dworkin 
meant to integrate it. However, Dworkin’s view of responsibility, 
if it is seen in the light of his overall theory, differs fundamentally 
from how the other two early luck egalitarians, Cohen and 
Arneson, make sense of it. Once we understand these 
fundamental differences between those three prominent luck 
egalitarian figures, we can realize that Dworkin shares more 
common ground with social egalitarians than he shares with 
Cohen and Arneson. 
My aim then, in this chapter, is first to examine what the 
underlying differences between the different luck egalitarian 
views are. In section (a), I shall first give a somewhat detailed 
account of Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources and then, in 
section (b), I shall go on to examine how his account differs from 
the two other influential luck egalitarian accounts, Arneson’s and 
Cohen’s.5 More specifically, in section (b1), I examine how their 
accounts differ with respect to how we should make sense of the 
responsibility/luck distinction as well as what the best 
 
5 Note that my focus on the aforementioned luck egalitarian theorists is not 
meant to undermine the fact that there have been proposed serious further 
developments on choice-sensitivity and on what the proper equalizandum 
should be. See for example, Rakowski (1991), Roemer (1994, 1996), Van-Parijs 
(1995), Lippert-Rasmussen (2001, 2005, 2015), Vallentyne (2002), Temkin 
(2011), Knight (2005, 2006, 2009a, 2012), Stemplowska (2008, 2009, 2011, 
2013a, 2013b). Yet, those developments fundamentally rest on and provide 
more nuanced ways of understanding the choice/luck distinction as this has 
been drawn by early luck egalitarians.
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equalizandum is. In section (b2), I argue that their differences 
discussed in section (b1) should be seen in the light of a more 
fundamental disagreement between Dworkin and what I shall call 
the control-based account of luck egalitarianism, defended by 
Cohen and Arneson. That fundamental disagreement rests on how 
each of them understands the point of equality and justice. Finally, 
in section (c), I argue that, given the differences discussed in 
section (b), Dworkin shares the social egalitarian commitments 
that equality is a relational value and that strong egalitarian duties 
are generated in virtue of morally significant forms of existing 
relationships. In the light of their shared commitments, I shall then 
suggest what is the most plausible way to make sense of the social 
egalitarian criticism against Dworkin. 
 
a. Equality of resources: a sketch 
In the introduction of his Sovereign Virtue Dworkin states 
that “equal concern is the sovereign virtue of political 
community―without it government is only a tyranny” (2000: 1). 
But what is the appropriate conception/interpretation of this 
abstract principle of equality according to him? 
Dworkin’s egalitarian theory is based on two basic 
principles. The first one says that every person’s life is of equal 
moral worth (2000: 5-6). The second principle is the principle of 
personal responsibility (2000: 5-6), according to which people 
should be responsible for how they lead their life.6 These two 
 
6 In his later Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin maintains that what we owe to 
others is based on the ethical idea of living in dignity (2011: ch. 9). The 
conception of dignity should be interpreted to include the principle of self-
respect, namely that each person should treat the success of his life as having
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principles are meant to give substance to the abstract egalitarian 
principle that a political community should show equal concern 
and respect to each member, that is, by respecting each person’s 
life as having equal moral worth and by respecting each person’s 
responsibility to lead her life as she thinks. The two principles are 
meant to give us guidance with respect to how we should act 
when it comes to distribution, political relationships as well as 
other morally important relationships. 
In what follows, I shall focus on how Dworkin suggests that 
we should interpret the abstract egalitarian principle with respect 
to the distribution of resources. As is well known, Dworkin 
suggests that equality of resources, as this is specified by the 
devices of the auction and the hypothetical insurance market for 
disabilities and talents, is the best interpretation of the abstract 
egalitarian principle with respect to distributive justice 
considerations. So, let’s see how this works. 
The auction 
In order to answer the question of what the appropriate 
division of resources is that better responds to the abstract 
 
 
objective importance, and the principle of authenticity, namely, that each 
person has a special, personal responsibility to create a life that he endorses 
(Dworkin 2011: 203-10). These two principles of dignity are integrated into 
morality. Regarding the first principle, we cannot respect our lives as having 
objective importance, unless we respect other people’s lives as having equal 
objective importance (Dworkin 2011: 254, 260). This is the guiding principle of 
morality. Regarding the second principle, if the principle of self-respect requires 
equal respect for the lives of others, then it follows that we should respect 
other people’s special responsibility for leading an authentic life by not 
usurping options otherwise available to them. I say more on this in chapters 6 
and 7.
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egalitarian principle, Dworkin suggests that an “economic market 
of some form” should be used “mainly as an analytical device” 
(2000: 66) for this purpose. He employs the example of the 
shipwrecked survivors on a desert island, who are confronted with 
the problem of how to divide the island’s resources between 
them. All of them have different preferences, but they all accept 
that distribution should satisfy the abstract egalitarian principle. 
In order for this to be so, two conditions need to be met, envy-
freeness and non-arbitrariness. A distributive outcome is envy 
free when the “envy test” is met, that is, resources have been 
divided equally only if, after the distribution, no one would prefer 
the bundle of resources of someone else to his own bundle of 
resources (Dworkin 2000: 67). A distributive outcome is non-
arbitrary, when the bundles of resources offered to people 
appropriately reflect their preferences. The two conditions are 
met under the auction model. 
According to the latter, each of the immigrants takes an 
equal amount of clamshells with which she bids for resource lots. 
The auctioneer proposes sets of prices for each lot, until one of 
them clears the markets. The process remains open until 
“everyone declares himself satisfied, and goods are distributed 
accordingly” (Dworkin 2000: 68). The envy test is met, since if 
there were some people who would prefer another’s bundle of 
resources, they could have purchased his bundle with their 
clamshells (Dworkin 2000: 68). The envy test, in other words, 
measures the opportunity costs of the immigrants. The non-
arbitrariness condition is satisfied since “each person played, 
through his purchases against an initially equal stock of counters, 
an equal role in determining the set of bundles actually chosen”
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(Dworkin 2000: 68). No one can have a legitimate complaint that 
he has not been treated fairly. 
So, there are two conditions that need to obtain in order 
for the distribution to be fair: envy freeness and non-arbitrariness. 
However, non-arbitrariness cannot be satisfied unless there is an 
account of liberty that stipulates the specific liberties people have. 
In chapter 3 of Sovereign Virtue, Dworkin advances the thought 
that the auction should take place against a liberty/constraint 
system. 
Theory of liberty 
Dworkin’s theory of liberty consists of three basic 
principles: the principles of abstraction, authenticity and 
independence. Each of these principles is supposed to ensure that 
genuine equality of opportunity is provided to all. 
                        The principle of abstraction7 
As we have seen, the auction is a device for distributing 
resources in a fair way. But in order for people to bid for resources 
in the auction they need to know what they can do with these 
resources. And what one can do with one’s resources depends on 
what the legal constraints are in regard to his freedom of action. 
“No one can intelligently, or even intelligibly, decide what to bid 
for in an auction, or what price to bid for it, unless he makes 
assumptions about how he will be able to use what he acquires” 
 
 
7 The principle of abstraction is backed up by the principle of correction in order 
to ensure that “a genuinely equal distribution measured by true opportunity 
costs” will be achieved. That is, it provides protection against externalities, 
which may be the result of the lack of transparency in people’s motives, the 
unpredictability of transactions and organizational costs (Dworkin 2000: 155-
8).
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(Dworkin 2000: 143). So, material resources and the rights to use 
them should be understood as two aspects of the same thing 
(Dworkin 2000: 144). In this sense, what we need is a “background 
or baseline liberty/constraint system” (Dworkin 2000: 143), which 
stipulates the specific liberties people have. But the problem is 
that of indefiniteness and arbitrariness. For, whichever baseline 
the auctioneer decides to use will have different results, all else 
being equal (Dworkin 2000: 143-4). This means that although the 
envy test will be satisfied, there will be some people who would 
prefer another baseline; that is, they would have a legitimate 
complaint that they have not been treated fairly. 
So, we need to find a way of ensuring that the baseline 
liberty/constraint system responds to the abstract egalitarian 
principle that all should be treated with equal concern (Dworkin 
2000: 147-8). As we said, the metric of equality of resources is 
opportunity costs—namely, the cost of a resource someone bids 
for is the cost others forgo by him having it. More simply, 
opportunity cost measures how much one is willing to pay in order 
to have a kind of resource in relation to how much others are 
willing to pay for the same resource. But, how much one is willing 
to pay depends (among other things) on what is the background 
or baseline liberty/constraint system, which stipulates what one is 
allowed and not allowed to do with regard to the resource put for 
sale. That’s why it is important to see that a resource and what 
one is permitted to do with it are different aspects of the same 
thing. As we have said, different baselines will have as a result 
different opportunity costs. 
So, we need to identify this specific baseline system that 
will have as a result what Dworkin calls “true opportunity costs”
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(2000: 149); that is, those opportunity costs that will reflect not 
only that the aggregate opportunity costs for each are equal—this 
is ensured via the envy test—but that the opportunities each 
person has to express her choices are as fair as possible, in the 
sense that the opportunities open to people should be such that 
everyone is treated as an equal. In order for a distribution of 
resources to reflect as much as possible people’s equal 
opportunities to choose among different ways of life, the baseline 
system should be so specified that there are as few legal 
constraints as possible on their freedom to act as they wish.8 This 
is what Dworkin calls “the principle of abstraction” (2000: 148). 
Related to the problem of the set of liberties people have 
is the size of the lots auctioned, which needs to be as sensitive as 
possible to all people’s choices, that is, to reflect true opportunity 
costs. If people are to have the fullest possible freedom to act as 
they wish, then it follows that the more abstract the form of 
resources offered is, the more sensitive the auction is to different 
choices; and thus the fairer it becomes, since it gives to all as equal 
opportunities as possible to express their choices (Dworkin 2000: 
151). 
The principle of abstraction is the best guide for stipulating 
the baseline liberty/constraint system in such a way that is fair to 
all. Since what one can do with a resource and the way this is 
actually divided (if it is divisible) affects the choices one will make 
and thus the formation of his preferences and plans, then both of 
 
 
8 Yet, note that freedom to act as they wish is constrained by the principle of 
security, which provides “people with enough physical security and enough 
control over their own property to allow them to make and carry out plans and 
projects” (Dworkin 2000: 149).
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these issues should be settled so that all are treated as equals. The 
principle of abstraction then provides us with a valuable tool to 
find the best bridge between the abstract egalitarian principle and 
equality of resources (Dworkin 2000: 148).9 
The principle of authenticity 
The outcome of the auction as well as the hypothetical 
insurance market for disabilities and talents (that I present below) 
are choice sensitive. It is one of the core elements of Dworkin’s 
theory that we respect people’s choices and what these cost to 
others. Both the auction and the hypothetical insurance market 
are designed so as to accommodate this demand. But, if choices 
are central to equality of resources, then we have to make sure 
that these reflect our true preferences, ambitions and plans. 
However, not all our choices are made after careful consideration 
of how these could fit our ambitions and life plans; neither are 
they made in the light of the fullest possible information necessary 
for deciding prudently. Moreover, people may change their life 
views and plans throughout their life; or their preferences may be 
the result of adapting to their bad circumstances. If this is so and 
since the auction and the hypothetical insurance market that are 
choice sensitive serve as devices for the allocation of goods which 
are necessary for people’s life plans, then we can imagine how 
devastating an imprudent choice could be for one’s life. It would 
be an unappealing feature of equality of resources if it remained 
 
 
 
9 See, however, Otsuka’s criticism (2004) that the envy test and the 
principle of abstraction are in conflict and so that liberty and equality are not 
completely reconciled contrary to Dworkin’s argument for the opposite.
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insensitive to the fact of imprudence10 or adaptiveness. Dworkin 
is careful to note that “[a] complete account of equality of 
resources must therefore include, as a baseline feature, some 
description of the circumstances in which people’s personalities 
will be taken as properly developed so that auction calculations 
can proceed. The baseline needs, that is, some principle defining 
authenticity” (2000: 159). 
So, it is essential for equality of resources that people’s 
choices “should not depend on a view of their personality, and of 
the personalities of others, with whose formation they remain 
dissatisfied”. People should be able “to form, reflect on, or to 
advocate convictions, attachments, or preferences” to the fullest 
possible extent and they should be able to do so “either before 
the initial auction or after it” (Dworkin 2000: 160, my emphasis). 
“Ideal authenticity requires the fullest possible opportunity” 
(Dworkin 2000: 160). Dworkin stresses the importance of the 
principle of authenticity, since violations of the latter “are likely to 
distort prices [away from true opportunity costs] more 
fundamentally [than violations of the principle of abstraction]” 
(2000: 160). This would, in the last analysis, reflect the distortion 
of equal treatment and respect. 
It is true that Dworkin does not elaborate any further on 
the principle of authenticity. He simply contends that authenticity 
is important for the formation of true opportunity costs and that 
 
 
10 By imprudence I mean the Dworkinian account of it, that is, imprudent 
choices are ones that do not fit to people’s life plans as judged from the point 
of view of the individual and not by some independent principle of prudence. 
“[W]hat is prudent depends on that person’s own individual needs, tastes, 
personality, and preferences” (Dworkin 2000: 313; see also p. 492, fn. 7).
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it “has both a passive and active voice” (2000: 160)—namely, 
people want to have opportunities both for self-reflection and for 
influencing others. This requires certain rights to freedoms of 
religious commitment, of expression, of personal, social and 
intimate association, of non-expression in the form of freedom 
from surveillance, and also the right to access the widest available 
literature and other forms of art. These liberties are protecting 
negative freedom (Dworkin 2000: 120, cf. 2011: ch. 17). However, 
usually when we talk of people being able to form authentic 
choices, it is not only negative freedom we have in mind. Adaptive 
preferences, for example, are such even under a regime of 
negative freedom. If equality of resources requires that choices 
people make are as authentic as possible, then the imposition of 
legal constraints is insufficient. Yet, in Justice for Hedgehogs, 
Dworkin insists that people should live in an independent way 
(2011: 211-13). This requires us to resist domination, not 
influence (Dworkin 2011: 212), where domination consists in 
being arbitrarily usurped of an otherwise available choice. 
Usurpation, though, does not consist only in being legally 
constrained from doing things, but also in being constrained from 
doing things out of fear of social sanction (Dworkin 2011: 212) or 
due to one’s preferences having been formed against a 
background of unjust social norms (2000: 490, fn. 9, 2002: 137). 
The principle of authenticity then requires compensation or more 
generally remedial measures to be put in place. 
The principle of independence 
Another way that true opportunity costs may be 
significantly distorted is due to prejudice against people belonging 
to different groups, such as cultural minorities, homosexuals,
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ethnicity groups, and so on; or against people holding unpopular 
opinions or leading unpopular ways of lives and so on. Prejudice 
constitutes a disadvantage, structurally similar to the 
disadvantages caused by people’s circumstances (Dworkin 2000: 
162), as these are judged from the point of view of the individual. 
However, though structurally similar, disadvantages caused by 
prejudice differ from those caused by lack of talents or disabilities 
in that compensation is not an appropriate means for diminishing 
the former, for this would be disrespectful to the victims of 
prejudice. Although, further elaboration would be needed to 
define what constitutes prejudice, but in a broad sense it includes 
all instances of dislike against people or avoidance of relating to 
them, which causes unfair disadvantage to the latter. So, it is 
crucial that we define what an unfair disadvantage is. 
As we have said, unfairness refers to the fact that some 
people have fewer opportunities than others to lead their life as 
they want—namely, some people’s preferences are disfavoured. 
That’s why the principle of abstraction ascribes maximum 
freedom of choice for all (except where the principle of security 
and correction should apply). But maximum freedom of choice for 
all may result in some people having fewer opportunities. The 
auction is in that way corrupted, since true opportunity costs are 
distorted. The principle of independence then applies, introducing 
additional constraints to the baseline liberty system.11 
 
11 However, there are instances of prejudice that do not result in 
economic/material disadvantage. There can be, that is, modes of behaviour 
that do not restrict a person’s liberty but nevertheless affect his level of self-
respect. For example, when people are willing to trade with members of an 
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The hypothetical insurance market 
As we have seen, the auction satisfies the envy test and so 
everyone receives her equal bundle of resources. However, 
assuming that the immigrants will get involved in production and 
trade with the resources they have received, the envy test will not, 
after a period of time, continue to be satisfied. Some people will 
produce more than others, be more skilful than others, be luckier 
than others in many respects, some will prefer to work harder or 
longer than others or to have more leisure time and so on. The 
question is whether an outcome that depends on each of these 
factors is fair or not. And if not, which of these factors can fairly 
influence outcomes. 
 
ethnic minority, refrain from harassing them and so on, but avoid contacting 
with them in other contexts, by, e.g., not sitting next to them on buses and not 
inviting them to their homes. This can cause damage to their self-respect. So, 
the question is whether such modes of behaviour constitute a form of 
disadvantage under equality of resources? For example, in Rawls’s work it is 
more obvious that this is so, since he regards the social bases of self-
respect/self-esteem as primary goods. On the other hand, there are cases of 
discriminative attitudes that do not result in any kind of disadvantage, but still 
are morally objectionable from the point of view of equality. These two cases 
do not seem to be covered by the principle of independence and Dworkin does 
not seem to address this problem. However, one possible reply here is that the 
liberty/constraint system is meant to specify those liberties relative to 
distributive justice. Although, we may have reason to condemn such attitudes 
from the point of view of equality, these are not a matter of concern from the 
point of view of distributive justice. Equality of resources is but one aspect of 
what it means to treat each other with equal concern and respect and regards 
how we should treat each other with respect to distribution. Dworkin’s theory 
of equality is a wider project of how we should conduct our relationships with 
others and, as we will see in chapter 2, this wider project gives us ground to 
deal with such kinds of objectionable attitudes.
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In order to answer such questions, Dworkin draws a distinction 
between option and brute luck, with the difference between them 
being a matter of degree (2000: 73). With option luck being the 
result of a choice made by the agent, who knows ex ante what the 
possibilities of either “losing” or “winning” are, Dworkin asserts 
that it is “consistent with equality of resources that people should 
have different income or wealth in virtue of differing option luck” 
(2000: 74),12 on the assumption that people should have as many 
opportunities as possible to run their life in their own way. Some 
may choose to run a risky life and given that they choose on equal 
terms with others, it is fair that they bear the good or bad 
consequences of their choice (Dworkin 2000: 75). 
On the other hand, it is consistent with equality of 
resources that the consequences of brute luck that people would 
not choose to be part of their life are mitigated. This is so, since 
bad brute luck restricts in an unfair way people’s opportunities to 
live their life as they wish. Note that Dworkin does not define what 
constitutes good and bad brute luck. It is open to people to decide 
what counts as good and bad luck for them. Blindness, for 
example, is not, according to Dworkin, necessarily bad brute luck. 
A blind person may not consider her blindness as a disadvantage. 
Each person has her own reasons for considering what is 
disadvantageous for her life and this is why Dworkin refrains from 
giving a list of disabilities and talents. 
 
 
 
12 For criticism of the view that bad option luck is always fair see, for example, 
Lippert-Rasmussen (2001, 2005), Vallentyne (2002), Temkin (2011), Knight 
(2013). See also Cohen (2011) who maintains that option luck never preserves 
justice and Williams (2013) for criticism of Cohen’s view.
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Having said that, the question is how those unwanted 
consequences of a person’s brute luck are to be mitigated in a fair 
way. The device of the hypothetical insurance market plays a key 
role here, since it “provides a link between brute and option luck” 
(Dworkin 2000: 74, 76). Dworkin uses two stages of the 
hypothetical insurance market; the first provides insurance 
against disabilities and the second against lack of talent. The idea 
behind the hypothetical insurance market is that fairness requires 
that all people should have equal opportunities to pursue the 
kinds of life they want and insofar as this is not possible due to 
differences in people’s abilities, skills and talents, which are only 
a matter of brute luck, equality of resources should equalise as 
much as possible people’s circumstances in a fair way. But, how is 
such equalisation to be made in a fair way? The kind of insurance 
market Dworkin employs is sensitive to how people assess the 
different disabilities and lack of talent they may face, attributing 
to them responsibility for their choice to insure themselves or not 
and for the level of insurance coverage they would choose to buy, 
given the fact that they all have equal opportunity to buy 
insurance coverage. 
With respect to the hypothetical insurance market for 
disabilities, Dworkin assumes that if all immigrants faced at the 
appropriate age equal chances of developing a range of disabilities 
in the future, with this range being fixed, then the level of 
coverage the average person of the community would buy (from 
her initial stock of clamshells) against these disabilities, will be the 
level of coverage offered to those who actually develop such a 
disability and which will be collected through taxation
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(2000: 77-8). Thus, taxation, being compulsory for all, would 
provide protection for all. 
The first stage of the hypothetical insurance market helps 
us correct the consequences of disabilities that may disturb 
equality of resources. But we are now faced with the question of 
whether the envy test will continue to be satisfied, on the 
assumption that the immigrants having different talents and skills 
will engage in production and trade. Like disabilities, talents and 
skills belong to people’s circumstances; people are born with 
them, they do not choose whether to have them or not. However, 
one’s talents affect the way one forms her life plan, part of which 
regards the kind of job she may choose and the income earned by 
it. If this is so, then equality of resources has reason to correct 
inequalities stemming from people’s differentiated talents. But 
how are we going to do this? 
As in the case of disabilities, we could ask our immigrants 
at what level they would insure themselves against lacking a 
certain set of skills, if they were facing the same possibilities of 
lacking them and on the assumption that they all have the same 
opportunities to buy insurance coverage (Dworkin 2000: 93). But 
this method turns out to be objectionable, on the ground that it 
assumes that the immigrants have no knowledge of their talents 
and skills. This is problematic; what we ask them presupposes that 
they already have knowledge of their talents and skills, since it is 
according to these (among others things) that they shape their 
ambitions, preferences and tastes (Dworkin 2000: 94). So, by 
assuming that they have no knowledge of their talents and skills, 
we deprive them of the very important informational background 
against which they form their
40 
 
conception of the good, which then would be the basis for 
answering the question we have posed. 
Instead, we can assume that people know their talents, 
skills, preferences, attitudes towards risk, the available resources 
and the income structure that will result after the auction, but 
they do not know what the economic rent of their talents and 
skills will be or whether their skills and talents will be valued at all 
by others (Dworkin 2000: 94). Now, they are all faced with equal 
possibilities of ending up in any particular level of the economic 
structure, while any premiums they will choose to buy will be paid 
out of their future income, not their initial stock (Dworkin 2000: 
94), as in is the case for disabilities. So, the question is “how much 
of such insurance would the immigrants, on average, buy, at what 
specified level of income coverage, and at what cost?” (Dworkin 
2000: 94). The answer to this question will then be the basis for 
the translation of this hypothetical insurance market to a tax 
system, with the premiums paid by each immigrant being 
analogous to the level of her actual income (Dworkin 2000: 100 
and on). 
These are the main features of equality of resources, that 
is, of what distributive justice requires if we are to treat each other 
with equal concern and respect. Dworkin was the first to draw the 
distinction between luck and responsibility and that was partly a 
response to Rawls’ supposed failure to properly accommodate in 
his theory of justice his own diagnosis that morally arbitrary 
factors, such as one’s talents, skills, sex, race, socioeconomic class 
into which she’s born and so on, should not affect people’s life 
chances. Dworkin’s theory purports to be endowment-insensitive 
and ambition-sensitive and has provided the basis on which luck
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egalitarianism has developed. Yet, as we shall see in the next 
section, luck egalitarian accounts differ fundamentally in how 
each proposes that we should make sense of the 
responsibility/luck distinction, which is in turn based on a more 
fundamental disagreement between Dworkin and advocates of 
the control-based account of luck egalitarianism. 
 
b. Luck egalitarianism and Dworkin 
As I said in the introductory section of this chapter, the 
basic idea of luck egalitarian theories is that luck is an arbitrary 
factor from a moral point of view with respect to how a person’s 
life goes and that a theory of equality properly understood should 
somehow take this into account by trying to mitigate (or erase if 
possible) the effects of luck on people’s lives on equal terms, while 
it should leave inequalities arising due to responsible choice as 
they stand. So, central to luck egalitarian theories of justice is the 
principle of responsibility, which, in its abstract form, stipulates 
that people should be responsible for whatever can be counted as 
their choice and not for factors that are attributable to luck. Much 
of the debate within the luck egalitarian camp has focused on how 
we can best make sense of the distinction between choice and 
luck, which has further implications with respect to what the best 
equalizandum is. This will be partly the focus of this section. After 
assessing the different ways that Dworkin and his fellow early luck 
egalitarians make sense of the distinction (section b1), I shall 
further argue that these differences lie in a more a fundamental 
disagreement between them that regards how each of them 
conceives of the point of equality and justice (section b2). 
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             b1. Luck, responsibility and the equalizandum 
             The Dworkinian account of luck egalitarianism 
Dworkin’s concern in the first two chapters of Sovereign 
Virtue is to examine how the abstract egalitarian principle is 
applied with respect to the distribution of resources. He contrasts 
two conceptions/interpretations of equality: equality of welfare 
and his equality of resources. Dworkin has forcefully argued 
against equality of welfare (1981a; 2000: ch. 1), claiming that if we 
try to define welfare under its specific conceptions, we realize that 
each of them turns out to be unattractive on different grounds. 
Moreover, equality of welfare is vulnerable to the expensive 
tastes and expensive disabilities objection. This vulnerability 
seems to be due to the fact that equality of welfare violates the 
principle of personal responsibility, namely that each person 
should be responsible for how her life goes which further requires 
that she is consequentially responsible for her choices.13 Why? 
Dworkin draws the distinction between the person and her 
circumstances (1981b; 2000: ch. 2). The distinction has been 
understood to draw a cut between what a person identifies with— 
that is, her preferences, tastes, ambitions, convictions, life plans 
and so on—and those circumstances that the person considers 
disadvantageous for her life and would not have chosen to be part 
of her life. As it was said above, disadvantage is identified from 
the point of view of the individual, that is, from the first point of 
view. We should note that the distinction as such points to both a 
 
 
13 In chapter 6 of Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin distinguishes between 
different kinds of personal responsibility (2011: 102-4). Consequential 
responsibility here refers to what in Justice for Hedgehogs Dworkin calls liability 
responsibility.
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comparative and a non-comparative dimension; that is, a person 
may think himself disadvantaged compared to the situation of 
others or independently of whether others are better-off than 
him. However, it is the comparative dimension that is crucial for 
the purposes of egalitarian justice, since what matters from the 
point of view of equality is comparative disadvantage not non-
comparative disadvantage. 
Given this distinction and the comparative dimension of it 
then, expensive tastes seem to be an embarrassment for equality 
of welfare. Briefly, if we were to adopt equality of welfare, we 
would have to make people bear the cost of the expensive tastes 
that some people have and with which they identify. But this 
seems to be unfair. For a person who identifies with her expensive 
taste does not consider it disadvantageous that she has this 
preference and she would not be willing to get satisfaction from 
another’s cheaper taste instead. But, if a person does not consider 
himself worse-off with his preferences ill-satisfied than he would 
be with another person’s preferences well-satisfied, then it is not 
clear why compensation is owed to him, as equality of welfare 
seems to suggest; that is, it is not clear why others should be made 
to bear the cost of him being able to satisfy his preferences, since 
he does not himself consider these welfare costs as burdensome 
when he takes suitable alternatives into account. 
Now, if equality of welfare treats some people unfairly, as 
the case of expensive tastes shows, then to undo this unfairness 
we would have to make people bear the costs of those 
preferences with which they identify, while we should 
compensate them only if they disidentify with their preferences 
and would be willing to have another’s preference instead. This is
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how equality of resources has been commonly understood.14 
According to the common interpretation of equality of 
resources then, people should be held consequentially 
responsible for what they identify with, while they should be 
compensated for their comparative disadvantage, with 
disadvantage being identified as such from the first-person 
perspective. This is one way of interpreting equality of resources. 
Yet, there is a second way we can interpret it. 
In my view, the relevant comparison (that is, whether a 
person thinks himself better off with her ill-satisfied preferences 
than he would be with another person’s well-satisfied 
preferences) that Dworkin suggests is meant to be used so as to 
see why equality of welfare is unfair. It is meant, that is, to be used 
with the aim of criticizing welfarism, not of suggesting that this is 
the right comparative measure that a theory of equality properly 
understood should appeal to. This further implies that the 
principle of responsibility should not be understood to require 
that people should be consequentially responsible for the costs of 
those choices that reflect their personality (that is, their 
ambitions, tastes etc.) and not responsible for those costs that 
 
 
14 Clayton (2000) and Williams (2002a) seem to suggest that equality of 
resources requires such kind of comparison so that compensation to be due to 
people. See also Van-Parijs who maintains that his theory of undominated 
diversity relies on and improves Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources, in 
the sense that it is more faithful to Dworkin’s main theoretical assumptions 
(1995, 2004). He thus maintains that “A’s internal endowment (a vector of 
talents) dominates B’s internal endowment if and only if every person (given 
her own conception of the good life) would prefer to have the former than the 
latter” (Van-Parijs 1995: 73). So, Van-Parijs’ theory is meant to improve 
Dworkin’s equality of resources as this has been commonly understood. 
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flow from facts or consequences that they think disadvantageous 
when compared with the circumstances of others. Let me explain 
my view. 
As we have seen above, Dworkin draws a second 
distinction between brute and option luck. “Option luck is a 
matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out— 
whether someone gains or losses through accepting an isolated 
risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined. 
Brute luck is a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense 
deliberate gambles” (Dworkin 2000: 73). The relation between the 
two distinctions is crucial with respect to his account of personal 
responsibility. As we have seen, what matters is what people 
themselves judge as having value for their lives to be good ones. 
Such judgements constitute their personhood. On the other hand, 
there are things that belong to people’s circumstances that they 
judge as disadvantageous for pursuing their conception of the 
good. In one sense, we could say that the 
personhood/circumstances cut can be better described as one 
between the person’s chosen and unchosen circumstances. 
Choice is understood in the sense of identification, that is, 
that which a person has reason to value from her own point of 
view. In this respect, we could say that people’s chosen and 
unchosen circumstances are a matter of brute luck to them.15 
So, given that our circumstances are a matter of brute luck 
to us, Dworkin suggests that identification can be a proper basis 
for distinguishing between chosen and unchosen circumstances. 
 
 
15 If I were born in the 19th century, I would probably be another person, with 
different convictions, preferences and so on. Yet, what matters to us is how we 
live in our circumstances.
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Our unchosen circumstances are those, the consequences of 
which we treat as disadvantageous in our personal lives. The 
question then is how we are going to mitigate those unwanted 
consequences of our circumstances in a fair way. To do so, 
Dworkin introduces the hypothetical insurance market for talents 
and disabilities, which converts bad brute luck into option luck. 
Bad brute luck takes the form of risk against which individuals are 
asked to insure themselves, taking into account their judgements 
about the significance in their life of resulting bad luck. So, the first 
cut between personhood and unchosen circumstances is meant 
to identify what constitutes a disadvantage for a person’s life. The 
second cut between bad brute luck and option luck is introduced 
as a first step to identify what a fair way of mitigating or 
eliminating unwanted consequences of a person’s circumstances 
is.16 I say as a first step, because it does not only matter (for 
purposes of egalitarian justice) that people are insured against 
certain risks, but that people’s insurance decisions are made 
against a background of fair equality of opportunity. This points to 
the fact that people should be fairly positioned when they make 
their insurance decisions against risk. People, under equality of 
resources, have been fairly positioned when each has a fair share 
of resources as this is specified through the auction and each had 
an equal opportunity to insure herself against what she judges to 
be disadvantageous for pursuing her life plan, as this is specified 
by the hypothetical insurance market. 
Given the two distinctions, Dworkin maintains that the 
best equalizandum is resources people have at their disposal 
(personal and impersonal) as these are measured by opportunity 
 
16 Note that both cuts are made from the first person point of view.
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costs rather than welfare. Resources have been equally 
distributed when people’s opportunity costs are equal. 
Opportunity cost is the metric of equality of resources and reflects 
the choices and the importance of choices (from the point of view 
of the individual) one makes with regard to material resources. So, 
opportunity cost reflects the idea that distribution is sensitive to 
first person judgements about an individual’s life. The 
hypothetical insurance market complements Dworkin’s 
distributive scheme by giving people equal opportunities to insure 
themselves against what they judge to be disadvantageous for 
pursuing their life plan. 
Having said that, let me return to my claim made above, 
that it is not the case that under equality of resources a person is 
owed no compensation to the extent she identifies with her 
preferences and would not be willing to have another person’s 
preferences instead, as the common interpretation suggests. 
Under equality of resources, people are owed compensation for 
what they have insured themselves against. Compensation and 
the level of compensation they receive depends on the insurance 
decisions of all people, given that all have been fairly positioned 
against facing certain risks and all had equal opportunity to insure 
themselves against these risks. To see the difference, suppose 
that all people decide to buy medical care to insure themselves 
against the possibility of facing a not so severe disability. In the 
(quite unlikely) event that all do actually suffer from this disability, 
all are entitled to medical care—since all have insured themselves 
against it—even if none can say that he is worse-off than another. 
So, according to my interpretation the comparative 
dimension regards whether a person has been disadvantaged
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compared to another with respect to his position against the 
possibility of facing bad brute luck.17 It does not further require 
that a person is disadvantaged compared to another when bad 
brute luck has actually occurred. This would be so under the 
common interpretation, but it would not be fair. This is so, for 
people would be denied to be offered medical care for which they 
have previously decided that they wanted to purchase out of their 
fair share of resources. This would fundamentally violate their 
decisions over how they want to spend their resources. Moreover, 
if we consider that the hypothetical insurance market is a process 
of distributing resources, such as medical care for curing the 
specific disability, then it seems that it would not be a good 
argument that because all people suffer from the same disability 
and none is worse-off than others, no one should receive medical 
care, as it would not be a good argument that because all people 
need the same resource to the same extent none should have it. 
As in the case of the auction, where people bid for the available 
resources, the same holds true with respect to the hypothetical 
insurance market for disabilities.18 
So, contrary to the common interpretation, according to 
my interpretation of equality of resources, it is not necessary that 
people disidentify with their preferences and would be willing to 
 
17 This is consistent with Dworkin’s commitment to an ex-ante conception of 
equality. 
18 As a matter of fact, Dworkin calls the hypothetical insurance market for 
disabilities also insurance auction (1981: 303-4). Note, also, that the auction 
and the hypothetical insurance market for disabilities run simultaneously, 
since, as we have seen, immigrants are asked whether and how much they 
would want to afford out of their initial stock of clamshells to insure themselves 
against the possibility of facing a certain disability. 
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have another person’s preference instead, so as compensation to 
be due. If compensation is due to people depending on the 
insurance decisions of all, then people can receive compensation 
for the unwanted consequences of those preferences with which 
they identify. “[T]he hypothetical insurance market supposes, not 
that people should have lived differently from the way they have, 
but that they should have had a fairer opportunity to guard 
against the risks of living as they have” (Dworkin 2002: 117). So, 
the insurance market for disabilities is meant to secure that we do 
not bear some unwanted consequences even if we do identify 
with what may be the cause of these consequences. A Formula 1 
pilot runs the risk of getting severely injured by what he values 
highly. Should we say to him that you are not entitled to 
compensation since you took the risk (fully informed) to drive at 
extremely high speed and you actually like that you do so? 
Certainly no. The right question to ask to the F1 pilot is whether 
you want to insure yourself against the possibility of getting 
severely injured as a result of your activity with which you identify. 
With respect to talents, it seems to be even more obvious 
that disidentification is not a requirement for compensation. In 
the insurance market for talents, people insure themselves not 
against lacking certain abilities (as in the case with the insurance 
market for disabilities), but against the possibility that the abilities 
they already have (as a matter of luck) will be unmarketable. This 
requires that people know what their talents and skills are and this 
is a central requirement, since people identify more with their 
talents and skills than they do with their disabilities (Dworkin 
2000: 93-4); thus, they need to know what these are so as to be 
able to form a view of the kind of life they want to live, according
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to which then they make insurance decisions with respect to 
income earned by making use of their talents. So, in the insurance 
market for talents, people are asked to buy insurance against the 
possibility their talents, with which they identify, to be of lower 
market value than the value they would prefer. It would make no 
sense, if people were asked to insure themselves against 
unmarketability of an endorsed talent, for which they would 
receive no compensation. 
That said, let me consider a possible objection to my 
interpretation of equality of resources. As I said at the beginning 
of this section, the personhood/circumstance distinction has both 
a comparative and a non-comparative dimension with respect to 
how disadvantage is identified. I also said that only the first one is 
crucial for the purposes of egalitarian justice. If that is so, then my 
interpretation would seem to suggest that people can receive 
compensation for what they think non-comparatively 
disadvantageous, so long as they buy insurance for this 
disadvantage. However, it is not true that under my 
interpretation, a person would receive compensation for 
whatever he thinks disadvantageous in his life. This is so, for, as it 
was said above, compensation as well as the level of 
compensation a person receives depends not only on his 
insurance decisions, but on everyone’s insurance decisions. So, a 
person who thinks himself non-comparatively disadvantaged for, 
say, not being able to run a sub three-minute mile,19 would not be 
offered compensation, not because everyone is similarly unable 
to do so, but because the cost of such insurance would be very 
 
 
19 This example is taken from Clayton (2000: 78). 
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high, thus unreasonable for one to buy, since no one would be 
willing to purchase such an insurance package.20 
 
20 This is consistent with Dworkin’s view. To see why, consider how equality of 
resources would treat insurance for unemployment relief and especially 
whether people who cannot find their preferred job would be compensated. 
Dworkin in his chapter on “Justice, Insurance, and Luck” of his Sovereign Virtue 
(2000: 320-350) discusses what the insurance market for unemployment 
should be like in practice. He begins by describing “a utopian story” (Dworkin 
2000: 332), where in the USA wealth and other opportunities have been 
distributed in a fair way and all have the required informational background of 
economic insecurity. People in the imagined American community are offered 
equal opportunity to buy insurance at a stipulated income against 
unemployment or being employed at a lower wage than that income. Dworkin 
assumes that “whatever distribution of wealth would result…there would be 
no ground for objecting that undeserving people, who could work but didn’t, or 
who could have trained themselves earlier or better but didn’t, were unfairly 
capitalizing on the efforts of those who did work. For whatever benefits were 
received would be the upshot of market decisions of various kinds that 
reflected the impact of everyone’s choices on everyone’s opportunities” (2000: 
332, my emphasis). So, people who can’t find their preferred job are entitled to 
compensation, even if they do not work, given that they have purchased such 
an insurance and on the condition that all had fair opportunity to buy insurance 
coverage and this is so independently of whether other people work on their 
preferred jobs or not. However, later on, when Dworkin examines the kind of 
insurance policies that would be prudent for people to choose, he points out 
that “it would not…be possible to insure against not having the job one wants: 
the premium for such insurance would presumably approach the coverage. On 
the contrary, any affordable policy would stipulate that the beneficiary attempt 
to mitigate his position by seeking employment” (2000: 335). So, although one 
could in principle insure himself against not having her preferred job, such 
insurance would probably be unaffordable. This case shares some similarity 
with the person who is non-comparatively disadvantaged for he cannot run a 
sub three-minute mile. Insurance coverage would be unavailable for it, for it 
seems that no one would be willing to buy such insurance. Moreover, notice 
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Summing up, I have argued that Dworkin has criticized 
equality of welfare on the ground that it does not sufficiently 
account for what justifies compensating expensive tastes, if a 
person thinks himself better-off with his expensive tastes less 
satisfied than he thinks himself with another person’s cheaper 
preferences well-satisfied. Taking stock of this, some have 
interpreted equality of resources to require that people should be 
compensated only if they disidentify with their preferences and 
would be willing to have another person’s preferences instead. I 
said that this is one way of interpreting equality of resources and 
this is how it has been commonly understood. I suggested, 
however, that there is an alternative interpretation of it, 
according to which people are owed compensation for what they 
have insured themselves against. Compensation and the level of 
compensation they will receive depends on the insurance 
decisions of all people, given that all have been fairly positioned 
against facing certain risks and all had equal opportunity to insure 
themselves against these risks. So, according to my interpretation, 
the comparative dimension regards whether a person has been 
disadvantaged compared to another with respect to his position 
against the possibility of facing bad brute luck, while it is not 
necessary that people disidentify with their preferences and 
would be willing to have another person’s preference instead, for 
compensation to be due. Instead, people can receive 
compensation for the unwanted consequences of those 
 
 
that, unlike the case of those who cannot find their preferred job, the person 
under this example, knows for sure that he is not able to run a sub three-minute 
mile and the same holds true of others who are similarly unable. What are the 
chances that they will afford to buy insurance coverage for this?
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preferences with which they identify depending on their and 
other people’s insurance decisions. 
The control-based account of luck egalitarianism 
Arneson and Cohen—the other two most prominent early 
luck egalitarian figures—have contested Dworkin’s anti-welfarist 
argument by pointing to the plausibility of a principle of equality 
of opportunity to welfare rather than equality of welfare.21 Given 
the two ways in which, I suggested, we can interpret equality of 
resources, it seems that Cohen and Arneson have appealed to the 
common interpretation. Based on it, they criticize equality of 
resources for inadequately accounting for what constitutes unfair 
disadvantage. Recall that the common interpretation suggests 
that people should be consequentially responsible for what they 
identify with and would not be willing to have another person’s 
preference instead. According to Cohen and Arneson, Dworkin 
fails to notice that people may not be causally responsible for 
what they identify with. If that is so, then it is not obvious why 
they should be held consequentially responsible for their 
preferences, even if they identify with them. 
So, Dworkin’s personhood/circumstances distinction is 
inadequate in providing both a proper basis for criticizing 
welfarism and consequently the right basis for a responsibility-
sensitive theory of egalitarian justice. If what matters is that 
people are not causally responsible for their choices, then, the 
right cut should be understood as distinguishing between causal 
control and luck. Briefly, their view is that people cannot be 
plausibly considered to be responsible for what they do not have 
 
21 Dworkin, though insists that, if it is put under scrutiny, equality of 
opportunity to welfare collapses into equality of welfare (2000: ch. 7). 
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control over, even if they identify with what they happen to want 
as a matter of luck. Only choices that are traceable to their 
capacity to (causally) control can be properly responsibility 
conferring. If that is so, then equality of welfare is defeated only if 
(hard) determinism is not true, not because people identify with 
their preferences. As Cohen asserts, the revised cut “subordinates 
political philosophy to metaphysical questions that may be 
impossible to answer”, since making “choice22 central to 
distributive justice lands political philosophy in the morass of the 
free will problem” (Cohen 1989: 934; cf. 2004: 22). Similarly, 
Arneson admits that his account of equality of opportunity to 
welfare “is distinct from equality of welfare only if some version 
of soft determinism or indeterminism is correct. If hard 
determinism is true, the two interpretations of equality come to 
the same” (1989: 86). So, in case determinism is not true, the right 
cut for a responsibility-sensitive theory of justice is this between 
control and luck. 
Cohen and Arneson appeal to a distinction between 
responsibility and luck from a third person point of view. This is 
so, since the right cut, according to the latter, draws on whether 
determinism is true. Unfair disadvantage then is identified by 
reference to whether a person had control over what has brought 
it about to have the specific disadvantage. Consequently, what 
matters for ascribing consequential responsibility to people for 
 
 
22 I prefer the term “control” to that of “choice”, since I think it better describes 
Cohen’s and Arneson’s position. Moreover, it would be misleading to withhold 
“choice” for Cohen’s cut. Both Dworkin and Cohen use the term choice, but 
disagree on what counts as a person’s choice (for the purposes of egalitarian 
justice). See also fn. 3 above. 
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their choices is that they exercise control over their decisions, 
preferences and so on, independently of what they themselves 
think. According to Cohen and Arneson, the choice/luck 
distinction is of fundamental importance with respect to 
attributions of consequential responsibility and a responsibility-
sensitive egalitarian theory of justice properly understood should 
depend on a proper understanding of this distinction. Given their 
view, Dworkinian resourcism provides a limited or inappropriate 
basis for identifying unfair disadvantage. 
This has consequences with respect to what the best 
equalizandum is. If what matters is that people are not held 
responsible for what they do not have causal control over, then 
opportunity for welfare, where welfare is understood in terms of 
(inoffensive) preference satisfaction, is a legitimate, if not the 
best, candidate for equalization. The fact that some people may 
be worse-off than others in terms of being less able to satisfy their 
preferences to the same extent as others can be due to factors 
that they do not control. The shift from resources to preference 
satisfaction illustrates the fact that what matters is whether 
distribution of resources is sensitive to people’s causal control 
capacity not simply to their personal value judgements. It thus 
further illustrates that we can identify disadvantage (whether or 
not it is one for which the individual is responsible) from a third 
person point of view—what matters is whether the person has 
more or less preference-satisfaction, rather than whether he 
believes that someone else’s opportunities are more valuable 
than hers. 
More specifically, early Arneson insists that although the 
case of expensive tastes is embarrassing for a theory of equality 
of welfare, still welfarism is more appropriate than resourcism in
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the form of equality of opportunity23 and as such non-vulnerable 
to the expensive tastes objection (1989). According to Arneson, 
welfare in his account should be understood in terms of 
satisfaction of people’s ideally considered self-interested 
preferences (1989: 82-3). Equality of opportunity for welfare 
“obtains among persons when all of them face equivalent decision 
trees—the expected value of each person's best (= most prudent) 
choice of options, second-best, ... nth-best is the same. The 
opportunities persons encounter are ranked by the prospects for 
welfare they afford” (Arneson 1989: 85-6). Yet, it doesn’t suffice 
that people face equivalent options; such options should 
additionally be effective. For this to be so, one of the following 
conditions should obtain: “(1) the options are equivalent and the 
persons are on a par in their ability to "negotiate" these options, 
or (2) the options are nonequivalent in such a way as to 
counterbalance exactly any inequalities in people's negotiating 
abilities, or (3) the options are equivalent and any inequalities in 
people's negotiating abilities are due to causes for which it is 
proper to hold the 
 
23 Arneson notes that although Dworkin’s criticism against equality of welfare 
is forceful, he fails to make the right contrasts. In the former’s view, there are 
four egalitarian positions, rather than two, as Dworkin wrongly implies: equality 
of resources and welfare and equality of opportunity to resources and welfare 
(1989: 88). According to this classification, Dworkin’s theory is a version of 
equality of opportunity to resources, rather than a version of equality of 
resources (Arneson 1989: 93, fn. 12, cf. also 1990; 2000). Yet, note that 
Dworkin, in making the distinction between treating people as equals and 
treating people equally (2000: 11), accommodates Arneson’s distinction 
between equality of resources and equality of opportunity to resources. It does 
not, however, accommodate the distinction between equality of welfare and 
equality of opportunity to welfare, since Dworkin thinks that, if it is put under 
scrutiny, the latter collapses into the former (2000: ch. 7).
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individuals themselves personally responsible” (Arneson 1989: 
86).24 Arneson’s concern about people’s equivalent options being 
effective is related with the problem of control mentioned above. 
He suggests that because people may “differ in their awareness of 
[their equivalent] options, their ability to choose reasonably 
among them, and the strength of character that enables a person 
to persist in carrying out a chosen option” (Arneson 1989: 86), we 
need additional conditions to equalize their initial decision-
making positions. According to Arneson, Dworkin fails to 
acknowledge that people differ in their innate capacities to make 
valuable choices for which they cannot be reasonably held 
responsible (Arneson 2002: 371). In Dworkin’s terms, these 
capacities belong to people’s circumstances, something which he 
nevertheless ignores. 
Cohen develops a hybrid view, which he calls equality of 
access to advantage (1989). According to this view, people may 
suffer both from resource and welfare deficits. Such is the case of 
Tiny Tim (Cohen 1989: 917-21). On the one hand, Tiny Tim is 
paraplegic, thus he has a resource deficiency (disability), but he 
has a very fortunate utility function; that is, he can get easily 
happy. On the other hand, he can easily move his hands, but every 
hand movement is followed by severe pain. In this respect, Tiny 
Tim has a welfare deficiency, but not a resource one. More 
generally, the distinction Cohen makes is one between difficulty 
and cost, which corresponds to resource and welfare deficiencies 
respectively (1989: 918-9). According to this distinction, in the first 
case it is very difficult for Tiny Tim to move his legs, but not costly. 
 
24 Later Arneson (1999, 2000) revised his egalitarian theory and opted for 
“responsibility-catering prioritarianism”. 
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In the second case, it is very costly for him to move his 
hands, but not difficult. Cohen asserts that egalitarians would be 
willing to compensate Tiny Tim for both kinds of deficiencies 
(1989: 921). Both resource and welfare deficits constitute a 
disadvantage for people and are compensable, in case these are 
not the result of people’s voluntary choices, where a choice is 
considered to be voluntary when the agent had (full) control. 
Cohen thinks that his stipulation of the distinction 
between control25 and luck better captures our egalitarian 
intuitions and it is more faithful to the rationale behind Dworkin’s 
initial personhood/circumstances cut (Cohen 1989: 922, 928). 
Under Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism, Tiny Tim would be 
compensated only for his resource deficit, to the extent he 
considers it as such. According to Cohen’s view, however, Tim is 
worse-off than the rest of us in terms of his ability to move and 
thus eligible for compensation, even if he identified with the fact 
that he is paraplegic. On the other hand, under equality of 
resources, Tim would not be compensated for his utility deficit,26 
for which he is nevertheless not responsible, since it is not his 
choice for his arm movements to be followed by severe pain, 
something which causes him frustration and thus affects the way 
he leads his life in a way that is unfair. Notice, however, that 
according to the common interpretation of equality of resources, 
Tiny Tim can be compensated for having more unwanted pain 
 
 
 
25 Cohen uses the notion of choice rather than control, but see fn. 3 and 23 
above. 
26 See Dworkin’s critique to Cohen’s argument about equal opportunity to 
welfare (2000: ch. 7, cf. 2004) and Cohen’s rejoinder (2004). 
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than another,27 while according to my interpretation, Tim would 
be compensated for his pain, if he would have insured himself 
against the possibility of suffering severe pain, given he had been 
fairly positioned when he made his insurance decisions. 
Cohen later revised his view on when we can appropriately 
hold people consequentially responsible for their choices. As we 
have seen, in his “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice” (1989), 
he maintains that people should be held consequentially 
responsible for their choices, if they can exercise (full) control over 
their formation, that is, if they could avoid developing those tastes 
(for example, they had full knowledge of their consequences 
before they developed them and they chose nevertheless to do 
so) or could school themselves out of them (Cohen 1989: 923, 
927). Expensive tastes that do not satisfy these conditions are, 
contrary to Dworkin’s view, compensable. Cohen later makes a 
further distinction between brute tastes, that is, tastes “that do 
not embody judgments of valuation”, “no particular approval of 
it” and “tastes that are informed by valuational judgment” (2004: 
7). Given this distinction, he maintains that it would not be fair to 
hold people consequentially responsible for their expensive 
judgmental preferences, even if the two conditions were met, 
because “to expect them to forgo or to restrict satisfaction of 
[those] preference[s] (because [they are] expensive) is, therefore, 
 
 
 
 
27 Williams, for example, suggests that under equality of resources 
people may be compensated for certain comparative welfare deficits, such as 
pain relief, but this would not be justified on account of a generalized welfare 
egalitarian principle (2002a: 383). 
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to ask them to accept an alienation from what is deep in them” 
(Cohen 2004: 7).28 
This shift in Cohen’s view seems to point to the fact that 
justice requires equality of welfare with respect to judgmental 
preferences. But why is asking people to alienate themselves from 
what is deep in them unfair? Two replies seem possible here. On 
the one hand, it is unfair, because what is deep in people is beyond 
their control. It seems that, in a sense, this claim suggests that we 
do not ultimately choose our personality. So, although people 
could have avoided developing their preferences or could school 
themselves out of them, they would nevertheless experience self-
alienation if they did so, for they would have to forgo what is 
ultimately not in their control. Thus, alienation would cause 
people an unfair welfare disadvantage. Notice that the crucial 
factor in this objection lies in the fact that people lack causal 
control over their deep preferences, not whether some people’s 
deep preferences are expensive. 
However, this version of the alienation objection rests on 
the common interpretation of equality of resources, according to 
which identification plays a crucial role in our judgements about 
consequential responsibility. Based on this, the objection implies 
that what we identify with is not ultimately within our control and 
this is all the more true about our judgemental preferences. 
However, according to my interpretation, people are owed 
compensation depending on what their insurance decisions are. 
Considerations over whether a person has formed her 
preferences freely or whether her preferences are affected by her 
 
28 See Dworkin’s reply (2004). See also Knight (2009b) for a critical 
assessment of Cohen’s revised view on responsibility.
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socialization (so long as her socialization is not characterized by 
injustices) or indeed whether determinism is true or whether she 
identifies with her preferences are not determinate factors for 
ascribing consequential responsibility.29 Instead, according to my 
interpretation, equality of resources asks us to form a view about 
what it would be reasonable to insure ourselves against, given 
that we are all equally positioned against certain risks. Thus, it is 
 
29 In defence of my view, see also Dworkin’s reply to Williams. Williams 
introduces the example of two deaf people, Dan and Ella, only the first of which 
welcomes his disability (2002b) and then goes on to maintain that under 
equality of resources only Ella would be compensated, while under equality of 
capabilities, both would be compensated for both lack a capability that others 
have, independently of the fact that Dan welcomes his deafness. To this 
Dworkin replies that “[i]t is crucial to the first conclusion not simply that Dan 
minds being deaf less than Ella does, or that he has been more successful in 
overcoming its disadvantages, or in finding consolation in opportunities open 
only to the deaf. None of that would matter, under equality of resources, in 
deciding whether he is, in principle, entitled to whatever compensation for his 
deafness might be justified by a hypothetical insurance calculation” (2002b: 
138-9, my emphasis). So, what matters is whether “he prefers being deaf and 
therefore would not submit to a costless and painless medical procedure…that 
would give him hearing. It is true that if he had that peculiar preference before 
becoming deaf, he would not buy insurance that would indemnify him if he 
became so” (Dworkin 2002: 139). So, Dan would receive no compensation and 
“[t]hat seems entirely sensible. Why should the community provide Dan with 
the funds needed for an expensive operation that would restore his hearing, 
rather than spending those funds in other useful ways, when he not only would 
not use those funds for that purpose but also would refuse the operation even 
if it were free” (Dworkin 2002: 139)? So, it seems apparent that, according to 
Dworkin, Dan would receive no compensation not because he doesn’t think 
himself worse-off than others, but because he is not willing to buy insurance 
coverage for overcoming his deafness. This is consistent with my interpretation 
rather than the common interpretation of equality of resources.
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not the case that people are owed no compensation for their 
judgmental preferences. What matters is what these preferences 
cost to others.30 
On the other hand, it could be said that asking people to 
self-alienate themselves from what is deep in them is unfair, for if 
it fundamentally matters that people live in an authentic way (to 
use a Dworkian term), then we cannot ask them to forgo aspects 
of their personhood that are constitutive of their authentic life, 
even if they identify with or are causally responsible for their 
judgmental preferences. So, if some people’s judgmental 
preferences are expensive, we still should compensate them 
because it is unfair to ask them self-alienate themselves from 
what is deep in them, just because what is deep in them happens 
to be expensive. The determinate factor in this objection lies in 
the fact that some people’s deep preferences are expensive, not 
that people lack causal control over their deep preferences. This 
fact should not ultimately figure in people’s ability to satisfy them, 
since although people may be responsible for what they want they 
are not causally responsible for the cost of their preferences and 
unless these preferences are satisfied they will become self-
alienated. 
This second reply has the following consequence for 
equality of resources. The identification vocabulary to which 
Dworkin appeals leaves room for certain welfare comparisons, 
contrary to Dworkin’s thought to the opposite. That is to say, that 
even if we were to identify comparative disadvantage in the first 
person, as Dworkin requires, we still are able to account for the 
 
30 In chapter 6, I develop a fuller view about how we should make 
sense of consequential responsibility within the Dworkinian context.
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sort of welfare deficits that are of concern to Cohen and Arneson. 
If it fundamentally matters that we all live authentic lives on equal 
terms, then a person can legitimately claim compensation for his 
welfare deficit, even if he would not want to have another 
person’s preferences instead. This is so, for even if “I can think 
myself better off with my [judgmental] preferences ill-satisfied 
than I would be with your [judgmental] preferences well-
satisfied”, I can still think myself worse off with my (judgmental) 
preferences than you are with yours (Cohen 2004: 25). And I can 
think so, because I cannot live an authentic life (constitutive of 
which are my judgmental preferences) to the same extent as you 
can, because of my ill-satisfied judgmental preferences. 31 
Notice that the second version of the alienation objection 
can also be raised against my interpretation of equality of 
resources, according to which, what matters is not whether 
people are causally responsible for or identify with them, but what 
these preferences cost to others (given that all people are fairly 
positioned with respect to distribution of resources). Apparently, 
other people’s preferences are among the factors that may make 
my preferences either expensive or cheap to satisfy. But other 
people’s preferences should not figure in my being unable to 
satisfy my judgmental preferences to an equal extent as others 
can. This would be unfair. 
To assess this version of the alienation objection, we need 
to consider two things. First, that equality of resources rests on a 
different understanding of the value of equality and justice to the 
 
31 See also Shiffrin (2004) and Bou-Habib and Olsaretti (2016) for a similar 
concern that the demand for authenticity is in tension with consequential 
responsibility in Dworkin’s theory.
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one that Cohen’s and Arneson’s view rests. This is the 
fundamental disagreement between Dworkin and the control-
based account of luck egalitarianism. And secondly, that 
Dworkin’s understanding of authenticity that depends on his 
understanding of the value of equality and justice differs from the 
one invoked by the second version of Cohen’s alienation 
objection. So, whether one opts for Cohen’s revised view and 
consequently agrees with the second version of his alienation 
objection or opts for Dworkin’s view and consequently does not 
agree with the specific objection would ultimately depend on 
which of the two views of equality, justice and authenticity one 
thinks more plausible or convincing. 
 
b2. The fundamental disagreement between Dworkin 
and the control-based account of luck egalitarianism 
So, what is the fundamental disagreement between 
Dworkin and the control-based account of luck egalitarianism? 
According to Cohen and Arneson, equality is a value 
characterizing a just state of affairs. On this view, principles of 
justice are not ones that derive from the agents’ perspective, but 
independently of them and independently of whether agents can 
have any influence on the quality of the state of affairs in question 
(Cohen 2008). If we hold that it is in itself bad or unjust that some 
are worse-off than others through no fault of their own, we do so 
independently of whether we can do anything to change this 
inequality. So, according to this view, a situation is identified as 
unfairly disadvantageous from an impersonal point of view, that 
is, compared to a state of affairs that is desirable in itself and thus 
independently of what the agents think. Individuals should act on
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principles of justice, when the circumstances are such that they 
can actually act on such principles. In the light of this, according to 
this view, justice does not fundamentally concern how we treat 
each other. This has further implications with respect to the scope 
of justice. If it is in itself bad or unjust that some are worse-off 
than others through no fault of their own, then this is so 
independently of whether we belong to the same or different 
communities either now, in the past or in the future. Moreover, 
according to such a view, if inequality is in itself bad or unjust, it 
is, independently of how it arose—namely whether it arose due 
to wrongdoing or due to factors beyond our control (such as how 
our genetic abilities and skills are distributed by nature)—and 
independently of whether it can or could be avoided or not. 
On the other hand, according to Dworkin, equality requires 
treating each other with equal concern and respect. This is the 
fundamental principle of morality and guides us with respect to 
how we should live together. As such it is a principle that applies 
to agents (individual and/or collective). The content of the 
principle of morality is to be found through personal ethics 
(Dworkin 2011: ch. 9). We respect others as equals when we treat 
them as equals to ourselves. So, it is crucial first to think what it 
means to respect one’s self and one’s life and then go on to apply 
our conclusions to how we should treat others. However, on 
Dworkin’s view, the guiding principle of morality is to be 
interpreted depending on the moral context in question. This is to 
say that what it means to treat each other as equals will depend 
on certain morally significant factors. Certain sorts of relationships 
between people give rise to certain duties. In this sense, according 
to Dworkin, political relationships give rise to stronger duties of
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justice between co-members than our shared humanity does. So, 
what we owe to others cannot be independent of the moral 
context in question. If that is so, then differences that are due to 
luck are neither bad nor unjust as such, that is, independently of 
the moral context in question. Rather, differences in luck should 
be evaluated given the context in question. So, for example, 
political relationships are morally significant for they 
fundamentally affect (through their coercive character) or are 
constitutive of how our life goes. If that is so, then the political 
community should treat all people with equal concern and respect 
by enabling each person to determine the terms of her life on 
equal terms with others. Within this context, differences due to 
luck should be so addressed so that they do not arbitrarily 
determine the life prospects of the individuals as these are judged 
from their point of view. Dworkin’s view further differs from the 
control-based account of luck egalitarianism in that the former, 
unlike the latter, restricts strongly egalitarian duties to our co-
members, while it takes judgements over how certain inequalities 
arose to be morally relevant factors in our assessments of 
injustice, namely whether they arose due to wrongdoing or 
whether they can be avoided. So, if certain inequalities arise due 
to our different innate endowments and these can be somehow 
eliminated or mitigated then we have moral reasons to do so as 
explained above, while not doing so counts as an injustice. But, 
contrary to what Cohenites and Arnesonians maintain, no such 
injustice occurs when there is nothing we can do now to undo 
such inequalities. 
Given his view of the point of equality and justice, Dworkin 
insists that living an authentic life, is not just living as one would
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wish, but in response to one’s circumstances (2011: 209), among 
which is one’s political community, the resources the latter 
commands, the cultural and technological stage of his society, the 
mix of preferences and ambitions of his co-members, as well as 
the mix of talents and abilities people within this community have, 
and so on. Given this, Dworkin insists that although those factors 
are a matter of luck to people, they are not in themselves “either 
fair or unfair to [them]; on the contrary that mix is among the facts 
that fix what it is fair or unfair for [them] to do or to have” (2000: 
298); and what is fair or unfair for people to do or to have should 
respond to the requirement that people should determine the 
conditions of their common living on equal terms. So, living 
authentically means living a life, the conditions of which one has 
determined on equal terms with others, by appropriately 
responding to her circumstances. Among those factors that 
people should collectively determine on equal terms is the 
distribution of resources. 
Equality of resources, then, is meant to illustrate what it 
would mean that people determine the conditions of their 
common living on equal terms with others with respect to 
distribution, by requiring people to form their “ambitions with a 
sense of their cost to others against some presumed initial 
equality of economic power” (Dworkin 2000: 81), not 
independently of it. So, given Dworkin’s understanding of 
authenticity, people can live authentic lives even when they 
cannot have what they would most like. Thus, a person cannot 
legitimately claim that he is entitled to compensation, because he 
cannot live as he would most wish, while others can. For he
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should form his ambitions about how to live taking into 
consideration what his fair share of resources is. 
It is apparent that Dworkin’s understanding of authenticity 
is different from the one invoked by the second version of Cohen’s 
alienation objection. The latter insists that it is unfair if some 
people are not able to live according to what they most want 
(which is what is deep in them) even if they are personally 
responsible (either in the identification- or control-based account 
of it) for them, while others can, only because what they most 
want happens to be expensive and thus they are less able to 
satisfy their judgmental preferences than others are able to satisfy 
theirs. Now, the fact that some people’s preferences are 
expensive is owed to certain factors, such as the mix of 
preferences, ambitions and so on one finds in her community, as 
well as the overall state of the world’s resources, the technological 
and cultural stage of her society and so on. But, as we have seen, 
according to Dworkin, even if such factors are a matter of luck to 
people, they are not in themselves “either fair or unfair to 
[them]”, but rather “fix what it is fair or unfair for [them] to do or 
to have”. Thus, to ask others to finance my (judgemental) 
preferences because they are expensive is to ask them to pay me 
because they do not share my preference, which had they shared 
it, would be less expensive. But, can’t others similarly complain 
that had I shared their preference, they would not have to pay me 
for my expensive preference?32 Asking people to compensate me 
 
 
 
32 In auction-like cases, the situation would be different. If all people want the 
same resource as I do, then this resource would be more expensive for me to 
buy. The fact that others want the same resource as I do is a matter of luck to 
me. But I cannot legitimately complain that it is unfair that others make my
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for my expensive preferences would violate their right to 
determine the conditions of their life on equal terms with me, for 
they would have to adapt their life plan to my life plan. But this is 
unfair. 
 
Summing up, I have argued that the fundamental 
disagreement between Dworkin and advocates of the control-
based account of luck egalitarianism lies in how each understands 
the point of equality and justice. This fundamental disagreement 
explains their differences in how we should make sense of 
responsibility and luck. Whether one should opt for Dworkin’s or 
Cohen’s and Arneson’ conception of equality and justice is a 
different issue, which I shall not address in this dissertation. 
Although, I advocate most aspects of Dworkin’s view, my primary 
aim in this dissertation is not to defend it against the control-
based account of luck egalitarianism and its view on the point of 
equality and justice,33 but rather to argue that his account 
properly understood shares the social egalitarian commitments 
and further that it provides a better understanding of what it 
means to relate to each other as equals, because it (among other 
reasons) is responsibility-sensitive. Before that, however, it is 
crucial to understand what is at stake between Dworkin and social 
egalitarians in the light of my discussion above. This is the task of 
the next section. 
 
 
 
favourite resource more expensive than it would be, had they not shared my 
preference for it. 
33 The argument I advance in chapter 7, however, can be understood to suggest 
a way of integrating the two views that makes each more plausible. 
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c. Dworkin and social egalitarianism: what is at stake? 
Social egalitarians have raised a number of objections 
against the luck egalitarian paradigm. Such objections were most 
systematically presented in Anderson’s “What Is the Point of 
Equality?” (1999). The social egalitarian project has been twofold 
and has a negative and positive aspect. The negative one is to 
reject luck egalitarianism as the proper or best interpretation of 
equality. The positive one is to provide us with what social 
egalitarians take to be the proper interpretation of the value of 
equality. 
Briefly, social egalitarians begin from the assumption that 
equality is primarily a social and political ideal, which certainly has 
distributive implications, but it is not a distributive ideal in the first 
place, as luck egalitarians seem to assume. According to this view, 
if we are to respect people’s equal moral standing, then we should 
respect them as social and political equals. Equality is primarily a 
social and political ideal and its concern is to identify the proper 
relations between social and political equals. In this sense, the 
fundamental egalitarian aim is to eliminate inequalities in social 
and political status and establish equal social and political 
relationships. So, according to social egalitarians, equality of 
status is the fundamental value, and treating people with equal 
respect is a requirement of according them equal status. This 
further implies that a society committed to this value is one where 
there are no relations of oppression and domination, since such 
relations undermine equality of status. Principles of distributive 
justice should be seen as either flowing from what it means to 
relate to each other as social and political equals (Anderson 1999) 
or distributive justice is a distinct value to social equality and
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where the two conflict it is the latter that should take priority 
(Wolff 1998). 
Having said that, social egalitarians diagnose two 
fundamental disagreements between luck egalitarianism and 
their favoured conception of equality. First, according to social 
egalitarians, equality is a relational value. It regards how people 
should relate to each other as social and political equals. This 
requires that we respect people’s equal social and political status 
and in order for this to be so, people should be free from arbitrary 
interference, that is, from domination. If this is so, then principles 
of justice should be justified in virtue of the requirement of non-
domination. As such, this conception of equality contrasts the luck 
egalitarian interpretation, according to which equality is a quality 
characterising a just state of affairs (Anderson 2010). Thus, 
secondly, since equality regards the proper relationships between 
people, principles of justice are ones that apply to individuals and 
institutions governing their common life. On this view, we have 
strong egalitarian duties to each other in virtue of our 
relationships or interaction with others, not independently of 
them, as luck egalitarianism maintains.34 
Given the first point, social egalitarians accuse luck 
egalitarianism of failing to satisfy what I shall call the justificatory 
 
 
34 See, for example, Scheffler who maintains that questions about the allocation 
of goods “concern the terms on which we want to live with one another” 
(Scheffler 2005: 22). And “[t]o answer such questions, we must determine the 
kinds of relations in which we want to stand to our fellow citizens…If there are 
distinctively egalitarian answers to these questions, they…must rest…on some 
conception of the importance of living together as equals” (Scheffler 2005: 22). 
This is a strong claim that states that there are no reasons to favour equality in 
the absence of the ideal of living together as equals. 
72 
 
test. Scheffler has systematically elaborated the argument that 
luck egalitarian theories of justice lack the necessary justificatory 
basis that a theory of distributive justice should have in a society 
of social and political equals (2003, 2005).35 His argument for this 
is twofold. On the one hand, if we try to give a substantive 
interpretation of the principle of responsibility by trying to identify 
the line between chosen and unchosen factors, we see that any 
such version of the substantive form is bound to be controversial 
(Scheffler 2005: 9). For the generalized form of the substantive 
principle of responsibility—namely that all inequalities resulting 
from people’s voluntary choices are always acceptable, while 
those resulting from people’s unwanted circumstances are always 
unacceptable—does not “enjoy widespread intuitive support” 
(Scheffler 2003: 32). According to Scheffler, “[t]he more common 
or intuitive view…is that the fairness or unfairness of differences 
in advantage resulting from, on the one hand, factors beyond 
people's control and, on the other hand, people's voluntary 
choices, is highly dependent on the prevailing social context and 
institutional setting” (2003: 32-3). 
For luck egalitarianism to be plausible, Scheffler maintains, 
it “must be anchored in some more general conception of equality 
as a moral value or normative ideal” (2003: 31), and although luck 
 
35 Anderson also holds a similar view (1999: 295). However, she makes a 
stronger claim than Scheffler by maintaining that luck egalitarianism fails to 
show equal respect to people (1999: 295), while Scheffler maintains that it is 
up to luck egalitarians to justify their position by showing that luck 
egalitarianism is anchored in a conception of equality as a social and political 
ideal (2003: 31), thus he leaves the possibility open for luck egalitarians to argue 
that distributive egalitarianism can be so anchored. However, see Scheffler 
(2015: 43). 
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egalitarians actually argue that the principle of responsibility is 
based on the equal moral worth of people and thus is anchored in 
a broader moral value, this view cannot be simply taken for 
granted, since “it is by no means clear that most people actually 
have the intuitions to which luck egalitarians appeal” (2003: 32). 
So, luck egalitarians need to justify their view that the principle of 
responsibility is the best interpretation of the ideal of treating 
each other as having equal moral worth (Scheffler 2003: 32). 
Moreover, they need to show how it can be compatible with a 
society of social and political equals (Scheffler 2003: 34). 
On the other hand, Scheffler argues that although luck 
egalitarianism needs to justify its position, it nevertheless cannot 
justify it, that is, it cannot pass the justification test.36 This is the 
most fundamental objection raised against luck egalitarianism by 
social egalitarians. The reason why luck egalitarianism cannot pass 
 
 
36 Anderson has more recently raised a similar objection (2010). She maintains 
that luck egalitarian theories are justified from a third-person point of view, 
while relational egalitarians adopt a second-person or interpersonal conception 
of justification. This is, she claims, the fundamental disagreement between luck 
and relational egalitarians (Anderson 2010: 3). According to Anderson, people 
in a society of social and political equals make claims of justice in the second-
person (2010: 3). More importantly, the second-person or interpersonal 
conception of justification is constitutive of a society of democratic equals 
(Anderson 2010: 3). If this is so, then luck egalitarian principles fail to be 
compatible with a society of equals, since they are based upon third-person 
justification (Anderson maintains that Dworkin “occupies an ambiguous 
position between these camps” (2010: 1, fn. 2)). Though Scheffler’s and 
Anderson’s formulations of the objection are not identical, they share a 
fundamental assumption: luck egalitarian principles of justice are not 
compatible (Anderson 1999, 2008, 2010; Scheffler 2015) or have not been 
shown to be compatible with a society of democratic equals (Scheffler 2003).
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the justification test on this view is that it is based on a 
philosophically dubious37 and morally implausible account of 
choice (Scheffler 2003: 17-19). Let me note that there is a weaker 
and a stronger sense in which we can understand the specific 
objection. 
In a weak sense, the objection seems to state that because 
luck egalitarianism is based on a philosophically dubious and 
morally implausible account of choice, it does not justify placing 
on it that great a political and economic significance as luck 
egalitarians do (Scheffler 2005: 17). That is, even if it were the case 
that choice should be of political and moral significance, it is not 
obvious that it should be of unique political significance. There 
may be other more important values in a society where people 
relate to each other as social and political equals. In such a society 
people deliberate on what the fair terms of living together as free 
and equal citizens are. In this respect, there are other values as 
well that people take into consideration in deliberating about the 
fair terms of living together and the choice/circumstance 
distinction may be one of them but not the most significant one 
(cf. also Scheffler 2015: 41-3). Respect and reciprocity are 
important values that also figure in the complex ideal of equality 
and in principles of distributive justice (Scheffler 2015: 41).38 
However, in a stronger sense, the fact that luck egalitarian 
 
 
37 For a similar criticism see also Fleurbaey (1995: 38-41) and Smilansky (1997). 
38 See also Wolff who maintains that the principle of responsibility is one aspect 
of what it means to treat each other as equals, is one value among others, but  
not the most important one, as luck egalitarians seem to assume, and it should 
not take priority when it conflicts with the value of respect for all as social and 
political equals (1998). 
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principles of justice rest on controversial metaphysical 
assumptions and are morally implausible makes them 
inappropriate candidates for principles of justice within a society 
of equals, even with the limited role the weaker view permits.39 
Now, as I said in the introduction of this chapter, Dworkin 
shares more common ground with social egalitarians than he 
shares with Cohen and Arneson. Given the differences between 
Dworkin’s conception of equality and that of Arneson and Cohen 
discussed in section (b) above, it is apparent that Dworkin’s view 
on what the point of equality and justice is shares—rather than 
contrasts with—the two basic social egalitarian commitments, 
namely that equality is a relational value that requires that we 
relate to each other in a non-dominating way, and that principles 
of justice are ones that apply to individuals and institutions 
governing their common life and so strong egalitarian duties are 
generated in virtue of our relationships or interaction with others, 
not independently of them. As we have seen above, according to 
Dworkin, equality requires treating each other with equal concern 
and respect, and so principles of justice apply to (individual and/or 
collective) agents; while, the demands of equality depend on the 
 
 
39 Such seems to be Anderson’s view (1999). Later Scheffler also holds the 
stronger view that luck egalitarian principles of justice fail to satisfy the 
egalitarian deliberative constraint in decision-making processes that is 
constitutive of a society of equals (2015: 40-3). According to the latter “[i]n a 
relationship that is conducted on a footing of equality, each person accepts that 
the other person’s equally important interests—understood broadly to include 
the person’s needs, values, and preferences—should play an equally significant 
role in influencing decisions made within the context of the relationship. 
Moreover, each person has a normally effective disposition to treat the other’s 
interests accordingly” (Scheffler 2015: 25). 
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moral context in question, which implies that certain sorts of 
relationships between people give rise to certain duties. As such, 
political relationships give rise to stronger duties of justice 
between co-members than our shared humanity does. 
That said, in order the social egalitarian criticism to be 
plausible against Dworkin, social egalitarians should first 
recognize how Dworkin’s view differs fundamentally from that of 
his fellow early luck egalitarians and that the former is committed 
to a view of equality similar to the social egalitarian one. In the 
light of this, social egalitarians can then object to Dworkin’s theory 
on the ground that although it aims to interpret what it means to 
relate to each other as equals, his overall theory and his equality 
of resources specifically violates, rather than gives substance to, 
the social egalitarian demand of non-domination and this failure 
is mainly due to it being responsibility tracking. 
More specifically, equality of resources is a morally 
implausible doctrine of distributive justice, for it fails to treat 
people as social and political equals. There are mainly two reasons 
why this is so. First, by basing people’s shares on their personal 
preferences and by ascribing consequential responsibility for such 
preferences, it fails to recognise that the former are in an 
important respect the outcome of certain cultural, social, 
economic and political structures that are themselves 
characterised by power inequalities for which people cannot be 
reasonably held responsible. This may result in people from 
oppressed groups being made to bear the disadvantageous 
consequences of their position on the assumption that it is their 
choice. Take, for example, women’s “preference” for taking care 
of dependents, which has been shaped by certain social norms 
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and processes that places women in a disadvantageous and 
dominated position. So, although equality of resources is 
supposed to be an egalitarian doctrine, it is not, for it doesn’t seek 
to erase structural inequalities that are pervasive in human 
relations; on the contrary, it reproduces them by holding people 
responsible for their preferences. On the other hand, it creates 
various political and social inequalities even if we assumed that 
there were no background structural inequalities and even if it 
were the case that circumstantial luck has been mitigated or 
erased. This is so, since equality of resources permits victims of 
bad option and brute luck to become vulnerable to the arbitrary 
wills of others (Anderson 1999). However, people as free and 
equal would not choose principles that would result in some being 
left destitute, even if their situation were traced to their 
“negligence, foolishness or high-risk behavior” (Scheffler 2003: 
19). This is unacceptable from the point of view of social 
egalitarianism, the primary concern of which is that people are 
free from domination. I shall call this the objection from the point 
of view of power equality. 
The second reason why equality of resources is morally 
unacceptable is that it justifies its principle of distribution on the 
feelings or emotions of envy and pity felt by those it categorises 
as unlucky and lucky respectively (Anderson 1999: 289). This is 
disrespectful to the envied (Anderson 1999: 307) and treats as 
inferiors the pitied, who are stigmatised by the state (Anderson 
1999: 289). Moreover, it would not suffice for the latter to admit 
their inferiority, but they would also have to prove that they are 
actually inferior in their personal qualities so as to qualify for 
compensation by making “shameful revelations” about
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themselves, that may even be humiliating and which may cause a 
harm to their “respect standing” (Wolff 1998: 109, 113-5; 
Anderson 1999: 305-6; Hinton 2001, McTernan 2013: 103). This, 
on the other hand, has as a consequence that for the state to 
inquire whether people are actually responsible for their plight to 
qualify for compensation, it “makes demeaning and intrusive 
judgments of people's capacities to exercise responsibility and 
effectively dictates to them the appropriate uses of their 
freedom” (Anderson 1999: 289). I shall call this the objection from 
the point of view of egalitarian motives/incentives/attitudes. 
However, there is a third objection that—although it can 
be raised from the point of view of the egalitarian ideal that we 
should relate to each other as social and political equals—is 
addressed to both social egalitarians and Dworkin. Let me explain. 
As we have seen, social egalitarians accuse luck egalitarianism of 
failing to properly account for what generates justice-based 
duties. If equality is a relational value, then strong egalitarian 
duties are generated in virtue of our relationships and 
interactions. The appropriate focus of justice-concern, according 
to social egalitarians, is not some kind of state of affairs, as luck 
egalitarians assume, but how either individual or collective agents 
act (Anderson 2010: 2, 16-9). Dworkin holds a similar view. The 
control-based account of luck egalitarianism, on the other hand, 
holds that justice is a property characterizing states of affairs, 
independently of whether individuals can have any influence on 
its quality (Cohen 2008). Social egalitarians and Dworkin deny this 
and instead maintain that the existence of certain relationships 
between people matters in a morally important way for people’s 
duties to one another, and so strong egalitarian duties are 
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justified on the basis of some form of interaction or relationship 
between people. Consequently, social egalitarians insist that it is 
not plausible to think that equality requires the mitigation of the 
consequences of luck in people’s lives as luck egalitarians assume 
(Anderson 1999, 2010; Scheffler 2003, 2005; Schemmel 2010), so 
that duties of justice are not triggered in virtue of natural 
inequalities (Anderson 2010). As I argued in section (b2) above, 
Dworkin does not advocate this, as some social egalitarians have 
assumed. Instead, he regards that certain natural inequalities 
should be addressed in virtue of morally significant forms of 
relationships and more specifically political relationships. 
The social egalitarian and Dworkinian view has 
considerable implications with respect to cosmopolitan justice 
considerations. If, as advocates of the control-based account of 
luck egalitarianism insist, it is bad or unjust that some are worse-
off than others through no fault of their own, then it cannot 
plausibly matter whether there are any existing social and political 
relationships for justice-based duties to be triggered, but instead 
we have strong egalitarian duties also to those people with whom 
we do not share political membership. In contrast, if, as social 
egalitarians and Dworkin insist, injustice is socially created, then it 
does matter whether we share political membership or whether 
we are related or interact in some morally important form, since 
it is within such relationships or interactions that social injustices 
arise. Absent these no injustice can exist and in this sense we do 
not owe strong egalitarians duties to non-members, with whom 
we have no interaction. 
As I shall ague in chapter 7, properly understood the ideal 
of social and political equality does not restrict strong egalitarian 
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duties to those with whom we interact or relate in morally 
significant ways. Instead, it requires that, where such morally 
significant forms of relationship do not exist, they should be 
established. This is so, for if the value of equality, properly 
understood, regards how we should relate to each other as moral, 
social and political equals, then it should be understood as 
defining properly structured relationships, not as presupposing 
certain relationships. I shall call this the objection from the point 
of view of the scope of equality. The argument advanced in this 
chapter can be understood to suggest a way of integrating the two 
views— the relational view of social egalitarians and Dworkin, on 
the one hand, and the asocial view of those advocating the 
control-based account of luck egalitarianism—that makes each 
more plausible. 
 
Summing up, I have argued that Dworkin’s theory of 
equality shares the two fundamental social egalitarian 
commitments that equality is a relational value and that strong 
egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of morally significant 
forms of relationships and interactions. Given this, I argued that 
social egalitarians can object to Dworkin’s theory on the ground 
that although it aims to interpret what it means to relate to each 
other as equals, his overall theory and his equality of resources 
specifically violates, rather than gives substance to, the social 
egalitarian demand of non-domination and this failure is mainly 
due to it being responsibility tracking. I maintained that there are 
specifically two kinds of objections that they can raise against 
equality of resources: the objection from the point of view of 
power equality and the objection from the point of view of 
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egalitarian motives/incentives/attitudes. However, I also claimed 
that there is a third objection—the objection from the point of 
view of the scope of equality—that can be raised from the point 
of view of the ideal of social and political equality properly 
understood against both Dworkin and social egalitarians. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
The Objection from the Point of View of Power Equality 
 
 
According to social egalitarians the aim of equality properly 
understood is to end oppression and domination (Anderson 1999: 
288) and to establish relationships of equality (Anderson 1999: 289). 
Understood in this way, one of the primary concerns of social equality 
is power inequalities. Social egalitarians theorise power inequalities in 
terms of domination, which is usually interpreted as having the 
capacity to arbitrarily interfere in other people’s actions. The notion 
of domination as arbitrary interference has been more systematically 
elaborated by the republican tradition that has advanced the ideal of 
freedom as non-domination.1 The social egalitarian claim can thus be 
understood to maintain that what matters from the point of view of 
equality is absence of arbitrary power. 
In the light of the social egalitarian demand that people should 
be free from domination, we can evaluate the objection from the 
point of view of power equality, which has been primarily advanced 
by Anderson (1999). One of her aims is to reject the luck egalitarian 
doctrine as insufficient for upholding a society of social and political 
equals that is the proper point of the value of equality.2 The problem 
 
 
1 See, for example, Pettit (1996, 1997, 1999, 2012), Skinner (2008), Lovett (2001, 
2009, 2010, 2012), Maynor (2003), Costa (2009), Laborde (2008, 2010), Richardson, 
(2002), Bohman (2008). 
2 However, earlier Scheffler leaves the possibility open for luck egalitarians to show 
how distributive egalitarianism can be anchored in a conception of equality as a  
social and political ideal (2003: 31, but see Scheffler 2015: 43). See also Wolff who 
argues that fairness is one value within the egalitarian ethos that may conflict with 
the value of respect for all (1998: 97), thus he does not reject luck egalitarianism but 
thinks that in some cases where the two values conflict respect should take priority;
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with the former, according to Anderson and other social egalitarians,3 
is that it cannot be reconciled with a society of equals (cf. also 
Anderson 2010), because it (re)produces objectionable social and 
political hierarchies. I call this the objection from the point of view of 
power equality. Although the specific objection has been advanced 
generally against all luck egalitarian theories, I shall discuss it only with 
respect to equality of resources, which is my focus in this thesis. 
In what follows then, I shall, in section (a), examine in more 
detail the objection under consideration here and argue that, in— 
what I think is—its best form or most plausible interpretation, it can 
be understood to point to mainly two reasons why equality of 
resources is vulnerable to it. First, in non-ideal circumstances, norms 
and processes that affect people’s preferences are sometimes the 
outcome of domination and oppression, so that holding people fully 
responsible for the consequences of their choices that are the 
outcome of such preferences is itself unjust. For example, dependent 
caretakers traditionally are women, but their “preference” of taking 
care of dependents has been shaped by certain social norms and 
processes that place women in a disadvantageous and dominated 
position. But the example of dependent caretakers also points to a 
second problem, namely that equality of resources improperly assigns 
the status of preference to certain duties, such as the duty of care we 
have to dependent people, especially children, the elderly, the 
disabled and the infirm, and thus places the burdens of caretaking on 
 
 
and Baker who argues that distributive equality is not less important than social 
equality and that the former does not derive its value by the latter (2015: 65). 
3 Young, for example, although she is not denying the importance of distribution 
within a society of equals, rejects the distributive paradigm as inappropriate for such 
a society (1990: 14-38, 66-81). See also Seligman (2007), who advances a 
“bargaining problem for luck egalitarians”, where fairness in distribution, as 
specified by luck egalitarian principles, can be compatible with political power 
inequality. 
84 
 
those who take up the relevant duties. This results in those people 
becoming dependent on wage earners or low state-subsidies, who are 
thus become vulnerable to the latter’s arbitrary will. Secondly, even if 
it were the case that circumstantial luck has been mitigated or erased 
and that objectionable background structural inequalities have been 
eliminated, equality of resources permits victims of bad option luck to 
become vulnerable to the arbitrary will of others. This is unacceptable 
from the point of view of social egalitarianism, the primary concern of 
which is that people are free from domination. Moreover, equality of 
resources can prevent such morally objectionable outcomes only by 
adopting paternalistic policies. Yet, paternalism is disrespectful. 
In section (b), I defend the view that the first part of the 
objection is inattentive to the fact that Dworkin actually acknowledges 
that some people’s preferences are partly shaped by unjust social 
norms and thus equality of resources would call for the appropriate 
remedies. Moreover, equality of resources has good reason to call for 
policies that aim at changing such norms, since the latter violate the 
two principles of dignity. Finally, I argue that equality of resources 
would require us to provide the necessary social benefits both to 
those who are dependents on account of our duty to treat them as 
equals and to dependent caretakers on account of the fact that 
dependent caretaking is a duty we all have and we cannot plausibly 
assume that we are absolved of it whenever there is someone willing 
to undertake it, even if it is her truly authentic choice to do so. 
In section (c), I intend to argue that equality of resources is not 
vulnerable to the second part of the objection, by showing that 
retaining access to insurance coverage is in fact constitutive of 
equality of resources. In doing so, I propose that the principle of 
authenticity can be consistently modified to account for compulsory 
insurance in a way that is faithful to Dworkin’s concern about
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ambition-sensitivity and that this is justified not on paternalistic but 
on egalitarian grounds. 
 
 
a. The problem of objectionable background power 
inequalities 
One reason why equality of resources is vulnerable to the 
objection from the point of view of power equality, according to social 
egalitarians, is that it fails to give proper consideration to the fact that 
norms and processes that affect people’s preferences, on which it 
heavily relies, may be the outcome of domination and oppression. But 
if this is the case, then it would be unfair to hold people fully 
responsible for those preferences, as equality of resources holds. 
Moreover, it fails to recognise the fact that some of what it considers 
to be individual preferences are duties we all have and it improperly 
holds those who undertake those duties fully responsible for the 
burdens such duties confer by assuming that it is their preference to 
do so. This is even more objectionable if those people, who undertake 
those duties, do so as a matter of their socialisation that has partly 
shaped their preferences. 
Dependent caretaking is one of the most prominent examples 
social egalitarians use to make their case. On the one hand, equality 
of resources regards taking care of dependent people not as an 
obligation owed to them but as a personal choice—as a lifestyle—for 
which one is not owed compensation to the extent she identifies with 
it.4 Since dependent caretaking is not marketable, dependant 
 
4 Similar to this is the problem of occupational discrimination Anderson raises 
against luck egalitarianism (1999: 298-9). She claims that luck egalitarians believe 
that people that have chosen to work in highly risky jobs are owed no public 
subsidies in case the risk turns out badly. Yet, this is objectionable to the extent such 
occupations are not only dangerous but socially valuable, such as policemen, 
soldiers, firefighters, farmers, fishers and miners. Although Anderson does not 
frame the problem is such terms, we can say that we all have a duty to serve in such
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caretakers become themselves dependent on wage earners or on 
usually low state subsidies and are thus vulnerable to oppression and 
domination (Anderson 1999: 297-8).5,6 Secondly, equality of 
 
 
socially valuable occupations. In this sense, people working in such jobs are 
commissioned by all citizens to perform what their duty requires. If that is so, then 
it cannot be plausible to maintain that bad luck resulting from performing one’s duty 
should fall entirely on the person who performs that duty. Yet, the point here is that 
such jobs are socially valuable, not that the state would discriminate against high 
risk occupations. If someone took up a risky but socially non-valuable activity, 
Anderson would not regard this as objectionable occupational discrimination. See 
also Lippert-Rasmussen’s discussion of the problem of occupational discrimination 
(2012: 130). Moreover, this specific objection disregards the fact that equality of 
resources concerns itself with the distribution of privately owned resources and the 
correction of market allocations. Some of the occupations Anderson discusses relate 
to the provision of public goods, such as national security. As such they are goods, 
the provision of which requires collective contribution. People working in such jobs 
would be provided with all the necessary public subsidies. 
5 On this see also Okin (1989: 134-69). 
6 Based on this, some social egalitarians raise the objection against liberal theories 
more generally that the latter fail in this way to appreciate that dependence is “a 
basic human condition” (Young 1990: 55), by basing principles of justice on a 
conception of human beings as rational, autonomous and independent choosers. 
This, in effect, has the consequence that, on the one hand, those who are dependent 
on others (children, ill, disabled and infirm people) do not fully enjoy the status of 
an equal within society, while, on the other hand, those who take up the task of 
caretaking are either considered to have made a fully rational and autonomous 
choice, the full burdens of which they should bear themselves, or they are 
considered to have made a less autonomous choice by being the “victims” of  
socialization, and thus see themselves as passive subjects defined by something 
alien to themselves and may experience loss of respect and self-respect. On the view 
that principles of equality of opportunity (as these are elaborated by luck 
egalitarians) may undermine autonomous agency see Phillips (2006). See, also, 
Gilligan who notes (in maintaining a paradigm shift in how we understand the 
human condition) that empathy and caring were considered to be feminine 
characteristics, while “the separation of the self from relationships and the splitting 
of thought from emotion” were considered to be healthy forms of development 
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resources disregards the fact that dependent caretakers have 
traditionally been women, whose preference for caretaking has been 
partly shaped by their socialisation. 
In the light of this, we can consider Mason’s criticism against 
Dworkinian equality of resources. His main concern is that Dworkin’s 
criteria of authentic choice are insufficient for justifying outcome 
inequalities (Mason 2000: 242). Dworkin maintains that for people’s 
choices to be authentic, people should have ample opportunity to 
form and critically reflect on their preferences, convictions, life 
projects and so on, and to influence the corresponding opinions of 
others (2000: 160). Moreover, people’s preferences, convictions etc. 
should not be the upshot of manipulation or brainwashing (Dworkin 
2000: 483, fn. 26). Given Dworkin’s criteria of authenticity, Mason asks 
us to consider the case of the kind of “career-sacrificing mother”, who, 
although she fully recognises that her needs and desires are shaped 
by her gender socialisation, which is based on the norm that women 
are primarily responsible for child rearing, and although she rejects 
that norm, nevertheless “reflectively endorses those needs and 
desires as her own” (2000: 242); thus, on Dworkin’s account, her 
choice is authentic. Yet, Mason maintains that even if it is the case that 
a woman meets the Dworkinian conditions of authentic choice, this 
doesn’t suffice to show that she is also fully responsible for the bad 
consequences of her choice, when this choice accords with a social 
norm that is itself unjust. As he says, “it is partly the injustice of 
 
 
(2014: 89). This had the effect that “emotions and relationships were associated 
with women and seen as limiting their capacity for rationality and autonomy” 
(Gilligan 2014: 89). It is interesting, however, to note how Rawls, being a liberal and 
a target of the above criticism, envisions a social community as one where people 
depend on one another for the fulfilment of their capacities and powers (1971: 522-
3). This points to the fact that dependence is a basic human condition not only when 
we regard cases of people that we normally think are in need of help, but it is an 
essential feature of the human nature more generally. 
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this norm (not merely the process of gender socialisation that is 
shaped by it and fosters behaviour that is in accordance with it) which 
explains why it would be unjust to require the career-sacrificing 
mother to bear the costs of her decision to act in a way that is 
consistent with the norm, even when she rejects it” (Mason 2000: 243-
4).7 
So, what primarily concerns social egalitarians is whether 
certain social norms produce (or are produced by) inequality of 
power. If people’s preferences are shaped to a considerable extent by 
their socialization, where this involves belonging to certain groups 
that form people’s identity, then we need to consider how 
socialization constrains people’s opportunities and whether such 
constraints are arbitrary and unjust or unfair.8 In the light of this, the 
 
 
7 For a similar line of thought see Brown (2005: 322-3). Williams’ case of the twin 
siblings, Bob and Ann (2002b), can also be seen to raise a similar point to the one 
examined here, namely that Dworkinian equality of resources cannot accommodate 
claims of justice on behalf of the career-sacrificing mother. Williams presents his 
case in reply to Dworkin’s objection to Sen’s capability approach that it is either 
identical to equality of resources or collapses into equality of welfare depending on 
how capabilities are specified (Dworkin 2000: 286). See Dworkin’s reply to Williams 
in his “Sovereign Virtue Revisited” (2002: 136-140). See also Browne and Stears 
(2005) for a criticism of Williams’ conclusion that resource egalitarianism is not 
equipped to account for such gender injustices vis-à-vis its capability egalitarianism 
rival. See also Sen’s reply to Dworkin (2009: 299-303) and Dworkin’s rejoinder (2011: 
476, fn. 6, 480, fn. 13). On the discussion over capabilities and Dworkinian 
resourcism see also Kaufman (2006: 125-8) and Pierik and Robeyns (2007). The 
notion of capabilities, albeit basic capabilities, is as well adopted by Anderson (1999: 
316 and on). 
8 Ann Phillips suggests that there are cases where “equality of 
outcome…has to be taken as a key measure of equality of opportunity” (2004: 6). 
When we observe that there are persistent outcome inequalities that are based on 
otherwise arbitrary factors, such as sex, skin colour, ethnicity and so on, then we 
have good reason to think that no true equality of opportunity has been achieved 
and we should strive for equality of outcome. 
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Dworkinian criteria of authentic choice are insufficient for justifying 
outcome inequalities, when such outcomes are partly explained by 
existing unjust social norms. Equality of resources thus neglects 
background hierarchical power structures and holds people 
responsible for their preferences even when such preferences are 
partly formed by objectionable norms. In this way, it reproduces and 
improperly justifies existing objectionable hierarchical power 
structures. Moreover, it fails to acknowledge the distinctive moral 
status of duties by inappropriately assigning them the status of 
preference. 
 
b. The abandonment of the bad-option-luck-victim objection 
One of the most well-known objections raised by Anderson is 
the abandonment of the negligent victim objection (1999: 295-6).9 
According to equality of resources, if a person had equal opportunities 
to insure himself against a risk (knowing what the probabilities are for 
that risk to turn out badly) and chooses not to insure himself, then no 
help or compensation is owed to him in case he suffers from bad 
option luck.10 Anderson maintains that in the case of an uninsured car 
 
 
9 Anderson discusses the specific objection against Rakowski’s version of luck 
egalitarianism (1991), which, as she acknowledges, is hard-line (1999: 298). 
However, she maintains that “other luck egalitarians do [not do] a better job than 
Rakowski in shielding the victims of bad option luck from the worst fates[.] 
Dworkin's theory offers no better protection than Rakowski's against predatory 
practices in the free market, once people have lost their fair share of resources 
through bad option luck. Nor would it help dependent caretakers, or people who 
are disabled as a result of choices they made” (Anderson 1999: 298). 
10 Related to the objection of the abandonment of bad option luck victims is the 
objection that equality of resources discriminates between those disabled people 
that have purchased insurance and those that have not (Anderson 1999: 296). As 
Anderson says “Dworkin's proposal would treat two people with the same disability 
differently, depending on their tastes. A risk-averse blind person could be entitled 
to aid denied to a risk-loving blind person, on the grounds that the latter probably 
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driver who is involved in a car accident, no obligation of assistance is 
raised by considerations of justice, according to equality of resources, 
and he may be left to die (Anderson 1999: 295-6).11 
Kristin Voigt has called this the harshness objection (2007). She 
offers a number of considerations that may prompt us to think such 
harshness as objectionable (Voigt 2007: 392-4).12 First, there are 
 
would not have insured against being blind, given the probabilities. [This is a case] 
of discrimination among the disabled” (1999: 303). Yet, the discrimination objection 
is misplaced with respect to Dworkin’s theory of equality. For the objection to be 
successful, it would have to be shown that some people under equality of resources 
are not given equal opportunities to insure themselves against bad brute luck. 
Differential treatment under equality of resources does not result from some people 
being deprived of their equal opportunity to buy insurance coverage, but by the fact 
that people themselves have chosen to have differential treatment through their 
insurance choices. It is unclear why, on Anderson’s view, this counts as 
discrimination in the first place and moreover as objectionable discrimination. There 
have been many suggestions with respect to the badness or wrongness of 
discrimination, but it is difficult to find any of these fitting what Anderson here 
describes as discrimination. For some influential accounts of wrongful discrimination 
or of the badness of discrimination, see, for example, Arneson (2006), Alexander 
(1992), Lippert-Rasmussen (2006), Hellman (2008), Scanlon (2008), Moreau (2010), 
Segall (2012). Finally, for a recent critical overview of accounts of discrimination and 
fruitful suggestions, see Lippert-Rasmussen (2013). 
11 See also Fleurbaey (1995: 40-1) for a similar criticism. 
12 There is now a considerable number of defences against the harshness objection 
offered on the part of luck egalitarianism. Some of the theorists that have provided 
arguments that qualify what can be called the crude version of luck egalitarianism 
are Stemplowska (2009, 2011, 2013), Knight (2005, 2015), Brown (2005), Kaufman 
(2004), Eyal (2006, 2007), Tan (2008, 2012), Segall (2007, 2010), Voigt (2007), Barry 
N. (2006), Christiano (1999). Such defences against the harshness objection fall 
under a wider project that aims at showing that luck egalitarianism cannot be 
plausible if choice-sensitivity is not backed up with a structure of opportunities, 
since we cannot possibly know what people are and are not responsible for, if we 
have not settled on an account of “what opportunities should be available to 
agents… [where] [a]n “opportunity” is defined both by the range of actions open to 
an agent and the range of payoffs corresponding to the actions” (Stemplowska 
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outcomes that are so severe that no one deserves them, even the 
imprudent (Anderson 1999b; Scheffler 2003: 18-9; Fleurbaey 1995: 
41). Secondly, luck egalitarians, and in what concerns me here 
Dworkin, don’t take into account that some outcomes are 
disproportionate to the probabilities of the risk taken (Goodin 1985: 
585; Arneson 2002: 371)).13 This kind of consideration is related to the 
first one, since it also takes into account deservingness of the 
consequences of risk-taking. Thirdly, there are certain goods to which 
people should never lose access, such as those serving people’s basic 
needs. Social egalitarians,14 among others,15 share this view. Finally, 
there is a basic moral intuition, which equality of resources 
contradicts, that relates to the duty we feel we have to alleviate 
suffering, especially when little or no cost would be required in doing 
so, something which is ruled out by equality of resources.16 
 
2013: 404). For similar elaborations see, for example, Vallentyne (2002), Olsaretti 
(2009), Segall (2012), Hill and Voorhoeve (2004), Fleurbaey (1995; 2008), Dekker 
(2009), Williams (2006). 
13 See, however, Stemplowska who stipulates that the principle of opportunity, 
which is one of the two principles that luck egalitarianism should be composed of 
(with the other principle being the choice-sensitivity principle), “can itself be more 
or less choice sensitive” (2013: 404) and in this sense there are two versions of it 
that can be seen as the two ends of a continuum: at the one end is the internalizing 
of the costs of choice version and at the other end the externalizing of the costs of 
choice version (2013: 404-5). 
14 See, for example, Young (1990: 91), Anderson (1999: 317), Scheffler (2003: 23, 
24). 
15 See, for example, Goodin who defends the view that “there are circumstances in  
which considerations of desert are simply out of place” and such are cases when 
“[n]eeds are trumping deserts. They do so not just in the sense of overriding deserts, 
but of actually cancelling them” (1985: 587). 
16 Such a view is accommodated by prioritarian considerations, namely that 
“[b]enefiting people matters more the worse off these people are” (Parfit 1997: 
217). Temkin, for example, calls the priority view “extended humanitarianism” 
(1993: ch.9). Arneson’s responsibility-catering prioritarianism also responds to our 
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Although all these considerations that generate the harshness 
objection are ones that an egalitarian can raise, they are not 
distinctively egalitarian. Non-egalitarians can also raise them.17 From 
 
 
duty to relieve suffering. As he says: “The root idea of prioritarianism is that one 
ought as a matter of justice to aid the unfortunate, and the more badly off someone 
is, the more urgent is the moral imperative to aid. The moral ground for helping 
someone is the badness of their situation, not any determination of how one 
person's situation compares with another's” (Arneson 2000: 342-3). On 
prioritarianism see also McKerlie (1994, 1996), Parfit (2000, 2012). For criticism see 
Williams (2012), Otsuka (2012), Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009). For replies to Otsuka 
and Voorhoeve’s objections to prioritarianism see, for example, O’Neil (2012), Parfit 
(2012), Porter (2012). Sufficientarianism can also accommodate claims for suffering 
alleviation that are based on humanitarian concerns. 
17 This is all the more true of the last reason. Both sufficientarianism and 
prioritarianism are non-egalitarian doctrines, yet they endorse the view that what 
stimulates us towards intervention is primarily our compassion felt for those whose 
situation is so bad that they suffer great evils. Nevertheless, they do not call for 
egalitarian policies (see, for example, Frankfurt (1987), Temkin (1993: ch.9). See, 
however, Hausman (2015), Fleurbaey (2015) and McKerlie (1994), who argue that 
prioritarianism is an egalitarian doctrine)). The special importance of basic needs is 
not a distinctively egalitarian demand either. It is compatible with hierarchical 
structures and economic inequalities. As long as people are provided with what is 
necessary for the satisfaction of their basic needs, no further steps towards equal 
dispensation is required, while benevolent elites can accommodate the demand for 
suffering alleviation by providing for basic needs satisfaction. With respect to the 
first reason, although it could be true that there are bad outcomes that no one 
deserves, it is also true that one need not address such an objection from the point 
of view of equality. Certainly, more needs to be said as to why people don’t deserve 
such bad outcomes no matter what, but whatever the answer is, trumping some 
such outcomes doesn’t necessarily lead to egalitarian arrangements. As with the 
third reason, namely that luck egalitarianism doesn’t take into account the 
disproportionality between outcomes and the probabilities of the risk taken, the 
case is somewhat more complicated. Even if we could actually match probabilities 
to deserved outcomes, for it to be a motivating reason to the harshness objection, 
it would need to be combined with the first reason for raising the harshness 
objection. In other words, we would have to put a threshold below which no 
proportionality applies
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a social egalitarian point of view, the abandonment of negligent and 
imprudent victims of bad option luck primarily points to the fact that 
the latter become subject to the arbitrary wills of others. So, besides 
the point that equality of resources is a harsh doctrine, the 
distinctively social egalitarian objection is that it does not prevent 
power inequalities and undermines equality of status. 
Satz provides such an illustration of how Dworkinian 
resourcism can lead to power inequality by forming what she calls the 
Titanic cases. Satz assumes that according to equality of resources 
what was objectionable in the case of the real Titanic boat was the fact 
that some people were so poor through no fault of their own, that 
they couldn’t afford to buy tickets with access to lifeboats and so many 
of them died. However, Satz considers another Titanic case, where 
there is no background wealth inequality and where some people 
make a fully rational and well-informed choice to buy tickets without 
safety access. In case the boat sinks, equality of resources will find 
nothing objectionable about the fact that some people will die. Satz 
maintains that what is counterintuitive in the second Titanic case is 
that those who have not bought tickets with security access are 
 
 
but only above it (Goodin (1985), for example, holds a similar view). In any case, 
proportionality has been suggested as a principle of equal treatment, namely that 
people are treated equally when they are given their due (see Aristotle on the 
distinction between numerical and proportional equality (Nicomachean Ethics, 
1130b-1132b)). However, this formulation is compatible even with extreme 
inequalities unless we assume that all people are morally equal. But neither this 
necessarily leads to substantive equality. With respect to the demand of making 
outcomes proportional to risk probabilities (and assuming the equal moral worth of 
people), although it can be a demand from an egalitarian point of view (Anderson, 
for example, argues that desert-catering egalitarianism calls for principles that 
specify “which individuals should have which goods, according to individual 
characteristics such as desert or need” (2008: 239)), this is not necessarily so (on this 
see, for example Kagan (1999)). 
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vulnerable to domination by those who have.18 In both Titanic cases, 
what is of egalitarian concern is that some people can be forced out 
of the lifeboats; they are at the mercy of those who have bought 
safety access (2010: 84-9).19 But in a society of equals no one would 
be left to such a situation. 
Given the fact that what matters from the point of view of 
equality is that people are free from domination, social egalitarians 
maintain that there should be certain constraints on the range of 
available options to people compatible with equal social relations 
(Anderson 2008: 261-270).20 Resource egalitarianism leaves people 
vulnerable to the outcomes of voluntary choices generated within 
 
18 See also Wolff who as well explores the implications of differential access to 
lifeboats and notes that “[i]n this particular case we are offering not purely a 
different level of safety, but, in the case of the ship sinking, a different form of 
treatment by other human beings. Differential entitlement to access to lifeboats 
would be horrible to implement and to police in an emergency. The ship’s officers 
will effectively be sending people to their deaths. Perhaps it is the horror of that 
situation, and not differential safety per se, which determines our thoughts about 
the case” (2007: 305). 
19 Note, however, that Satz seems to confuse the social egalitarian concern about 
non-domination with other non-egalitarian reasons. For, what is counterintuitive in 
her Titanic case can be explained by our feeling that we should alleviate suffering 
(see 4th reason above). If we were to give to those who have made a fully rational 
and well-informed choice to buy tickets with no safety access a pill that would make 
them die once the boat sinks, or if we were to put them in a different boat without 
safety precaution (Schelling who has introduced the Titanic Puzzle gives a similar 
example (1984: 115-6)), they would not be vulnerable to the wills of others. 
Although, this would be counterintuitive on account of some of the non-egalitarian 
reasons mentioned above, it does not violate the non-domination demand. In order 
for her case to work well, she would have to provide an argument where the 
harshness objection is constitutive of the objection. A possible reply to my objection 
against Satz would be that in a society of equals, choices of the sort I mention (death 
pill or non-safety-provision-boat) would be blocked. Yet, such a reply does not refute 
my objection. 
20 See also Satz (2010: 99-100). 
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unconstrained markets, once it has ensured equal shares in people’s 
personal and external resources. But, “free choice within a set of 
options does not justify the set of options itself” (Anderson 1999: 308-
9). Equality of resources, thus, fails to recognise that outcomes 
attached to choices are a matter of social arrangements that are 
themselves in need of justification (Anderson 2008: 257).21 On the 
other hand, equality of resources can escape this objection only by 
implementing compulsory insurance on paternalistic grounds, which, 
however, is itself disrespectful (Anderson 1999: 292, 300-2),22 since 
“[i]t is hard to see how citizens could be expected to accept such 
reasoning and still retain their self-respect” (Anderson 1999: 301). 
 
Summing up, I have argued that, according to social 
egalitarians the point of equality is that people should relate to each 
other in a non-dominating way. If this is so, then we should aim at 
providing for all people the conditions that enable them to stand as 
social and political equals, through properly structuring those 
institutional arrangements, which are mainly constitutive of people’s 
relations to each other. Equality of resources fails not only to take 
account of how institutional arrangements can constitute hierarchical 
relationships, but it improperly justifies such relationships supposing 
that they are the outcome of bad option luck. I have argued that there 
are two main reasons why equality of resources may be susceptible to 
the objection from the point of view of power equality. First, luck 
egalitarianism disregards 
 
 
21 See also Wolff and de-Sahlit who recommend that people have genuine 
opportunities to the extent it is reasonable to expect them to so act so as to achieve 
the relevant functioning and thus it is reasonable to hold them responsible under 
these circumstances (2007: 80). They contrast their proposal of what should be the 
set of choices open to people against which accountability is reasonable with 
Dworkin’s and Cohen’s view of identification and choice respectively (Wolff and de-
Shalit 2007: 75-80). 
22 See Dworkin’s answer to the paternalism objection (2002: 114-5). 
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the fact that in non-ideal circumstances the process of socialisation 
that influences people’s preferences may be affected by unjust social 
norms so that people cannot be held fully responsible for such 
preferences. Secondly, even if circumstantial luck has been mitigated 
or unjust social norms have been eliminated, people may end up being 
vulnerable to domination due to their bad option luck. 
 
             c. Equality of resources on the problem of objectionable 
background power inequalities 
The first part of the objection, recall, holds that the Dworkinian 
criteria of authentic choice are insufficient for justifying outcome 
inequalities, when such outcomes are partly explained by existing 
unjust social norms. Equality of resources neglects background 
hierarchical power structures and holds people responsible for their 
preferences even when such preferences are partly shaped by unjust 
social norms. In this way, equality of resources reproduces and 
improperly justifies existing objectionable hierarchical power 
structures. Moreover, it disregards the moral status of duties by 
regarding them as mere preferences. 
The reviewed objection, however, seems to be misplaced with 
respect to equality of resources. First, in my view, the objection 
wrongly supposes that the conditions of authenticity Dworkin 
discusses under the authenticity principle are sufficient for making 
choices that satisfy them consequential/liability-responsibility 
conferring. On the contrary, authenticity seems to be one of the 
conditions necessary for making people’s choices 
consequential/liability-responsibility conferring. As we have seen, 
Dworkin maintains that for people’s choices to be authentic, they 
should have ample opportunity to form and critically reflect on their 
preferences, convictions, life projects and so on and to influence the
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corresponding opinions of others (2000: 160).23 This can be 
understood as pointing to what conditions are sufficient for people’s 
choices to be authentic not for them to be consequential-
responsibility conferring as well. More needs to be said as to when 
people are also consequentially responsible for their authentic 
choices. I discuss in more detail what necessary and sufficient 
conditions are for a person’s choice to be consequential/liability-
responsibility conferring in chapter 6. 
Secondly, Dworkin has already developed the similar view that 
when one’s preference has been formed against a background of 
injustice, then in the event her preference has as a consequence that 
she has to bear some burdens, the latter are compensable (2000: 490, 
fn. 9). He discusses Scanlon’s example of a work shy person, who has 
become so due to his upbringing in an environment where work is not 
valued highly (Scanlon 1998: 292). Dworkin distinguishes two reasons 
we may have to give such a person unemployment relief. The first is 
that the work shy person has not chosen to dislike working; the 
second is that “unjust and inadequate education, or poverty or 
prejudice insured [sic] that work was not available…on reasonable 
terms”. He then describes two kinds of work shy persons. The first is 
an upper-class person and has grown up to snub work as something 
only lower class people should do. The second is a poor person having 
grown in an environment of high and endemic unemployment. If we 
adopt the first reason, we should give both people unemployment 
relief; if the second, then only the second person should receive 
subsidy. Dworkin maintains that it is the second reason we should 
adopt. 
This line of argument seems to accommodate also the case 
ofMason’s career-sacrificing mother. In fact, in his reply to Williams, 
 
 
23 He also maintains that people’s preferences, convictions and so on should not be 
the upshot of manipulation or brainwashing (Dworkin 2000: 483, fn. 26). 
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Dworkin is more explicit with respect to how unjust norms would 
distort equality of resources and thus compensation or more generally 
remedial measures would be supported (2002: 137).24 He maintains 
that equality of resources presupposes that there are no such kind of 
background social injustices, such as unjust social norms (Dworkin 
2002: 137). His theory of equality is meant to illustrate what 
distributive equality would be like under certain idealised conditions. 
This is not to say that equality of resources is insensitive to non-ideal 
circumstances of the sort invoked by the objection. On the contrary, 
equality of resources is meant to provide a theoretical background 
against which we can judge what counts as injustices in real world and 
what the proper rectifications are.25 In this sense, the career-
sacrificing mother, whose otherwise authentic preferences are partly 
formed by “social expectations that are themselves the consequence 
of long-standing and unjust patterns of discrimination and 
stereotyping”, would be entitled to “remedial measures” (Dworkin 
2002: 137). 
Moreover, dependent caretakers would be entitled to social 
subsidies, independently of whether their choice satisfies any criteria 
of authenticity or not. If dependent caretaking is a duty owed to 
dependents, then it cannot be plausibly the case that those who take 
up the relevant duty are solely consequentially responsible, even if it 
is their authentic choice to take up the specific duty. Our duty to 
dependents flows from the abstract egalitarian principle that we 
should respect each other as equals. Dependents are entitled to our 
help in virtue of our duty to respect them as equals. This entails that 
people who take up the task of taking care of dependents are entitled 
 
 
24 See also Navin’s defence of luck egalitarianism against the objection that the latter 
tolerates oppression (2011). 
25 See chapter 3 of Sovereign Virtue, where Dworkin advances ways of applying 
equality of resources in the real world (2000: 162-180). 
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to our help on account of the fact that it is all people’s duty to come 
to the aid of those in need. The fact that a mother may willingly 
sacrifice her career to raise her children does not mean that we are 
absolved of the relevant duty to dependents.26,27 In this sense, we 
would have to provide the required social benefits (as these would be 
formed under the hypothetical insurance scheme).28 
However, it would be wrong to think that welfare benefits 
would be sufficient for undoing the injustice brought about by certain 
social norms. Liberal welfare states have been accused of reproducing 
such injustices instead of eliminating them (Young 1990: ch. 3). 
Indeed, the problem is not only that people should be compensated 
for unfair disadvantage experienced due to discrimination, 
stereotyping and so on. The problem is that discrimination and 
stereotyping should be eliminated. Moreover, compensating the 
discriminated for the fact that they are discriminated is disrespectful. 
In the light of this, equality of resources could be accused of not aiming 
at the right target. By giving compensation to dependent caretakers, 
for example, it simply reproduces or at least it does not undermine 
sexist norms that disadvantage women. The proper egalitarian aim 
would be to eliminate unjust social norms. 
 
26 This does not mean that everyone has a duty to bear equal costs in coming to their 
need. Parents have a special duty to raise their children. My point, however, is that 
even if certain costs should fall on procreators, we all have a duty to children to help 
them grow up decently and provide them with the conditions to become full 
members of political society. 
27  Note also that the career-sacrificing mother would be entitled to public subsidies, 
independently of whether she identifies with her preference to raise her children,  
on account of the fact that she would have insured herself against the possibility of 
not being able to bear the full costs of raising her children. As I said in chapter 1, 
according to my interpretation of equality of resources, people are owed 
compensation if their insurance decisions support this, given that they are fairly 
positioned before they make them, not if they disidentify with their preferences.  
28 See Dworkin (2000: 338-9), where he discusses insurance provisions to children.
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The present social egalitarian argument is partly right in that it 
insists that unjust social norms should be eliminated. However, it is 
wrong to the extent that it implies that equality of resources is 
insensitive to the relevant demand. Equality of resources would object 
to such social norms and would call for policies that aim at their 
elimination, not only because the effects of such norms may be 
unfairly disadvantageous for some people, but also because—and 
more fundamentally—such norms are themselves morally wrong, 
independently of the disadvantageous effects they may have. We can 
better appreciate this by examining Dworkin’s two principles of 
dignity. 
According to Dworkin, what we owe to others is based on the 
ethical idea of living in dignity (2011: ch. 9). The conception of dignity 
should be interpreted to include the principle of self-respect, namely 
that each person should treat the success of his life as having objective 
importance, and the principle of authenticity, namely, that each 
person has a special, personal responsibility to create a life that he 
endorses (Dworkin 2011: 203-10). These two principles of dignity are 
integrated into morality. I cannot regard my life as having objective 
importance if I do not, at the same time, recognise that other people’s 
lives are of equal objective importance (Dworkin 2011: 254, 260).29 
This has implications for the second principle as well. I cannot, 
in the name of leading my life as I see fit, diminish other people’s 
dignity and their special responsibility for leading an authentic life. If 
other people are to lead an authentic life, as I am, which is entailed by 
the principle of self-respect, and if self-respect requires equal respect 
for the lives 
 
 
 
29 Dworkin bases the principle of self-respect on “Kant’s principle”, according to 
which we cannot consistently think that our life is of objective importance without 
at the same time thinking that all peoples’ lives are of equal objective importance 
(2011: 19, 255-67).
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of others, then it follows that I should respect other people’s special 
responsibility for leading an authentic life. 
Prejudicial attitudes flowing from certain social norms, such as 
sexism, racism, religious fundamentalism, homophobia and so on, fail 
to respect the lives of the victims of such attitudes as objectively 
important, while they impose unfair disadvantages on the 
opportunities they have to lead their life as they wish, namely they fail 
to respect those people’s personal responsibility to make something 
valuable out of their life.30 The second principle of dignity guides us 
with respect to what justice requires, namely that if we are to respect 
other people’s personal responsibility, we should provide to all 
opportunities to lead their life on equal terms, where this requires, 
among other things, that people should be able to lead their life in an 
authentic manner, that is, the success of a person’s life should be 
judged by the person whose life it is. The kind of norms under 
consideration deny those people who are victims of prejudice the 
personal responsibility to form their life in an authentic manner, since 
they impose on them a certain view of their personal qualities as well 
as a certain view of what a successful life is. This clearly is a violation 
of the requirements of equality of resources and as such the latter 
would call for the required remedies, change of social norms being 
included. 
However, there is a stronger reason why equality of resources 
would condemn such social norms, namely because they more 
fundamentally violate the first principle of dignity, that of respect for 
the equal objective importance of all people’s lives. If we hold that we 
should respect all people’s lives as equally objectively important, then 
 
 
30 See Hansen (2011) who provides a nice argument in favor of the view that 
Dworkinian resource egalitarianism can account for the kind of disadvantages 
stemming from misrecognition by appealing to the principle of independence as 
well as the principle of abstraction. 
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this is so even if no other injustices are taking place. According to 
Dworkin’s theory, justice is one aspect of what it means to treat each 
other as equals and is thus informed by the value of equality. We 
cannot possibly make sense of what justice requires independently of 
what the value of equality requires. Prejudicial attitudes violate the 
value of equality that demands more fundamentally that we respect 
each other as moral equals. And they do so, because they are based 
on the view that some people’s personal qualities are of lower 
importance. This implies that equality of resources would have good 
reason to condemn as morally objectionable certain forms of conduct 
and attitudes that fail to treat people as equals but that are not 
otherwise unjust. 
To understand this, consider Mason’s argument in favour of 
the value of social equality as distinct from justice (2011; 2015). Mason 
gives certain examples where no other injustices are involved but 
where there seems to be something morally bad from the point of 
view of equality in treating people in the way he describes. Generally, 
the cases he provides involve a person who avoids interaction with 
people from another ethnic minority, because he thinks that they lack 
certain qualities. For example, whenever there is an empty seat in the 
bus near a black person, one avoids sitting there and he prefers to 
stand up instead. But we can think of other similar cases as well. For 
example, an individual may avoid developing an intimate relationship 
with his gay colleague, because he may think that homosexuality is 
abnormal, but when at work he treats him decently. Another case 
could be when a man avoids visiting a woman doctor, because he 
thinks that women do not have the required skills and they would do 
better if they restricted themselves in domestic work. Frazer mentions 
the case of “the African-American Wall Street banker who cannot get 
a taxi to pick him up” (2003: 34). Finally, we may consider cases where 
one does not refrain from interacting with certain people, but he 
nevertheless fails to treat them as equals, 
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because he is interacting with them on morally objectionable grounds. 
Mason gives the example of a man, who, when he is shopping at the 
supermarket, “tries to avoid going through a checkout that is being 
operated by a member of an ethnic minority. He would rather queue 
for longer, or even shop elsewhere (perhaps paying more money for 
his groceries) than have to interact with a cashier from that minority 
because he believes that members of this minority are inferior” (2015: 
132). Consider, however, that this man does not avoid interaction with 
the cashier when at the supermarket (and he even treats the cashier 
in a very polite manner), because he thinks this is the kind of job the 
latter should be doing as a member of this minority. He thinks that 
people from this minority should be in less prestigious jobs, such as 
ones that require menial work or less skills etc., so he is perfectly 
happy when he sees people from this minority where they “deserve” 
to be but not if he sees them occupying more demanding and well paid 
posts. 
Such cases point to the fact that justice and equality are 
different values,31 contrary to the view that “considerations of social 
 
 
31 Miller (1998), O’Neil (2008) and Fourier (2011) also argue that social equality is 
distinct from justice, but unlike Mason, they do not give a satisfactory account of 
the distinctiveness of the value of social equality, since the arguments they provide 
in favor of the latter view include inequalities that can more plausibly be described 
as injustices, since they point to disadvantageous effects certain attitudes may have 
on some people. Moreover, not all social egalitarians agree that social equality and 
justice are distinct values. According to one strand of social egalitarianism (see for 
example, Anderson (1999, 2010), Scheffler (2003, 2005), Schemmel (2010, 2011, 
2015), Young (1990), Baker (2015)), social justice is about the proper social and 
political relationships between people. Inegalitarian relationships are unjust for they 
are disrespectful of people’s equal moral status. Supporters of this view define 
egalitarian relationships as ones of non-domination. Where non-domination occurs 
there is no further egalitarian concern. Whether one agrees with this or not, it is still 
the case that there are certain social inequalities that are not otherwise unjust in 
the sense meant by the account of justice as non-domination and that are morally 
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equality [to the extent they] are, in general, weighty in our assessment 
of outcomes, forms of behaviour, or basic institutions, then they 
automatically count as considerations of justice” (Mason 2015: 130). 
Whether, however, we regard justice and equality as distinct values 
or whether equality considerations count as or are an aspect of what 
justice requires will, to an important extent, depend on how justice is 
defined (Mason 2015: 131). According to Mason, “unless someone 
suffers from disadvantage as a result of another’s behaviour, either 
because she suffers psychological damage, or receives less of some 
good in a way that makes a difference to how well her life goes, or the 
behaviour is a constitutive part of a dominating relationship in which 
she is being subjected to the arbitrary exercise of power, then that 
behaviour does not come within the purview of justice” (Mason 2015: 
142, cf. 131). In the cases above people do not suffer from an unfair 
disadvantage, but they nonetheless are not treated as equals. 
 
 
objectionable from the point of view of equality. For it can still be the case that 
although people relate to each other in a non-dominating way, they fail to respect 
people as equals if, for example, they avoid making friends with people from certain 
ethnic minorities or having any everyday interactions with them. Of course, 
advocates of the justice-based account of social equality may not find anything 
objectionable in such kinds of attitudes to the extent they do not violate justice-as-
non-domination requirements. As Schemmel says: “inegalitarian dispositions are, 
on that view, problematic for justice only if they lead to domination and 
marginalization in the ways just explained. If they do not, people remain free to 
pursue them in their personal lives (for example, in their personal conceptions of 
friendship, or even of marriage—if the institutional background is cleared from any 
structural gender disadvantages)” (2015: 163). Yet, to the extent that almost all 
social egalitarians accept that social and political equality has its root in universal 
moral equality (Anderson 1999: 313, but see Miller (1999: 238, 240-1) who does not 
accept this), then it is difficult to see why failing to treat a person as a moral and 
thus social equal is not morally objectionable even if the kind of treatment in 
question is not unjust. Of course, they could answer that it is not “problematic for 
justice”, but it is morally objectionable. But this would commit them to the view that 
social equality and justice are distinct values. 
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Having said that, Dworkin’s theory of equality asks us more 
fundamentally what it means to treat each other as equals in all 
aspects of our lives, not simply when it comes to questions about 
distributive justice (broadly understood). As Dworkin says, the 
principle of dignity, as this is integrated into morality, requires first 
that we respect others as equals and secondly that we do so by 
showing the right attitude towards them, where the right attitude 
depends each time on the moral context, that is, our political 
relationships, distributive justice, our social and personal 
relationships. In the cases examined above, the attitudes under 
consideration are not right from the point of view of equality, since 
some people are not treated as equals. So, from the point of view of 
equality of resources we have reason to call for remedial measures 
and elimination of unjust social norms and more importantly we have 
reason to condemn such norms as morally wrong, even if there is no 
unfair disadvantage stemming from them. This is so because such kind 
of social norms violate the two principles of dignity. 
Yet, note that, in accepting this, we need to face the following 
objection. If we consider it as morally objectionable that some people 
are not treated as social equals, but not unjustly, then there would 
seem to be a conflict between equality as distinct from justice and the 
liberal demand of neutrality between conceptions of the good. 
Suppose that we do accept the view that such kinds of attitudes are 
morally objectionable and that public condemnation from the state is 
called for as a response (Mason 2015: 136). But if the state tells to, 
say, the gay-averse person that it is morally objectionable not to treat 
his gay neighbour as an equal by refraining from having any interaction 
with him, because he believes his neighbour to be of less moral 
importance due to his “abnormal” sexuality, then it would seem to 
impose on him a view of what a good life is. According to the gay-
averse person homosexuality is sinful or abnormal and he does not 
think it right for him to have any interaction with his gay neighbour. 
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However, the objection fails to appreciate that what is morally 
objectionable is that we fail to treat others as social equals when our 
reasons for refraining from interacting with them are based on the 
view that they are morally inferior and this is morally condemnable 
from the point of view of equality, even if no injustice is involved due 
to our conduct. In the example above, the gay-averse person may 
avoid interacting with his gay neighbour because he thinks gays are 
morally inferior. This is morally objectionable and the state (among 
others) has reason to condemn such attitudes that are based on 
morally wrong reasons. On the other hand, the gay-averse person may 
think that all people are moral equals, but insist that those choosing 
or leading a life of homosexuality violate the will of god. That kind of 
gay-averse person may refuse to interact with gays, because he does 
not want them to be part of “the social setting he needs in order 
successfully to pursue his chosen way of life” (Dworkin 2000: 154). The 
liberal state is neutral with respect to how people want to pursue their 
lives and cannot condemn people for not wanting to interact with 
those with whom they have no shared comprehensive values. If we 
treat people with whom we share different comprehensive values 
justly and regard them as moral equals, we do not thereby treat them 
as social unequals if we refrain from interacting with them. 
 
Summing up, in this section I have tried to rebut the objection 
that Dworkin’s criteria of what an authentic choice is are insufficient 
for justifying outcome inequalities, when such outcomes are partly 
explained by the existence of unjust social norms. Against this, I 
argued, first, that the objection wrongly assumes that the Dworkinian 
criteria of authenticity are sufficient for making people’s preferences 
consequential-responsibility conferring and that this seems to be only 
one of the conditions for making a choice consequential-responsibility 
conferring. Secondly, the objection is inattentive to the fact that 
Dworkin actually acknowledges that some people’s preferences are 
partly influenced by unjust social norms and would call for the 
107 
 
required remedies. Thirdly, equality of resources has reason to call not 
only for compensation for the disadvantageous effects of preferences 
that are formed by unjust social norms, but it would also call for 
changing such norms on account of the fact that the latter violate the 
two principles of dignity. Finally, with respect to the related objection 
that equality of resources improperly assigns the status of preferences 
to certain duties, such as our duty to care for dependents, and thus 
places the burdens of caretaking on those who “willingly” undertake 
the relevant duties, I argued that equality of resources would require 
us to provide the necessary social benefits both to those who are 
dependents on account of our duty to treat them as equals and to 
dependent caretakers on account of the fact that dependent 
caretaking is a duty we all have and we cannot plausibly assume that 
we are absolved of it whenever there is someone willing to undertake 
it, even if it is his truly authentic choice to do so. 
 
             d. Equality of resources and compulsory insurance 
As we have seen, Anderson has raised the abandonment of the 
negligent victim objection against the luck egalitarian paradigm. The 
objection, recall, holds that equality of resources permits people to be 
vulnerable to their bad option luck. I have argued that we may object 
to this mainly for two reasons. First, it would be very harsh. This is not 
a distinctively egalitarian reason. Secondly, victims of bad option luck 
would be vulnerable to the arbitrary wills of others. This would be a 
distinctively social egalitarian reason to object to equality of 
resources. Moreover, equality of resources could only escape the 
objection by imposing compulsory insurance on paternalistic grounds. 
In what follows, I shall defend the view that the principle of 
authenticity can consistently be modified to account for compulsory 
insurance. The modification I propose is faithful to Dworkin’s concern 
for ambition-sensitivity. If my argument proves successful, then 
compulsory insurance would be shown to be constitutive of equality 
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of resources and this is justified not on paternalistic but on egalitarian 
grounds. 
So, let me take Anderson’s example of the uninsured car driver 
who injures himself as a result of his careless driving. Suppose that the 
driver is saved and is asked to take out insurance. There are two 
possibilities. The driver either refuses or agrees. In the latter case, the 
victim changes his mind; he is engaged in a self-deliberative process 
and decides that he should get insured. We have reason to believe 
that his previous choice not to insure himself was not authentic, since 
he did not have full information about the consequences of such a 
disastrous fact in his life or that he has falsely not given the proper 
importance to getting insured against such an occurrence in his overall 
assessment of his life plan. If this is so, he should be given the chance 
to insure himself now. This is constitutive of equality of resources, 
since it is a crucial presumption that people’s choices should be 
authentic at every level of the distribution (Dworkin 2000: 158-161). 
This is what the principle of authenticity requires. 
In general, the principle of authenticity requires that people’s 
“freedom to engage in activities crucial to forming and reviewing” 
their life plans should be protected to the fullest possible degree. If 
such a freedom is to make sense, it should be protected throughout 
people’s lives. One crucial element of the relevant freedom is that 
people have the chance to reconsider their insurance decisions, for 
these are constitutive of their life projects. And they should have this 
opportunity at any moment throughout their life. The social 
egalitarian requirement then that insurance should be available to all 
is satisfied under equality of resources in virtue of the principle of 
authenticity.32 This is my main argument here, which I shall try to 
defend against certain objections. 
 
 
32 Note that I am not here contending that one’s decision to insure, following the 
accident, is more authentic than one’s decision not to insure, prior to the accident. 
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First, running an insurance scheme that allows post-accident-
insurance-purchase may make the scheme more expensive in an 
unfair way than it would be had such post-accident-insurance-
purchase not been available. Given post-accident-knowledge, the 
regretful uninsured car driver may decide to purchase a costlier 
insurance package than what he would buy had his decision been 
based solely on knowledge of the statistical chances of having a car 
accident, which would probably be unfair to others. Yet, we should be 
careful to distinguish between having knowledge of the statistical 
chances of suffering X and having knowledge of the consequences of 
suffering X. The insurance market clearly requires both. Even if we 
knew that we have Y chances of suffering X, we wouldn’t know how 
much we would like to insure against suffering X, if we didn’t know 
what the consequences of suffering X were. Equality of resources 
requires that people should be protected against risk on equal terms 
with others, given full knowledge and understanding of what given 
risks entail. The regretful car driver actually acquires this kind of 
knowledge and understanding of what it means to suffer from a 
serious car accident. But the problem is not his knowledge of the 
seriousness of his post-accident situation, but the fact that he actually 
 
It is not necessarily the case that any later decision is more authentic since it is a 
more accurate reflection of the current commitments/views of the person. Rather, 
what I maintain is that people do not form once and for all authentic preferences, 
tastes, commitments and so on, according to which they then decide how to lead 
their lives and make choices. People change their views and one reason for doing so 
is because they may realise after reflection or in virtue of new information available 
to them that had they the opportunity at that time to reflect on the choices available 
and their consequences and/or had the information that they now have, they would 
have chosen differently; their choice would be more authentic. But, since treating 
each person with equal concern and respect means giving to all equal opportunities 
to lead their lives according to what they truly identify with, then this is a strong 
reason for equality of resources to provide the opportunity to all to reflect on their 
choices throughout their lives. 
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experiences this situation. It is this knowledge that becomes tricky 
with respect to what concerns us here. 
However, note that the Dworkinian distributive scheme 
(auction, insurance market) is hypothetical and is meant to guide us 
with respect to our speculations about what would be a fair 
distribution under real circumstances. This means that there is a large 
degree of uncertainty with respect to what would be individuals’ 
decisions under the hypothetical scheme’s counterfactual conditions. 
Take, for example, the case of the hypothetical insurance market for 
disabilities. People are asked how much they would insure themselves 
against the possibility of facing a certain disability, had the chances to 
face it been equal for all. Yet, in fact some people are born disabled or 
become so during childhood, when we cannot properly hold them 
responsible for their choices or at least to the same extent as when 
they reach adulthood. So, the hypothetical insurance market for 
disabilities (and talents) asks us to imagine what insurance decisions 
we would reasonably make before bad luck occurred (Dworkin 2000: 
345). Given this we can similarly say that in the event a person changes 
her mind and she now wants to insure herself against X, and since the 
principle of authenticity requires that people have the fullest possible 
opportunity to reconsider their projects, convictions, preferences and 
so on, she should be provided with the insurance coverage she would 
have purchased before bad luck occurred. In our example, the level of 
the insurance coverage with which the regretful car driver would be 
provided would be the level it would be reasonable for him to 
purchase before the car accident actually occurred. 
Considering the second objection, this might be stated as 
follows. If what I have said so far is right, then if the insurance scheme 
allows that uninsured people are offered post-bad-luck-insurance 
coverage at the level they would insure themselves before bad luck 
occurred to them, it would be possible that some people would 
capitalise on other people’s contributions to the welfare scheme. 
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They may think, for example, that “I can now keep my share of 
resources and spend it on my preferred activities, and in case 
something goes wrong I shall ask for coverage on the pretention that 
I have changed my mind”. In other words, people may have a strong 
incentive not to contribute to the insurance scheme, since they know 
that coverage will always be available. This would certainly be not only 
unfair, but it would probably undermine the whole scheme. Note that 
the same may hold true were people’s incentives not malign. Think of 
the regretful car driver above. Were many people regretful of their 
imprudent insurance decisions, the insurance scheme would probably 
be undermined. In the face of this problem, we could make insurance 
compulsory. 
But, would this be justified for those prudently non-insured? 
This is the third objection I shall consider. As was said above, the driver 
may refuse to get insurance after the accident. To make my argument 
clearer imagine that now there are two uninsured car drivers who are 
both engaged in an accident and get badly injured. According to what 
was said above, we should save them both on the assumption that 
their choice not to insure might not be authentic and so equality of 
resources demands that they should be given the opportunity to re-
think their choices, preferences, convictions and so on, so as to form 
an authentic choice. After we have saved them, driver Y reconsiders 
his choice in the face of the consequences that an accident would have 
on his life and decides to insure himself. However, driver X tells us that 
his choice not to insure himself was authentic. He does not regret that 
he hasn’t insured himself even after he suffered the accident and even 
if he knows that he would have died or become disabled, say because 
his religion prohibits medical treatment. In other words, he has made 
an ex ante authentic choice not to insure himself,33 and so he may now 
 
33 Note here that it would be a mistake to say that a choice not to insure oneself is 
imprudent. “[W]hat is prudent depends on that person’s own individual needs, 
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complain that we have no right to ask him to pay for insurance, since 
his choice was authentic. In this extreme case then, equality of 
resources would have difficulty in explaining why it has required the 
driver to be saved, once he has made his full-informed choice not to 
buy insurance. 
More generally, we are faced with the following dilemma: 
what kind of policy should we follow? One that says that all uninsured 
car drivers should be saved, on the grounds that the choice of some of 
them not to insure themselves might not be authentic and so they 
should now be given the opportunity to form their authentic choices, 
even if this is at the cost of those whose choice not to insure was 
authentic? Or, one that says that all uninsured car drivers should not 
be saved on the grounds that those who have already made an 
authentic choice not to insure themselves should not be made to pay 
the cost of being saved or made to insure themselves, even if this is at 
the cost of those who have not made an authentic choice not to insure 
themselves? The principle of authenticity seems to give us no guide 
here with respect to what policy we should choose. If it is authentic 
choices that we should respect, why should we choose to provide an 
opportunity to someone to make an authentic choice, rather than 
respect the already authentic choice of someone else? 
Making insurance compulsory then would seem to disrespect 
the preferences of those who would prudently not choose to insure 
themselves, if insurance was not compulsory. On the other hand, if 
insurance is optional, then we would disrespect the regretful person’s 
equal opportunity to form an authentic choice. Compulsory insurance 
seems to pose a problem of conflict between the principle of 
 
 
tastes, personality, and preferences” (Dworkin 2000: 313; see also p. 492, fn. 7). In 
this sense, one may decide that getting insured against becoming blind, for example, 
does not matter to him, since in the event he becomes blind, nothing can 
compensate him (Dworkin 2000: 76). 
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abstraction and the principle of authenticity. As we said in chapter 1, 
the metric of equality of resources is true opportunity costs. 
Opportunity costs are true when the opportunities people have to live 
according to their conception of the good are as wide as possible. This 
is so when the liberties against which the auction and the hypothetical 
insurance market are taking place are available to the fullest possible 
degree to all. This is what the principle of abstraction requires. If we 
allow compulsory insurance, it seems that we would violate the 
principle of abstraction, since we would require those who would 
prudently decide not to insure themselves in the absence of 
compulsory insurance to use their resources in a way that is not 
ambition-sensitive. On the other hand, if insurance is not compulsory, 
then we would have to require those regretful non-insured people to 
bear the full cost of their imprudent decision, thus we would be unfair 
to them in the light of the requirements of the principle of 
authenticity. 
To answer this objection, we need to provide an argument that 
shows that compulsory insurance justified on account of the principle 
of authenticity is not an arbitrary constraint on the principle of 
abstraction. I have argued that the principle of authenticity requires 
that people’s “freedom to engage in activities crucial to forming and 
reviewing” their life plans should be protected to the fullest possible 
degree. If such a freedom is to make sense, it should be protected 
throughout people’s lives. What is of importance then with respect to 
our argument here is that compulsory insurance is meant to secure 
people’s opportunity to revise their life plans. Being able to revise 
one’s life plan necessarily requires that this is so throughout a 
person’s life. Compulsory insurance is justified on account of the 
revisability requirement. Because people are likely to change their 
convictions, preferences, tastes, projects and so on throughout their 
lives, compulsory insurance ensures that they do not lose access to 
insurance coverage that is necessary for people in the light of their
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revised judgements. Moreover, different people form their authentic 
preferences at different moments throughout their life. The auction 
and the hypothetical insurance market would be unlikely to ever 
commence until all have declared themselves satisfied with their 
choices. Given these considerations, we can provide two answers to 
reject the objection examined here. 
First, no one can reasonably reject the revisability 
requirement, that is, no one can reasonably claim that there is no 
chance that her convictions, projects and generally her conception of 
the good will be revised.34 If that is so, then it cannot be the case that 
compulsory insurance imposes an arbitrary constraint on people’s 
liberty, rather it protects it throughout people’s lives. Second, the 
objection wrongly considers the revisability requirement required by 
the principle of authenticity to be a constraint on people’s liberties. 
The revisability requirement should rather be seen as a liberty. It 
would not be a good argument on the part of the objector that some 
people may have no interest in protecting this liberty, for this kind of 
argument invokes what Dworkin calls the interest based strategy for 
defining the liberty/constraint system, which he rejects (2000: 139-
45). The liberty/constraint system is meant to secure fair equality of 
opportunities to all people to live according to their conception of the 
good and the revisability requirement is constitutive of fair equality of 
opportunities not an enemy of it. What is important from the point of 
view of equality is that people make choices against a background of 
fair equality of opportunities. “Ideal authenticity requires the fullest 
possible opportunity” (Dworkin 2000: 160), until there is no one who 
would want to exploit this opportunity any longer (Dworkin 2000: 
160). Compulsory insurance is meant to ensure that all people will 
have the opportunity to form authentic choices, namely choices “with 
 
 
34 See Buchanan (1975) who discusses the revisability principle with respect to 
Rawls’ theory.
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whose formation they [do not] remain dissatisfied” (Dworkin 2000: 
160). 
Would making insurance compulsory in the way I suggested be 
paternalistic? In Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin offers a different 
reply to the similar objection raised by Ripstein (2007),35 that 
compulsory insurance would be a paternalistic imposition upon those 
who would not buy insurance coverage, had the insurance scheme not 
been mandatory. Instead, Dworkin claims that the insurance “scheme 
is not paternalistic. But it is probabilistic. No one can sensibly think or 
argue that he would not have made the decision we assume most 
people would have made. The counterfactuals are too deep for any 
such individualized judgement: the scheme’s claims can only be 
statistical. But he can rightly say that he might not have made it. That 
fact presents an issue not of paternalism but of fairness. We can treat 
individual citizens on either of the two assumptions, and it seems fair 
to treat them, lacking any information to the contrary, as if each would 
have done what we judge most would have done. This is our 
justification” (2011: 362). The objection I examined here is framed in 
terms of fairness rather than paternalism. I asked whether it would be 
fair to impose compulsory insurance on those who would prudently 
not choose to insure themselves if insurance were optional. Dworkin’s 
answer invokes the probabilistic nature of the hypothetical insurance 
market to resist the objection of unfairness. My answer resolves the 
problem that the objection diagnoses in a more principled way by 
invoking the requirements of the principle of authenticity. 
Note also, that the argument advanced here in favour of 
compulsory insurance is not vulnerable to the paternalism objection 
as this is raised by Anderson (1999: 301). As is known, Dworkin 
endorses the view that insurance should be made compulsory on 
paternalistic grounds with respect to those imprudently non-insured 
 
 
35 Cited in Dworkin (2011: 479-80). 
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under an optional insurance regime,36 but he rejects the view that the 
kind of paternalism he defends, namely weak paternalism, is offensive 
of people’s liberty (2002: 114-5). However, the view I advanced here 
is that compulsory insurance is justified on account of the requirement 
that all people should be able to form authentic choices throughout 
their lives. It is required, that is, on reasons of fairness rather than on 
reasons of paternalism. As such it also escapes the harshness 
objection, but it does so as a consequence, not because it deems 
harshness itself an objection from the point of view of egalitarian 
justice. What is objectionable from the point of view of equality is 
unfairness not harshness. 
Let me finally note that my argument that under equality of 
resources compulsory insurance would be justified on egalitarian 
reasons partly determines what arbitrary interference consists is. 
Violation of the revisability requirement would constitute a violation 
of the requirement of non-domination, in the sense that people would 
be arbitrarily deprived of choices otherwise available to them. As I will 
argue in chapters 5 and 6, we cannot account for what arbitrary 
interference consists in unless we say what a fair choice structure is, 
violations of which would consist arbitrary interference. Equality of 
resources, unlike social egalitarian accounts, by determining what a 
fair choice structure is provides a yardstick against which we can judge 
whether one has been arbitrarily interfered with. 
 
Summing up, I have argued that, contrary to the social 
egalitarian critique, equality of resources is not vulnerable to the 
 
36 Dworkin’s endorsement of weak paternalism is meant to justify compulsory 
insurance to those who Anderson calls negligent victims, that is, those who may be 
mistaken about what a prudent decision is. On the other hand, his argument about 
probabilities reviewed above is meant to justify compulsory insurance to those who 
would prudently decide not to insure themselves had insurance not been 
mandatory. 
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abandonment of the negligent victim objection. This is so, for, as I tried 
to show, compulsory insurance is justified on account of the 
revisability requirement required by the principle of authenticity, 
which is constitutive of true opportunity costs, the metric of equality 
of resources. If my argument is valid, then this would be a first step in 
showing that equality of resources can qualify as at least one 
reasonable conception of justice that people within a society of equals 
could adopt, since it does not have morally objectionable 
consequences. This is the weak claim for which my thesis tries to 
provide support. In chapter 6, I argue for the stronger claim that 
equality of resources is better equipped to account for the social 
egalitarian demand that people should relate to each other as equals. 
I shall now turn to the second reason why social egalitarians have 
accused luck egalitarianism more generally, and equality of resources 
more specifically, of being morally implausible, namely because the 
latter seems to justify its distributive principle on objectionable 
incentives, motives and attitudes. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The objection from the point of view of egalitarian 
motives/incentives/attitudes 
 
 
The present chapter is concerned with the social egalitarian 
objection that the motivations, attitudes and incentives that people 
develop under luck egalitarian principles of justice are inappropriate 
from the point of view of social egalitarianism because they diminish 
people’s equal status. Anderson develops the view that luck 
egalitarianism justifies its principle of distribution on the basis of the 
feelings or emotions of envy and pity felt by those it categorises as 
unlucky and lucky respectively (1999: 289). On the one hand, what 
motivates those who are unfortunate to make justice claims with 
respect to their distributive shares is envy felt for what the more 
fortunate of their society have. “Envy's thought is ‘I want what you 
have’” (Anderson 1999: 307). But, first this can hardly “generate 
obligations on the part of the envied” (Anderson 1999: 307) and, 
secondly, it is disrespectful to the objects of envy (Anderson 1999: 
307). On the other hand, those the luck egalitarian theory labels as 
fortunate are motivated by feelings of “contemptuous pity” towards 
those with inferior qualities in their talents and abilities (Anderson 
1999: 289). Pity—so Anderson argues—is based on feelings of 
superiority by those who feel it, when they compare their situation to 
that of the objects of pity (1999: 306-7). Thus, those pitied are 
recognised as inferiors by the more fortunate. If the luck egalitarian 
principle is adopted as a public principle of justice, then social stigma 
can be generated with respect to those the state labels as inferior 
(Anderson 1999: 289, 305-6, 311). But this hardly treats those people 
with equal respect, while loss of self-respect is highly possible. 
Although luck egalitarianism is “emotionally consistent” (Anderson
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1999: 307), since “[t]he two attitudes are well-suited to each other: 
the most generous attitude the envied could appropriately have 
toward the envious is pity” (Anderson 1999: 307), it cannot generate 
reasons for action relevant to justice. This is so, for, on the one hand, 
those envied cannot accept envy as a justice-generated reason to act 
accordingly. Why would a person feel obligated by a rule that says that 
“once another person envies your personal and impersonal resources, 
you are required to compensate him”? On the other hand, those 
pitied cannot accept pity as a justice generated reason, since they 
would have to accept their innate inferiority to those they envy. 
Moreover, it would not suffice for those labelled as 
unfortunate to admit their inferiority, but they would also have to 
prove that they are actually inferior in their personal qualities so as to 
qualify for compensation. But in order to prove their inferiority they 
would have to make “shameful revelations” about themselves, that 
may even be humiliating, which may cause a harm to their “respect 
standing” (Wolff 1998: 109, 113-5; Wolff and de-Shalit 2007: 170-1; 
Hinton 2001; McTernan 2013: 103). 
The argument advanced here can be seen in the light of the 
Rawlsian idea of self-respect, which is “perhaps the most important 
primary good” (Rawls 1971: 440). In Rawls’ terms, self-respect 
consists of two aspects: 1) “a person’s sense of his own value, his 
secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is 
worth carrying out”, and 2) “a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is 
within one’s power, to fulfil one’s intentions” (1971: 440). It becomes 
apparent that self-respect is the most important primary good, since 
it is what gives our lives meaning, it encourages our sense of a 
worthwhile life. Since all people have a strong interest in their lives 
being meaningful, it is reasonable for them to try to secure the social 
bases of self-respect equally for all in the original position. So, what is 
crucial for the argument advanced here is that principles 
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of justice should promote people’s sense of self-respect, by providing 
the social bases of self-respect to all. This can be done so far as 
principles of justice are ones that everyone can reasonably agree on 
and everyone can reasonably agree on principles that are to the 
advantage of all. In other words, no one, as free and equal, would 
reasonably agree on principles of justice that would not promote her 
own good as well on equal terms with others. 
It is in this sense that social egalitarians raise the specific 
objection to luck egalitarianism. The social egalitarian basic 
commitment is equality of status: we should respect each other as 
social and political equals, that is, as each having equal social and 
political standing. This partly and more fundamentally consists in 
providing to all the social bases of self-respect. For one cannot be 
reasonably said to be respected as an equal if one is denied the 
opportunity to advance a sense of one’s self-identity as valuable and 
of one’s life that is worth pursuing. Yet, envy, pity, shame and 
humiliation are emotions that are incompatible with respect of the 
equal status of persons in that they are based on feelings of 
superiority and inferiority and are potentially harmful to the self-
respect of the victims of attitudes potentially generating such feelings. 
Since luck egalitarianism bases its principles on envy and pity and 
since shameful revelation and humiliating treatment are the 
consequences of adopting such principles of justice, then such 
principles are incompatible with a society of equals, or people within 
such a society would not consent to them, since no one could 
reasonably agree to principles of justice that would reduce the value 
of the most important primary good: self-respect. 
In what follows, I shall examine more closely how social 
egalitarians relate the aforementioned emotions specifically to 
equality of resources. I argue that a more nuanced defence of the 
social egalitarian position is required in order for social egalitarians to 
persuasively make their case and propose how they can provide 
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such a defence. Yet, I argue that even the more nuanced version of 
the objection under consideration cannot be sustained with respect 
to equality of resources. More specifically, in section (a), I examine the 
role of envy in equality of resources. I argue that social egalitarians 
can motivate their envy objection against equality of resources better 
by drawing on Rawls’ elaboration of the problem of envy. Based on 
this, they can then ask whether the principles of justice prescribed by 
equality of resources are expressive of envy or can generate what 
Rawls calls excusable general envy. However, I argue that both these 
strategies fail to show that Dworkin’s theory is vulnerable to the envy 
objection. In section (b), I examine the role of pity in Dworkin’s theory 
of equality. I first consider how we can make better sense of the pity 
objection and propose that social egalitarians can make a moderate 
claim, namely that luck egalitarian principles of justice can possibly be 
expressive of pity—an attitude or motivation that is, however, morally 
objectionable when acting on principles of justice—and that to the 
extent social egalitarianism blocks this possibility, it is a better 
alternative to luck egalitarianism. However, I argue that this moderate 
claim fails if advanced against equality of resources. Finally, in section 
(c), I consider two reasons that social egalitarians may invoke in order 
to raise the humiliation objection against luck egalitarianism. On the 
one hand, they can refer to the fact that in non-ideal circumstances, 
people would be vulnerable to humiliation and shame by being 
required to reveal their “inferior” capacities to qualify for social 
subsidy. On the other hand, they can refer to the idea of opacity 
respect advanced by Carter. I argue that it is the second form of the 
objection that seems to be more persuasive. Yet, I argue that 
Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources would not be vulnerable to 
it. 
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           a. The role of envy in equality of resources 
The standard criticism, first advanced, as noted above, by 
Anderson, is that luck egalitarian principles are expressive of envy. 
This kind of objection has been motivated due to the introduction of 
the envy test as a means of measuring opportunity costs in Dworkin’s 
equality of resources (1981b; 2000: ch. 2). As is known, in his reply to 
Anderson, Dworkin notes that envy in equality of resources is used in 
a technical sense and that Anderson “confuses the psychological and 
technical economic senses of ‘envy’” (2002: 117, fn. 19). Nevertheless, 
the question with respect to what concerns us here is whether, 
contrary to what Dworkin maintains, equality of resources does 
express envy in the psychological sense, even if the envy test is based 
on the technical sense of envy. In other words, is the fact that a person 
would prefer another’s bundle of resources based on some kind of 
psychological envy? Anderson, to be sure, is not careful to make such 
distinctions, nor does she offer any definition of envy in the sense she 
wants to use it, except for saying that “[e]nvy’s thought is ‘I want what 
you have’” (1999: 307). This is certainly insufficient for making her 
case. But the fact that Anderson’s argument is insufficient, doesn’t 
mean that there is no possibility for her conclusions to be right. So, it 
is worth trying to answer the above question. 
My suggestion is that social egalitarians can follow Rawls’ 
argument in his examination of envy. Rawls examines the problem of 
envy by making a two-step argument (1971: 143-4, 530-541). First, he 
argues that principles of justice are chosen in the original position 
under the veil of ignorance, so that they are not influenced (among 
other things) by destructive and contingent inclinations, such as 
feelings of envy. Secondly, he examines whether excusable general 
envy would occur in a well-ordered society, where the two principles 
of justice are adopted. He first defines general envy as “the envy 
experienced by the least advantaged towards those better situated”, 
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where such envy is meant “in the sense that [the least advantaged] 
envy the more favoured for the kinds of goods and for the particular 
objects they possess” (Rawls 1971: 531). He then goes on to define 
excusable envy as the “reaction to the loss of self-respect in 
circumstances where it would be unreasonable to expect someone to 
feel differently” (Rawls 1971: 534). Such circumstances may arise 
under three conditions, one psychological and two social (Rawls 1971: 
535-6). The psychological condition concerns people’s lack of self-
confidence in their worth and their ability to pursue worthwhile life 
plans. The first social condition concerns those circumstances that 
may make it the case that a person’s lack of self-confidence 
mentioned just above is “experienced as painful and humiliating” 
(Rawls 1971: 535), where the basic structure allows for great 
disparities between those less and more advantaged.1 Finally, the 
second social condition concerns the fact that those less advantaged 
“see their social position as allowing no constructive alternative to 
opposing the favoured circumstances of the more advantaged” (Rawls 
1971: 535). 
So, social egalitarians who embrace Anderson’s objection 
about envy should explain whether the principles of justice that 
equality of resources prescribes are the expression of envy or can 
possibly generate excusable general envy. Rawls examines whether 
his two principles of justice can possibly generate (excusable) general 
envy in a well-ordered society, but not whether they are expressive of 
envy. This is so, since people behind the veil of ignorance have no 
knowledge of their psychological propensities, including envy (Rawls 
1971: 142-150). The absence of such knowledge is, according to 
Rawls, necessary, for “the choice of a conception of justice should not 
be affected by accidental 
 
1  As Rawls notes “in theory the difference principle permits indefinitely large 
inequalities in return for small gains to the less favoured” (1971: 536). 
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contingencies”, and in so far as envy is disadvantageous for all parties, 
“it seems desirable that, if possible, the choice of principles should not 
be influenced by that trait” (1971: 530). So, the two principles of 
justice chosen in the original position are not ones expressing envy. 
Anderson, on the other hand, accuses equality of resources 
not of (possible) envy resulting from the adoption and application of 
its prescribed principle of justice, but of it actually expressing envy or 
being motivated by envy. However, she does not persuasively explain 
why it is the case that equality of resources is expressive of or 
motivated by envy. She merely says that (psychological) envy’s 
thought is “I want what you have”, that the envy test on which 
equality of resources rests is satisfied when no one would want what 
others have, thus equality of resources rests on (psychological) envy. 
Now, as I have argued, saying that “I want what you have” is 
insufficient for making it the case that “I envy you”. Not every instance 
of wanting what others have can qualify as being an instance of envy, 
at least the kind of envy that should be the concern of a theory of 
justice. However, it might be worth examining whether equality of 
resources does actually take the form of “I want what you have”. 
Before proceeding, I should make clear that my aim is not to 
suggest some definition of psychological envy, nor to explore what an 
appropriate definition of it would be, given existing ones,2 so as to 
then argue that Anderson has not proved that equality of resources is 
motivated by envy properly understood. My aim rather is to show that 
equality of resources does not even take the form of “I want what you 
have”, which, as I have noted above, is in any case insufficient for 
saying that such a statement is the expression of feelings of envy. 
However, I think it would be useful to undertake 
 
 
2 See, for example, Nozick (1974: 239-246). 
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this task for the following reason. If we take the statement “I want 
what you have” as a necessary condition/basis for psychological envy, 
in the sense that there are those who envy and thus would want to 
have what the envied have, then if we are able to show that people 
under equality of resources do not base their claims on what others 
have even in this sense, we would have shown that the principle of 
equality of resources is not motivated by envy properly understood. 
Such a task is, to my mind, worth pursuing, not only because 
Anderson’s criticism of luck egalitarianism has been greatly influential, 
and thus we need to subject her judgements to scrutiny, but because 
psychological envy is indeed a crucial problem for theories of justice 
to confront, and especially egalitarian theories. 
Equality of resources: expressive of envy? 
Having said that, I shall turn to Dworkinian equality of 
resources and, in the light of the Rawlsian argument, see whether it 
expresses envy. Note that, in Dworkin’s theory, people are not behind 
a veil of ignorance when they bid for resources in the auction, while 
they are put behind a thinner veil of ignorance than Rawls’ veil when 
they make their insurance decisions in the hypothetical insurance 
market. According to Dworkin, it is necessary that people have 
knowledge of their conception of the good in order to know what 
external resources, from the available stock of the world’s resources, 
will be useful in fulfilment of their life plan so as to bid for them in the 
auction by paying the opportunity costs others forgo, as these are 
formed by the envy test, which takes place against a background of 
equal liberties, as these are specified by the liberty/constraint system. 
He then goes on to examine how equality of resources would deal 
with inequalities stemming from differential talents and abilities by 
devising the hypothetical insurance market for talents and disabilities, 
on the outcome of which his compensatory scheme relies. So as a first 
step to the examination of the place of (psychological) envy in equality 
of resources, we should 
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see whether people in the auction express envy. I think the answer is 
negative. 
People in the auction have knowledge of their life plans and 
try to secure their favoured resources. Envy has no place at this stage, 
not even in the primitive sense stated by Anderson, namely that “I 
want what you have”. This is so, first because the immigrants have no 
prior rights over the island’s resources nor do they have any other 
possessions with them, so it cannot be the case that some may “want 
what others have”. Also, they cannot feel envy for others, for they do 
not yet know how things will turn out for them when they will engage 
in production and trade, thus they do not know what their place in the 
economic system will be and whether they will be among those 
worse-off. At this stage, people have equal resources and nobody can 
reasonably be said to envy what others have. Moreover, people in the 
auction cannot express feelings of envy, for the social conditions that 
would generate such feelings are for the moment absent. This is so, 
because if, following Rawls, “the main psychological root of the 
liability to envy is a lack of self-confidence in our own worth combined 
with a sense of impotence” (1971: 535), that is, if envy’s psychological 
root is lack of self-respect, and if the social bases of self-respect are 
the formation of a worthwhile (as judged by the person) plan of life, 
income and wealth, liberties, and respect of one’s life plan from 
others, then at the auction stage, we cannot say that there exist those 
conditions that would make it possible for envious feelings to arise. 
Examining this more closely, we can say first that people do have their 
conception of the good that they think worthwhile pursuing and they 
all have the fullest possible liberty to act as they wish (as liberty is 
specified by the liberty/constraint system). No one has more 
opportunities than others to pursue her life plan. The auction is meant 
to secure on equal terms the resources necessary for the fulfilment of 
people’s life plans, which after the auction have been divided equally. 
So
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again, no one can be said to be disadvantaged. Thus, so far it seems 
that the social bases of psychological envy are absent. 
What about respect from others for one’s life plan? This case 
is somewhat more complicated. Rawls maintains that it is important 
for people’s self-respect to know that other people appreciate their 
person and plan of life, for this is partly what makes them think that 
their life plan is worthwhile (1971: 440-1). At the stage of the auction, 
people know their life plan, but Dworkin is not clear about whether 
they know others’ life plans. There are places in his theory, however, 
that suggest both possibilities.3,4 So, given that it is unclear whether 
people know the conception of the good of others, which is necessary 
for evaluating and giving esteem or not to each other, we can examine 
both possibilities. 
Apparently, if people have no knowledge of other people’s 
conceptions of the good, then there is no basis (at the stage of the 
auction) for any loss in their self-respect, which could be caused by 
the disfavour others might show to one’s life plan. However, let’s 
suppose that people have knowledge of each other’s life plans and 
thus they can affirm some of them while disvalue others. There is a 
possibility then that psychological envy may arise on the part of those 
who will be disadvantaged due to prejudice. But, the principle 
 
3 For example, when Dworkin discusses the principle of correction, that is aimed at 
correcting externalities and transactional costs, he supposes that a person A may 
buy a lot of land in order to build a glass box, but he also states that “A’s intentions 
might not be transparent” or that if his intentions were known to the other 
members of the auction, the latter could decide to cooperate and outbid him in the 
auction (2000: 156); but his intentions may not be known. On the other hand, the 
principle of independence is aimed at protecting some people from ending up with 
lesser resources because they are the objects of prejudice (Dworkin 2000: 161). But 
for one to be prejudiced, others need to know his conception of the good. 
4 Note that if people do not know or partly know other people’s life plans, then it 
seems that they would be behind a thin veil of ignorance. 
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of independence is there to ensure that no such disadvantage is 
generated (as far as possible). And we cannot possibly say that the 
principle of independence is expressive of envy on the part of those 
prejudiced. Prejudice is itself unjust and victims of prejudice are 
expressing resentment when disadvantaged rather than envy.5 
However, it might be objected that what is most crucial for self-
respect is not the resources people can secure for the fulfilment of 
their life plan, that the principle of independence tries to secure, 
although it is certainly important that people have the requisite 
resources available, but recognition of one’s life plan from others. And 
victims of prejudice, although they are secured against the possibility 
of ending up with fewer resources than they would otherwise have 
had, had they not been prejudiced, do not get the recognition that is 
due to them. This certainly may raise problems of envy. But we should 
ask whether it is the principle of justice that expresses envy or 
whether the envy is a consequence of it. I tend to think that neither is 
the case. As we have seen, the principle of independence cannot 
possibly be said to be the expression of envy. But nor does it seem 
plausible that those prejudiced would become envious as a 
consequence of the principle of independence. Besides, no principle 
of justice, no theory indeed, can rule out the possibility that there may 
exist ill-conceived conceptions of the good, such as racism for 
example. What a theory of justice tries to do is to rule out, as far as 
possible, such conceptions having any bearing on the victims’ life, by 
mitigating or eliminating, where this is possible, the distributive 
effects of such views and by trying to suggest policies that would 
undermine the rise or reproduction of such norms or reforms of the 
structural background that produce or reproduce them. I have 
 
 
 
5 See Rawls on the distinction between envy and resentment (1971: 533-4). 
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explained why equality of resources would be sensitive to this in 
chapter 2.6 
Yet, even if equality of resources may not be expressive of 
envious feelings at the auction stage, it may be argued that the 
hypothetical insurance market for disabilities and talents is. This is so, 
for compensation for lack of abilities or talents is due when one would 
prefer another person’s (circumstantial) advantages stemming from 
his abilities and marketable talents to her own. But as we have seen in 
chapter 1, this is what the common interpretation of equality of 
resources suggests. I argued, however, that this is not the best 
interpretation. 
As I maintained, with respect to the hypothetical insurance 
market, compensation is owed to those who have made the choice to 
insure themselves against a disability or lack of talent. In the case of 
disabilities, the level of coverage offered to those who actually 
develop a disability (and which will be collected through taxation) is 
fixed by the level of coverage the average person of the community 
would buy against a range of disabilities, if all people faced at the 
appropriate age equal chances of developing such a range of 
disabilities in the future, with this range being fixed (Dworkin 2000: 
77-8). In the case of talents, the level of coverage offered to those less 
talented is fixed by the level of coverage each person would, on 
 
6 One possible objection to my argument here is that the principle of independence 
implies that people can act out of envy when they make choices over the resources 
they bid for in the auction, since people do have the relevant knowledge of their 
conception of the good and thus of character traits (assuming that one’s character 
traits partly affect what life plan one chooses to pursue), thus of their possible 
envious feelings, that they lack under the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. But such an 
objection fails to recognize that feelings of envy arise when there are the social 
conditions that would generate them, and no such conditions are in place yet. 
Moreover, envy is not itself a conception of the good, according to which people 
decide what resources they bid for, but it arises due to lack of self-confidence and 
impotence, that is, lack of faith in one’s life plan. 
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average, buy at a specified level of income and cost, if all had 
knowledge of their talents, skills, preferences, attitudes towards risk, 
the available resources and the income structure that will result after 
the auction—that is, when immigrants engage in production and 
trade—but with no knowledge of what the economic rent of their 
talents and skills will be and assuming that they all faced equal 
possibilities of ending up in any particular level of the economic 
structure (Dworkin 2000: 93-4). 
Interestingly, claims of compensation are not based on people 
pointing to each other’s good brute luck, which we might have reason 
to say that they envy, nor do they have to say “I want what you have”. 
People, being fairly positioned, make decisions on the insurance 
coverage they would want to buy against the possibility of ending up 
in a situation they themselves would judge as disadvantageous for 
their life prospects. So, one who ends up at a lower level of the income 
structure, or develops a disability, doesn’t need to say that “I claim 
compensation because I lack a talent or ability that others have and I 
think it valuable for my life”. As I said in chapter 1, if that were the 
case, then in the event all people were suffering from a disability 
against which all have insured themselves, then no one could ask for 
compensation, for no one could say that he lacks an ability that others 
have, since others are similarly situated with respect to the specific 
ability. Suppose, for example, that all people within a community 
decide to buy insurance coverage against developing a certain 
disability, which although not very serious would restrict their 
mobility, and can be fairly easily cured. In a case in which all actually 
develop this disability, would they then not be entitled to medical 
treatment, because no one can say that she is worse-off than others? 
No. All one needs to say is that “I have chosen to buy insurance against 
suffering from a disability or lacking marketable talents, and since I do 
actually suffer from a disability or I 
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have actually ended up at a lower socioeconomic level, compensation 
is due to me”. 
So far I have argued that equality of resources is not expressive 
of feelings of envy nor is it motivated by envy. I have taken 
psychological envy to mean that “I want what you have”, as has been 
suggested by Anderson, although such a definition would be 
insufficient to describe what psychological envy is. However, I have 
argued that if we are able to show that it is not even the case that 
under equality of resources people need to show that they want what 
others have, then we will have reason to maintain that it is not 
motivated by envy properly defined.7 For, we would have shown that 
 
 
7 Note that my argument against the envy objection does not imply that the 
common interpretation of equality of resources would necessarily be vulnerable to 
it. As I said “wanting what others have” is not sufficient to make it the case that “I 
envy you”. In this sense, it is not necessarily problematic from the point of view of 
egalitarian justice if, to claim compensation, one did say “I’d prefer to have the brute 
luck that you have”, as the common interpretation suggests. Of course, whether it 
would be problematic or not, it would depend on the reasons one might have for 
preferring another’s good brute luck. One reason for preferring to have the brute 
good luck of another person is because he has it. This points to feelings of envy. 
Another reason for preferring another’s brute good luck is not because he has it but 
because I think that I would be better-off had I the brute good luck that he has. But 
the fact that he has it is irrelevant in this case; it just happens that he has it. Even if 
he didn’t have it, I would still prefer it to mine. Whether I am entitled to 
compensation for not having the good luck I would prefer to have is a different issue. 
Proponents of the common interpretation say that I would be entitled to 
compensation only if someone else had the good luck I would prefer, because only 
then I could legitimately claim that I am worse-off than another. I say that I would 
be entitled to compensation if I had insured myself against brute bad luck and 
depending on the insurance decisions of all. Neither of the two justifications for 
compensating bad brute luck are problematic with respect to the envy objection. If 
there is a difference, there is because, under the common interpretation, there is 
the possibility that someone may claim and receive compensation because he has 
envious feelings, since we cannot possibly 
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equality of resources does not even share the specific form/pattern 
that envy has, namely the two parts and that thing possessed by one 
part which the other part wants or envies. If my analysis above is 
successful, then the envy objection fails. 
             Equality of resources: generating envy? 
There is a second strategy, though, that social egalitarians 
might be interested in, which they nevertheless have not pursued, at 
least as far as I am aware. As I argued, they can either argue that the 
principles of justice that equality of resources prescribes are 
expressive of envy, which I examined just above, or they can 
examine—following Rawls—whether applying equality of resources 
arouses excusable general envy to an extent that such envy would 
“undermine the arrangements it counts to be just” (1971: 531), in 
which case its principle of justice “should be reconsidered” (1971: 
534). Recall that such envy may arise under three conditions, one 
psychological and two social (Rawls 1971: 535-6). 
There are three cases where general excusable envy may be 
said to arise if equality of resources were adopted as a principle of 
justice: 
Case 1: victims of bad option luck. Negligent victims by being 
denied any help for their destitute situation may experience envious 
feelings, for it is highly possible that they will lack self-confidence in 
their own worth and their ability to pursue worthwhile life plans. This 
is so for mainly two reasons. First, by feeling responsible for their 
destitute situation, they lose faith in themselves and in their ability to 
lead their lives successfully and meaningfully. Second, they lack the 
wherewithal necessary for them to pursue their conception of the 
good. Moreover, such people may experience their condition as 
humiliating and painful, since they experience great inequality 
 
 
know what each person’s intentions are when he claims that he is worse-off than 
another. However, under my interpretation such a possibility is blocked. 
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between themselves and the rest of their society. Finally, they are not 
able to find “constructive alternatives to opposing the favoured 
circumstances of the more advantaged” and this is especially true, 
when those worst-off through their imprudent choices belong to 
groups that are dominated and oppressed.8 Homeless people who 
have become homeless through their choices can be a paradigm case 
that satisfies all the three conditions. 
Case 2: unemployed people unable to find a job during a period 
where there are plenty of jobs available (Wolff 1998: 113-4, cf. 2015: 
222-4). In order to qualify for welfare benefits those people are 
subject to “shameful revelation”. Such people may be said to be 
vulnerable to the conditions of envy. First, they may lack self-
confidence in themselves and their ability to make something valuable 
out of their lives, since they have to admit that their talents are 
worthless and thus they cannot contribute to the social product. 
Moreover, since they lack productive talents, their confidence in their 
ability to pursue a worthwhile plan of life is certainly reduced. 
Secondly, although their relative situation with respect to others may 
not be so bad, given that they have access to welfare benefits so as to 
be able to attain a decent standard of life, such access is conditional 
on them being able to prove that they are not responsible for their 
inability to find a job, thus making them vulnerable to the 
psychological condition. Such people may refuse to claim benefits in 
order not to put themselves into the position of admitting their lack of 
talents and their inability to find a job when there are plenty of job 
opportunities and despite their effort to do so (Wolff 1998: 114), thus 
they become vulnerable to the first social 
 
8 This is not to say that there is a statistical significance pointing to the fact that those 
worse-off through their fault are people from certain oppressed and dominated 
groups, for that would mean that probably there has been no background equality 
of opportunity. I am just saying that it may happen that a negligent victim also 
belongs to such a group. 
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condition of envy. Finally, joblessness can make people see 
themselves as unable to find constructive alternatives to opposing the 
favoured circumstances of those who are better-off. It seems to be a 
paradigm case of this second social condition, for it is mainly through 
one’s job that a person able to work can lead a decent life, even one 
that is not as attractive as other people’s lives, but at least he has 
reasons to think that he can make something valuable out of his life 
and thus not be willing to impose a loss on those better-off even at a 
cost to himself. 
Case 3: dependent caretakers. Dependent caretakers (and 
especially mothers) may be less vulnerable to the psychological 
condition than people in the above cases, since they usually think of 
themselves as pursuing a valuable life plan, one that as well 
contributes to the social product. However, it may be the case that 
some dependent caretakers would prefer not to take care of 
dependents or that the responsibilities of looking after dependent 
people are split fairly between family members, so that they can as 
well pursue their career, say, but social norms are so pressurising that 
the burden falls entirely on them. In this case, dependent caretakers 
may see their lives more as a burden than as fulfilling, and although 
they may not feel they lack the ability to pursue a valuable life plan, 
they may think, because of their caretaking responsibilities, that their 
opportunities to do so are lost. This thought that their life remains 
unfulfilled may be damaging to their self-confidence. Another aspect 
we might consider is the recognition that dependent caretakers take 
from others for what they do. If self-respect depends, among other 
things, on how others value one and her life plan, then we can easily 
think that dependent caretakers may lose faith in themselves, if 
dependent caretaking is a low-valued activity. And recognition of the 
value of dependent caretaking has to also (but not only) take the form 
of externalising at least some of its burdens. This is related both to the 
psychological 
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condition and the first social condition. Since dependent caretakers 
are not paid for their services, they at best become themselves 
dependent on wage earners. This certainly cannot be said to 
encourage their self-confidence. Worse though is the situation of 
those who do not have a supportive family environment, even when 
that would put them in a dependent position. Poor single mothers are 
such an example, since they are usually dependent on very low state 
subsidies. Such people are vulnerable to the first social condition, that 
is, they experience their situation as painful and humiliating, for they 
are usually considered to be responsible for their destitute situation, 
while at the same time their position relative to others is usually 
greatly unequal. Finally, such people (especially poor single mothers 
and people facing similar circumstances) are usually not able to find 
any constructive alternative to opposing the more advantageous 
circumstances of the better-off. This is so, since their situation is so 
destitute exactly because of the lack of any reasonable alternative 
open to them; poor single mothers can neither abandon their 
children, at least not without an excessive psychological cost to them 
and their children, nor can they provide for their and their children’s 
basic needs. 
I have argued in chapter 2 why people considered to be 
vulnerable in cases 1 and 3 would be protected under equality of 
resources. So, the generation-of-excusable-general-envy objection 
fails with respect to these cases. Case 2 poses a problem for equality 
of resources with respect to the objection under consideration, to the 
extent that unemployment relief is conditional upon proving that one 
is not responsible for her plight, which may be experienced as 
shameful. Yet, it is not obvious that people under equality of resources 
will have to prove that they are not responsible for their inability to 
find a job by reporting their lack of talents, thus admitting that their 
qualities are inferior. This depends on the insurance coverage that it 
would be reasonable for people to buy against 
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facing unemployment and insurance policies vary depending on 
several factors. Dworkin, in discussing what insurance policies would 
be reasonable for people to buy against unemployment, argues for 
what he calls the mandatory-interventionist policy (2000: 336-8). The 
mandatory-interventionist policy “provides that the insurer must 
provide training and use its best efforts to find jobs”, while insurance 
is paid until the unemployed person gets actually employed and on 
the condition that he does not refuse a “stipulated number of such 
offers” of jobs provided by the insurer (Dworkin 2000: 336). I should 
add that offers of jobs should be reasonable. Such a policy does not 
require that people should reveal information about their personal 
qualities. Personal responsibility is identified through the person’s 
refusal of offered jobs and/or her refusal to receive training. No one 
needs to declare herself untalented to qualify for subsidies. 
 
Summing up, I have argued that social egalitarians can seek to 
defend their view that principles of justice prescribed by equality of 
resources are either expressive of psychological envy or can generate 
excusable general envy. In the first case, they can try to show that 
equality of resources is based on the thought that “I want what you 
have”. This will only be a necessary condition though. But it would be 
worth taking up the task of showing that equality of resources satisfies 
this condition as a first step to persuasively make their case. However, 
I argued that such an attempt fails. In the second case, social 
egalitarians can, following Rawls, examine whether principles of 
justice prescribed by equality of resources can arouse psychological 
envy and I suggested that there are three main cases where the latter 
might be thought to do so, namely with respect to the negligent 
victims, those jobless through no fault of their own, and dependent 
caretakers. However, I argued that equality of resources is not 
vulnerable to the excusable-general-envy objection. 
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            b. The role of pity in equality of resources 
Let me now turn to the case of pity. Anderson argues that luck 
egalitarian principles of justice are expressive of pity, a morally 
objectionable attitude since it treats those pitied as inferior, which in 
turn may generate humiliation of those pitied and social stigma 
(though, these latter can be generated by other morally objectionable 
attitudes as well). So, the social egalitarian objection with respect to 
pity can take the following form: a) luck egalitarian principles of justice 
are expressive of pity, which is objectionable since pity requires 
feelings of superiority on the part of those who pity others who are 
respectively regarded as inferior; b) luck egalitarian principles of 
justice, because of (a) can generate humiliation of those pitied and 
social stigma. Note also, that (a) can be true even absent (b), since 
being pitied does not necessarily mean that one feels humiliated. Yet, 
social egalitarians could argue that when one is pitied he is necessarily 
humiliated regardless of what he himself feels and thinks. It is in itself 
humiliating to be pitied, since pity rests on feelings of superiority and 
this is so irrespective of whether the object of pity feels humiliated or 
not. 
Now, there are several questions arising: 1) is it the case that 
pity necessarily rests on feelings of superiority? And if not, is pity a 
morally objectionable attitude regardless of whether it is related to 
feelings of superiority or only when it is so related? In other words, 
would it be morally objectionable if I felt pity for you without at the 
same time feeling that I am superior to you and you are inferior to me? 
Call this second kind of pity good-will pity. 2) Is good-will pity a morally 
objectionable attitude when in acting on principles of justice we are 
expressing good-will pity? 3) Are luck egalitarian principles necessarily 
expressive of (good- or ill-will) pity or are they possibly expressive of 
(good- or ill-will) pity? 4) Does the fact that a principle of justice is 
possibly expressive of (good- or ill-will) pity—and suppose we assume 
it is morally objectionable to act from reasons
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other than justice reasons—make it the case that the principle of 
justice is itself morally objectionable? 
Having these questions in mind, social egalitarians can make 
the following moderate claims: a) Pity is a morally objectionable 
attitude when it is related to feelings of superiority.9 b) It is morally 
objectionable when in acting on principles of justice we are motivated 
by pity rather than by a sense of justice. By this I mean that pity is not 
the right attitude when acting on principles of justice, because it is not 
a proper reason of justice. So, it would be morally objectionable even 
if we were motivated by good-will pity. Moreover, good- or ill-will pity 
may cause harm to one’s self-respect. c) If a principle of justice can be 
possibly expressive of (ill- or good-will) pity, then it is a morally 
objectionable principle. Because luck egalitarian principles can be 
possibly expressive of (ill- or good-will) pity, they are morally 
objectionable. 
Yet, social egalitarians have further to explain why luck 
egalitarian principles can be expressive of (good- or ill-will) pity. 
According to Anderson, people under luck egalitarian principles are 
categorized as fortunate or unfortunate by reference to their innate 
abilities and skills. Note, however, that Anderson seems to be making 
a stronger claim against luck egalitarianism instead of the moderate 
one I suggest social egalitarians should make. I say “seems” since her 
argument is not very clear, but one way we can faithfully interpret it 
is as suggesting the claim that pity necessarily rests on feelings of 
superiority and that luck egalitarian principles of justices are 
necessarily expressive of pity. I think this stronger view is mistaken.10 
Yet, her view can consistently take the more moderate 
 
9 This leaves the possibility open that pity is not necessarily related with feelings of 
superiority. 
10 Anderson thinks that pity, unlike compassion, “is aroused by a comparison of the 
observer's condition with the condition of the object of pity. Its characteristic 
judgment is not “she is badly off” but “she is worse off than me”. When the  
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form. So, social egalitarians can say that judgements of brute bad luck 
can be possibly regarded as inferiority conferring (Lippert-Rasmussen 
2012: 125) while judgements of brute good luck can possibly be 
regarded as superiority conferring. Secondly, those regarded as 
superior because of their brute good luck may possibly be motivated 
by pity to give to the inferior unfortunates. This is certainly morally 
objectionable. On the other hand, it may be the case that judgements 
of brute bad and good luck are not inferiority and superiority 
conferring respectively, but luck egalitarian principles of justice are 
expressive of good-will pity felt by the fortunate for the unfortunate. 
This is not a permissible reason to act if we are to act on principles of 
justice. Moreover, in both cases, there may be morally objectionable 
consequences for those labeled as unfortunate, since pity (in either 
form) may result in the pitied people’s loss of self-respect. 
Yet, assuming that it is morally objectionable to act from 
reasons other than justice reasons, one may object that the fact that 
a principle of justice is possibly expressive of (good- or ill-will) pity does 
not make it the case that the principle of justice is itself morally 
 
 
conditions being compared are internal states in which people take pride, pity's 
thought is "she is sadly inferior to me". Compassion and pity can both move a person 
to act benevolently, but only pity is condescending” (Anderson 1999: 306-7). 
Although she tries to make her case about pity being necessarily based on feelings 
of superiority, her argument is unpersuasive in that she wrongly regards that 
feelings of pity are motivated by comparisons between people’s internal states, 
where the ones with “superior” innate capacity take pride in them. This is 
unjustified. For one thing one need not take pride in her internal state in order to 
say that another is worse-off than her. Moreover, and more importantly, luck 
egalitarianism’s motivating thought is that there is nothing we should take pride in 
our undeserved innate skills and abilities. It is just a matter of luck how we have born 
and thus it is unjust if some people have less good lives due to undeserved 
misfortune or due to facts for which they cannot be reasonably held responsible. So, 
Anderson’s strong formulation of the objection seems misplaced. 
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objectionable (see question 4). Social egalitarians may respond as 
follows. Even if we assume that this is true, to the extent this is a 
possibility, then if we can find an egalitarian principle that avoids this 
possibility, we should opt for the latter. So, even if we assume that 
luck egalitarian principles of justice are not themselves objectionable, 
it is nevertheless possible that people in acting on them may express 
pity. To the extent social egalitarianism avoids this possibility, it is a 
better alternative to luck egalitarianism.11 Social egalitarianism avoids 
this possibility because it does not need to cite people’s innate abilities 
and talents for justice-claims to be generated. Instead, people under 
social equality make justice-claims on each other in virtue of their 
equal social and political standing.12 
Moreover, luck egalitarianism cannot be so modified so as to 
avoid this possibility, because to do so, luck egalitarians would have 
to either abandon the responsibility element of their theory by 
securing unconditional access to certain goods, so as to indirectly 
address luck inequalities; or, to abandon the luck element with 
respect to innate talents and abilities by equalizing external resources 
at the start of 
 
 
 
11 Of course, social egalitarians would have further to argue that their preferred 
conception of justice is better all things considered. But I leave this complication  
aside here, since it does not affect my argument. 
12 See, however, Lippert-Rasmussen who maintains that Anderson’s democratic 
equality is as well vulnerable to the humiliation objection (2012: 126-7) that the 
latter raises against luck egalitarianism and which according to Lippert-Rasmussen 
“focuses in part on the morally objectionable attitude of pity expressed by someone 
who, acting on luck egalitarian principles, compensates another for bad brute luck” 
(2012: 126, cf. Wolff 2010: 348). Yet, it is possible for a social egalitarian to claim 
that in a society of equals, people should have unconditional access to basic 
capabilities or genuine opportunities etc., thus public policies do not have to aim at 
identifying individuals that are in some sense disadvantaged, thus possibly causing 
harm to their respect standing (Wolff 1998; 2010; Wolff and de-Shalit 2007; Carter 
2011).
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people’s lives, leaving people to end up unequal by the use of their 
internal skills (Carter 2011: 569). 
My concern here is whether the pity objection can successfully 
stand against equality of resources. I argue that it cannot. As in the 
case of envy, it would be useful to examine whether pity is the 
motivating emotion in each of the three stages of distribution, namely 
the auction and the hypothetical insurance market for disabilities and 
talents. With respect to the auction, we cannot plausibly say that the 
more fortunate pity those unfortunate, since considerations relating 
to how luck affects people’s lives are out of place at this stage of 
distribution. People are assumed to be equally positioned when they 
bid for resources. With respect to the hypothetical insurance market 
for disabilities and talents, people, being fairly positioned, make 
decisions on the insurance coverage they would want to buy against 
the possibility of ending up in a situation they themselves would judge 
as disadvantageous for their life prospects. It is difficult to see why pity 
would be the motivating reason for those fortunate to give to the 
unfortunate, since when insurance decisions are made no one knows 
whether he will end up in a lower level of the income structure or 
whether he will develop a disability. 
 
Summing up, I have argued that social egalitarians can object 
to luck egalitarianism for being expressive of either ill- or good-will 
pity, because it bases claims of justice on people’s innate abilities and 
talents. Ill- or good-will pity is a morally objectionable attitude when 
acting on principles of justice. However, I argued that equality of 
resources is not vulnerable to the pity objection, since pity is not the 
motivating reason in either of the three stages of the distribution. If 
that is so, then social egalitarians cannot hold that their account of 
equality is a better alternative than equality of resources on account 
of what the right attitudes are within a society of equals. 
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            c. Is equality of resources humiliating of people’s dignity? 
As I said above, pity may generate feelings of humiliation and 
social stigma on the part of those pitied, which may harm their respect 
standing. Yet, such objectionable consequences may occur 
independently of whether the pity objection stands. So, we can 
examine the humiliation objection independently of the pity 
objection. Considering, for example, Wolff’s shameful revelation 
objection to means tested welfare policies, it can be humiliating for 
people to be singled out as internally inferior in order to qualify for 
subsidy (Anderson 1999: 305). Luck equalitarianism “disparages the 
internally disadvantaged and raises private disdain to the status of 
officially recognized truth” (Anderson 1999: 306). It is hard to see how 
such treatment respects people’s dignity or personhood. But what 
does “internally inferior” here mean? 
On the one hand, it could mean that one is not as skilful as 
another, or that he lacks a certain ability that others have and so on. 
This in itself does not suffice to make it the case that someone may 
feel shame for this kind of “inferiority”. On the other hand, it could 
mean that judgements of brute bad luck are moral inferiority-
conferring.13 Certainly, luck egalitarian principles cannot be assumed 
to rest on any such implausible assumption. So, what is the problem 
with luck egalitarianism and the specific concern about humiliation? 
There are two things that seem to be problematic. On the one hand, 
in non-ideal circumstances, adopting luck egalitarian principles of 
justice may result in the less talented or the disabled being considered 
as morally inferior. This can be due to prevailing prejudicial social 
norms. Because there may be such harmful 
 
 
13 Note, however, that only third-person judgements of bad brute luck could be said 
that they could possibly be moral inferiority conferring. See chapter 1 on the 
distinction between first and third person judgements of bad brute luck. 
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consequences, we should seek other ways to remedy the relevant 
differences in people’s innate endowments, such as unconditional 
basic income. I take the point of the specific concern, but I think that 
the specific argument is unpersuasive. Policies that call for 
unconditional basic income in order to protect people from losing 
their self-respect are insufficient. The problem of prejudicial social 
norms and the harmful effects these have on certain people is not 
solved by ensuring that all people have a guaranteed basic income. 
More importantly the problem of disabilities cannot be sufficiently 
tackled through the provision of basic income. People with disabilities 
have special needs that cannot be fulfilled by basic income, nor, on 
the other hand, can basic income be of so high a level to cover the 
needs of those with severe disabilities. Moreover, it seems to me that 
the present objection disregards the fact that by turning a blind eye 
to disabilities and lack of productive talents, the state preserves rather 
than eliminates prejudicial social norms that relate differences in 
people’s endowments to people’s moral value. This is so, for the 
harmful consequences we are considering are experienced because of 
the existence of prejudicial social norms. So, even if the state adopted 
unconditional basic income, it would not do away with prejudice. My 
claim though here is stronger. Not only would it not do away with it, 
but—to use Anderson’s claim in a reverse sense—it would “[raise] 
private disdain to the status of officially recognized truth”. 
On the other hand, the humiliation objection can be 
interpreted to suggest that it is in itself disrespectful of people’s 
dignity to evaluate their internal endowments and this is so 
independently of whether there are any prejudicial social norms or 
whether people would consider such evaluation humiliating and 
shameful. This is so, for dignity requires that we abstain from such 
evaluations if we are to respect people as equals. I think this is the 
best way of making sense of the humiliation objection. 
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Carter advances the thought that what we owe to people if we 
are to respect them as equals is opacity respect (2011). Opacity 
respect requires that to respect people’s dignity we should abstain 
from evaluating people’s agential capacities on which moral agency 
supervenes. He maintains that although “looking inside” people is 
inappropriate if we are to respect people’s dignity, it is necessary to 
do so, so as to test whether individuals satisfy a certain minimum 
standard of agential capacities to qualify as moral agents (Carter 2011: 
552-3).14 Once we see that individuals satisfy this minimum, we should 
then abstain from further evaluations of people’s agential capacities 
(Carter 2011: 553), we should treat them as opaque. Carter argues 
that the kinds of dignity people possess as moral agents are “dignity 
as agential capacity” and “outward dignity” (2011: 555). People 
possess the first kind of dignity in virtue of their agential capacities, 
which they keep even if treated in humiliating ways (Carter 2011: 554-
5). People possess “outward dignity” in virtue of their “character, 
behavior, or situation” (Carter 2011: 555). Outward dignity requires 
that people are invulnerable to exposure, that is, to evaluation of their 
agential capacities by others (Carter 2011: 555-7). If this is so, then a 
person may lose her outward dignity if she is exposed to treatment 
that presupposes such kind of 
 
 
14 Let me note that, according to my view, it is not sufficiently justified why “looking 
inside” people so as to test whether they satisfy a certain minimum standard of 
agential capacities to qualify as moral agents is not disrespectful, even more 
disrespectful than doing so after people have satisfied that minimum. It seems more 
plausible to me if people thought that their dignity is disrespected when they are 
asked to prove that they can qualify as moral agents than when they are asked to 
prove that they are not responsible for not being able to find a job, for example. If 
moral agency is fundamental for constituting personhood, then it seems that the 
kind of evaluation that Carter thinks necessary for testing moral agency is even more 
demeaning. However, I shall not pursue this thought any further here. 
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evaluation of her agential capacities.15 Opacity respect, Carter argues, 
constrains the currency of egalitarian justice (2011: 560-4). Any 
egalitarian principle should in its application satisfy the “opacity test”, 
namely it should not fail to respect people as opaque (Carter 2011: 
561). An egalitarian principle fails to respect people as opaque, if, in 
applying it, we are required to evaluate people’s agential capacities. 
If this is right then luck egalitarian theories of justice fail the 
opacity test, since they require evaluation of people’s agential 
capacities or “internal endowments” (Carter 2011: 565-6, ).16 To pass 
the opacity test, as it was said above, they would have to either 
abandon the responsibility element of their theory by securing 
unconditional access to certain goods or provide for the least 
advantaged, so as to indirectly address luck inequalities; or to 
 
 
15 I think Carter’s argument in favour of opacity respect is problematic with respect 
to people facing mental disabilities. If opacity respect is owed to people only if they 
satisfy the certain minimum standard of agential capacities to qualify as moral 
agents, then it follows that people who do not satisfy that minimum standard are 
not owed opacity respect. Opacity respect of people’s outward dignity requires a 
degree of concealment. “In the case of the human body, outward dignity involves a 
literal covering up with clothing or veils or paint; in the case of persons considered 
as bundles of agential capacities, it involves the maintenance of what Kolnai calls a 
certain “distance,” of a certain “intangibility” and “inaccessibility”— features that 
imply the kind of metaphorical opacity of the agent” (Carter 2011: 556). If that is so, 
it is hard to see why people that do not satisfy that minimum are not owed respect 
of their outward dignity in terms of their body being covered up and in terms of not 
being forced to reveal their innate capacities, especially when doing so is humiliating 
for them. But if this is so, then opacity respect is independent of moral agency and 
it cannot function as the basis of equality, if equal treatment or respect is owed to 
those who qualify as moral agents. 
16 Note that according to Carter the capability approach as used by Anderson also 
fails the opacity test, since it requires that individuals with inferior capability sets 
are identified so inequality along these lines to be removed (2011: 565-7). See also, 
fn. 12 above. 
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abandon the luck element with respect to innate talents and abilities 
by equalizing external resources at the start of people’s lives, leaving 
people to end up unequal by the use of their internal skills (Carter 
2011: 569). In the first case, assuming that there is a correlation 
between being least advantaged in terms of external resources and 
having low earning power, an indirect way to mitigate inequalities in 
people’s agential capacities is to provide for the least advantaged 
(Carter 2011: 569; ch. Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). However, such a 
policy would not be responsibility-sensitive, for it doesn’t aim to 
identify first who the least advantaged is and second whether she is 
responsible for being disadvantaged. In the second case, 
responsibility-sensitivity does not fail the opacity test to the extent all 
people are considered equally responsible, once they have satisfied 
the minimum standard for qualifying as moral agents, and inequalities 
in their external endowments are considered just, despite above-the-
minimum-standard differences in their agential capacities or internal 
endowments (Carter 2011: 569). 
Carter in examining whether luck egalitarianism passes the 
opacity test objects to Cohen’s, Arneson’s and Roemer’s versions of it 
(2011: 567, fn. 64). He is silent though on Dworkin’s view. I think, 
however, that it is worth examining whether Dworkin’s theory fails the 
opacity test for two reasons. First, as we have seen, in comparing luck 
egalitarian principles of justice with unconditional access to certain 
goods or the difference principle, Carter says that the latter would 
indirectly address luck inequalities assuming that there is a correlation 
between being least advantaged in terms of external resources and 
having low earning power. Modifying luck egalitarian principles in this 
way—Carter maintains—the latter would not fail the opacity test, 
since people’s differences in their productive talents would be 
mitigated indirectly through provision of unconditional access to 
certain goods or application of the difference principle, thus we would 
not have to evaluate people’s earning power that are 
 
147 
 
part of their innate endowments. In maintaining this, Carter seems to 
imply that people’s earning power belongs to their agential capacities; 
that’s why he suggests that they should be modified so as not to 
violate the requirement of opacity respect. To the extent then, Carter 
implies that people’s earning power belongs to their agential 
capacities from which we should abstain looking into if we are to treat 
people as opaque, equality of resources would seem to be as well 
vulnerable to his objection, namely that it is not a properly egalitarian 
theory since it fails the opacity test. This is so, for equality of resources 
introduces the hypothetical insurance market for disabilities and 
talents, that partly constitute people’s earning power, for identifying 
compensation to those who lack certain abilities and productive 
talents. In other words, equality of resources seems to require to look 
into people’s innate abilities and skills, which Carter thinks 
unacceptable from the point of view of opacity respect. 
However, I think Carter’s view is mistaken. If what is important 
in regard to opacity respect is not evaluating those agential capacities 
that are related to moral agency—such as, for example, the capacity 
for a sense of justice and the capacity to form a rational plan of life—
then it is not clear why looking into the sort of capacities that are of 
concern to equality of resources—that is, people’s productive talents 
and abilities—would be problematic for an egalitarian theory; that is, 
why it would consitute a violation of opacity respect. For equality of 
resources to fail the opacity test, it would have to be shown that the 
sort of capacities which are of concern to the latter are properties on 
which moral personality supervenes. However, the capacities on 
which moral personality supervenes are certain agential capacities in 
particular. In this sense, it has to be shown that talents and disabilities 
are such kinds of capacities, so that opacity respect rules out 
evaluating them and so for equality of resources not to be 
appropriately egalitarian. In other 
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words, it is not clear why people’s earning power—or, in Dworkin’s 
terms, talents and abilities—is part of those specific agential 
capacities on which moral personality supervenes. 
Moreover, it seems to me, that any attempt to relate people’s 
talents and abilities to the sort of agential capacities on which moral 
personality supervenes is both epistemically and morally wrong. 
Carter maintains that although people differ with respect to their 
agential capacities, we should nevertheless treat them as opaque, 
that is, turn a blind eye to these differences, once they have qualified 
as moral agents. Yet, these differences exist. Now, if talents and 
abilities are considered to be among those agential capacities that 
qualify someone for moral personality, then we would have to 
consider that people differ in their capacity for moral agency 
depending on the kind of talents and abilities one possesses as well as 
the degree to which they possess them. The fact that we should turn 
a blind eye to these differences once a certain minimum threshold is 
satisfied does not mean that the theory does not assume that there is 
such a correlation between moral powers and the specific capacities. 
This, however, is unacceptable. 
Now, one can object that the reason Carter maintains that luck 
egalitarian principles fail the opacity test is not because they, strictly 
speaking, require us to evaluate people’s earning power, that is, their 
abilities and productive talents, but because in doing so they aim to 
track responsibility. In other words, luck egalitarian principles of 
justice are concerned with whether a person is responsible for being 
disadvantaged or not. And the exercise of responsibility certainly 
depends on the specific agential capacities on which moral personality 
supervenes. To answer this objection, we have to distinguish between 
what, in chapter 1, I called the control-based account of luck 
egalitarianism and Dworkin’s equality of resources. The objection 
under examination here would be more plausible
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against the former, but only with respect to a restricted range of cases. 
The control based account identifies disadvantage (whether or not it 
is one for which the individual is responsible) from a third person 
perspective, that is, independently of how the person herself judges 
it. If that is so, then this conception of luck egalitarianism in its 
application would not require evaluations of responsibility at least in 
certain cases, such as when people are born disabled. We have also 
seen that Cohen thinks that equality of welfare is appropriate with 
respect to people’s judgemental preferences. Equality of welfare, 
however, is insensitive to responsibility considerations.17 
Generally, given Cohen’s revised view on consequential 
responsibility, it seems that the range of cases over which evaluations 
of responsibility are required is quite restricted. In any case, even if 
the objection we are examining here has some force against the 
control-based account of luck egalitarianism, it fails with respect to 
Dworkin’s account. As I maintained in chapter 1, according to my 
interpretation of equality of resources, people are not required to 
prove that they have not been causally responsible for their 
preferences or for their disabilities and unmarketable talents, nor do 
they need to report that they disidentify with them, in order to qualify 
for compensation. Compensation is due depending on the insurance 
decisions that all people make, given they have been fairly positioned 
before their decisions. In applying equality of resources, the 
redistributive scheme will be modelled on those hypothetical 
insurance assumptions. That said, it is not clear why Carter thinks that 
only unconditional access to certain goods or providing for the least 
advantaged as the difference principle requires can satisfy the opacity 
test. 
 
 
17 As such it seems that equality of welfare would qualify as a properly egalitarian 
principle according to Carter for it does not require evaluation of people’s agential 
capacities on which moral agency supervenes. 
150 
 
As I said above, there are two reasons why it is worth 
examining whether Dworkin’s theory fails the opacity test. So, let me 
now come to the second reason which relates to the objection that 
equality of resources fails to acknowledge that certain agential 
capacities required for decision-making are at least partly influenced 
by people’s innate abilities to deliberate, choose and act prudently. 
Such skills, however, belong to our circumstances, while people 
possess those decision-making agential capacities to differing degrees. 
If this is so, then people cannot be reasonably held (fully) responsible 
for what they identify with, since what they identify with depends on 
those decision-making capacities for which they are not responsible. 
Thus, if Dworkin’s theory is to be consistent, it should account for such 
differences in people’s agential capacities by properly proportioning 
consequential responsibility. If this objection stands, then equality of 
resources would fail the opacity test, since for equality of resources to 
be consistent it would have to evaluate those capacities properly 
considered as agential capacities on which moral personality 
supervenes, that is, people’s capacity for a sense of justice and their 
capacity to form a conception of the good. Yet, the objection supposes 
that under equality of resources identification is a sufficient condition 
for holding people consequentially responsible for what they identify 
with, something which, as I have argued in chapter 1, is wrong. In 
chapter 6, I discuss what are necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
person’s choices or preferences to be consequential responsibility 
conferring. Secondly, Dworkin does not need to hold the 
proportioning-of-consequential-responsibility view in order for his 
theory to be consistent. As I will argue in chapter 6, we can 
consistently interpret Dworkin’s account of consequential 
responsibility as requiring that people have a certain minimum level 
of certain agential capacities and that evaluation of people’s above-
the-threshold capacities is unacceptable from a liberal egalitarian 
point of view. If my argument 
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is persuasive, then Dworkin’s responsibility-sensitive theory of justice 
does not fail the opacity test, thus it qualifies as a properly egalitarian 
theory. 
 
Summing up, I have argued that social egalitarians can raise 
the humiliation objection against luck egalitarians by referring either 
to the fact that in non-ideal circumstances people would be 
vulnerable to humiliation and shame by being required to reveal their 
“inferior” capacities to qualify for social subsidy or to the idea of 
opacity respect advanced by Carter. I argued that it is the second form 
of the objection that seems to be more forceful. Yet, I argued that 
Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources would be invulnerable to it. 
As I said in the introduction, one of my two fundamental aims 
in this dissertation is to challenge the social egalitarian view that 
responsibility is incompatible with or only of secondary moral 
importance to the demand of non-domination and instead to argue 
that responsibility is constitutive of non-domination. In order to 
defend this thesis, I said that I shall argue that Dworkin’s theory of 
equality properly understood is not only attentive to the social 
egalitarian demand that people should relate to each other as social 
and political equals, but provides a better understanding of non-
domination than the proposed social egalitarian accounts precisely 
because it builds upon a conception of personal and consequential 
responsibility that is constitutive of equal social and political 
relationships. That said, my argument proceeds from a weaker to a 
stronger claim. 
            So far, I tried to defend the weaker claim, namely that 
Dworkin’s theory of equality is attentive to the social egalitarian 
demand that people should relate to each other as social and political 
equals. In chapter 1, I argued that Dworkin’s theory of equality shares 
the two basic social egalitarian commitments, 
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namely that equality concerns how we should relate to each other as 
equals and that strong egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of 
morally significant forms of interaction or relationships. In the light of 
this, I argued that the most plausible objections social egalitarians can 
raise against Dworkin’s theory so understood are the objection from 
the point of view of power equality and objection from the point of 
view of egalitarian motives/incentives/attitudes. In this and the 
previous chapter, I tried to examine each objection by formulating 
them in their best form and then argued why equality of resources is 
not vulnerable to them. Having done that, I hope I have persuasively 
argued in favour of the modest claim that equality of resources does 
not violate the social egalitarian demand of non-domination. 
However, there is stronger claim that I want to defend, namely 
that equality of resources, by making responsibility (properly 
understood) constitutive of non-domination, provides a better 
conception of non-domination than influential social egalitarian 
accounts. In order to defend this stronger claim, I need first to examine 
what I think the most prominent social egalitarian accounts of what it 
means to relate to each other as equals are and argue why each fails 
to give an attractive conception of non-domination. This will be the 
focus of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Social Egalitarian Interpretation of Equality I: The 
Attitudinal Conception 
 
 
In this and the following chapter, I shall examine how social 
egalitarians interpret what it means to relate to each other as equals. 
As Miller asserts “[i]t is possible to elucidate the ideal of social 
egalitarianism in various ways, but difficult to give it a sharp 
definition” (1999: 239). Social egalitarians maintain that people are 
owed equal respect, but this is quite vague as to what it means. 
Besides, luck egalitarians as well take equal respect of moral agents to 
be their starting position, but, as we have seen, social egalitarians 
claim that they differ with respect to how they interpret equal respect. 
According to Anderson and social egalitarians more generally, 
social and political equality has its root in universal moral equality 
(1999: 313). That all people have an equal moral standing means that 
when it comes to how people relate to each other in the social and 
political sphere they should do so on a footing of equality. This is so, 
since if we treat some people as social or political inferiors we deny 
them their equal moral standing. So, it is in this way that moral 
equality demands social and political equality. People relate to each 
other as equals when each has an equal standing and thus what we 
owe to each other is respect of our equal moral, social and political 
standing. 
This provides a first step to unpack the social egalitarian aim. 
As Anderson states “[t]he proper negative aim of egalitarian justice 
is…to end oppression, which by definition is socially imposed. Its 
proper positive aim is…to create a community in which people stand 
in relations of equality to others” (1999: 288-9). This general 
statement is one endorsed by almost all social egalitarians. The proper
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egalitarian aim is twofold: to end oppression and domination and to 
establish equal social and political relationships. Yet, we need to 
identify what oppression and domination consist in and relatedly what 
equal social relations are. This is a complex task and there have been 
several proposals as to what the best interpretation of such concepts 
is. 
In what follows, my main objective is to study and critically 
evaluate the main proposals that have appeared and are more 
influential in the relevant field. I have classified the different 
suggestions in basically two categories: the attitudinal interpretation 
of social equality, which I examine in this chapter, and the democratic 
participatory interpretation of social equality, which I examine in the 
next chapter. Within these two categories, I study the proposals of 
different social egalitarian thinkers. More specifically, within the first 
category I list and study the proposals of Miller, Fourie, Schemmel and 
Scheffler, while in the second, Young’s ideal of “city life” and 
Anderson’s “democratic equality”. This is not to say that these social 
egalitarian thinkers do not share common ground. They certainly do. 
They all think that democratic participation is constitutive of a society 
of equals and that people within such a society should have egalitarian 
attitudes, dispositions and so on. Their classification, however, into 
two distinct categories is helpful for reasons of analysing and 
evaluating what I think the most powerful social egalitarian arguments 
are. In this sense, I think that Miller, Fourie, Schemmel and Scheffler 
have been more attentive to the proper egalitarian attitudes of a 
society of equals, while Young and Anderson have more powerfully 
stressed the constitutive role of democratic participation in a society 
of equals. 
My main objection is that none of the proposed 
interpretations of social equality have provided us with an adequate 
account of non-domination spelled out in non-distributive terms, 
given the fact that social egalitarians maintain that social equality is 
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distinct from distributive equality. This is especially true of the 
attitudinal interpretation and more specifically of how Miller, Fourie 
and Scheffler spell out the ideal of social equality (sections a and b). 
The latter insist that social equality properly understood is concerned 
with the right egalitarian attitudes we should have towards each other 
and that distributive issues (widely understood) are not part of the 
interpretation of social equality, but are rather determined by it. 
While, I agree that a society of equals is one where people 
regard each other as equals and feel they are treated as equals, as the 
attitudinal interpretation requires, I shall argue that we cannot 
properly account for what the right egalitarian attitudes are, if we 
have not explained what a society of equals requires with respect to 
the distribution of political power, resources and so on. If this is so, 
then contrary to what social egalitarians maintain distributive 
arrangements are constitutive of non-domination and thus we cannot 
account for what a society of equals looks like independently of the 
former. 
Schemmel’s argument is concerned with how state institutions 
bring about certain outcomes (section c). His main point is that from 
the point of view of social equality what ultimately matters is not 
simply that an outcome is just, but that the process of bringing about 
a certain outcome is just. The latter concerns the kind of attitudes that 
state institutions should have if they are to respect people’s equal 
social and political standing. According to Schemmel, luck 
egalitarianism cannot account for the kind of injustices that may be 
involved in how certain outcomes are brought about, for it concerns 
itself with the pattern of distribution thus it neglects the relationships 
within which these goods are produced and distributed or the justice 
of the processes through which they have been brought about. I 
argue, however, that Dworkin’s theory of equality is not vulnerable to 
Schemmel’s objection, for, properly understood, equality of resources 
judges certain distributive outcomes as just or unjust depending on 
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how such outcomes have been produced, and more specifically on 
whether people have been prevented from exercising their 
responsible agency with respect to how they want to lead their lives 
on equal terms with others. Given this, I argue that Schemmel’s 
concern that the state should show equal concern and respect to 
people does not differ from at least one form of luck egalitarianism, 
that is Dworkin’s account. However, I also argue that Schemmel has 
not been successful in defending his argument that “how institutions 
treat people has relevance to social justice that is independent of, or 
at least not reducible to, the distributive effects of such treatment” 
(2011: 125). 
 
 
a. Social equality as distinct from justice: Miller’s and Fourie’s 
case 
Miller distinguishes between two kinds of equality, both of 
which, he says, are valuable: distributive equality, which is related to 
justice and is individualistic and social equality that is independent of 
justice concerns and is holistic (1999: 231-2). He identifies the ideal of 
social equality as a “form of life in which people in a very important 
sense treat one another as equals. In their social intercourse, they act 
on the assumption that each person has an equal standing that 
transcends particular inequalities” (Miller 1999: 240). By this Miller 
means that equal status is different from other inequalities such as 
inequalities in power, prestige, wealth and natural endowments, 
which fall within the purview of distributive justice. People may indeed 
differ along these dimensions, but what matters from the point of 
view of social equality is “how such differences are regarded, and in 
particular whether they serve to construct a social hierarchy in which 
A can unequivocally be ranked as B’s superior” (Miller 1999: 239). In 
order for social equality to obtain then people within a community 
should feel that they enjoy an equal standing with all the rest 
irrespective of how they score with respect to the
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aforementioned dimensions. Moreover, “[t]his is expressed in the way 
people interact” (Miller 1999: 239). So, there seem to be two 
important features that characterize a society of equals: first, that 
people regard each other as having an equal standing irrespective of 
their differences in wealth, power, natural abilities and so on. And 
second they express this belief in the way they interact with each 
other in their everyday lives.1 
Yet, by simply saying that equal standing means the absence of 
social hierarchies, it is unclear what is distinctive about social equality. 
For, we now have to ask how we are to define a social hierarchy. 
Answering that people are hierarchically ranked when they do not 
enjoy an equal standing would make our argument circular. Note that 
such circularity cannot be resolved by saying that people have an 
equal standing when they are equal in their power, wealth and so on, 
for this would render the ideal of social equality indistinguishable from 
distributive justice broadly understood. 
A possible objection to my circularity objection is that social 
equality is identified in terms of what people believe and feel. In this 
sense, social hierarchy is such when A regards B as her inferior and B 
feels he is inferior to her. Social rank, according to this view, is what it 
is because people believe it to be so. If, on the other hand, people do 
not regard their differences in abilities, power, wealth etc. as a basis 
of superiority or inferiority, then they feel that they enjoy an equal 
standing. To quote a famous passage: 
 
“social equality is how people regard one another and how 
they conduct their social relations. It does not require that 
people be equal in power, prestige, or wealth, nor, absurdly, 
that they score the same on natural dimensions such as 
 
 
1 Such a view shares some similarities with the idea of opacity respect advanced by 
Carter (2011). On Carter’s opacity respect see chapter 3.
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strength or intelligence. What matters is how such differences 
are regarded, and in particular whether they serve to construct 
a social hierarchy in which A can unequivocally be ranked as 
B’s superior. Wherever there is social equality, people feel that 
each member of the community enjoys an equal standing with 
all the rest that overrides member’s unequal ratings along 
particular dimensions. This is expressed in the way people 
interact: they use common modes of address…they shake 
hands rather than bow, they choose their friends according to 
their common tastes and interests rather than according to 
social rank, and so forth” (Miller 1999: 239, my emphasis). 
 
I shall put aside certain problems with this view and instead 
focus on what I consider to be a major drawback of it. As we have 
seen, Miller maintains that social equality does not require that 
people are equal along certain dimensions such as wealth, power, 
prestige and so on, but that they do not regard these differences as 
superiority conferring.2 I think he is wrong. This is especially true of 
power. If what matters is that people do not treat each other as 
inferiors independently of their inequalities in power, then such an 
account could be compatible with a society where domination is in 
place. Recall that domination is not only actual interference, but the 
capacity to arbitrarily interfere with one’s actions. If social equality 
concerns, as Miller insists, how we feel or how we interact with each 
other independently of inequalities in our wealth or power, then it 
seems that such a society is compatible with some having the capacity 
to exercise their power over others arbitrarily even if they do not 
 
 
2 See also Miller (1993: 302) where he states that a society of equals is “a community 
in which people's dealings with and emotional attachment to others are not 
inhibited by the barriers of class”, that is, a society of equals is not a classless society. 
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actually do so, because they believe they should not in the name of 
social equality. This is something most social egalitarians rightly reject. 
Miller could reply that the case of inequality of power I am describing 
above falls under the purview of distributive justice and so his 
definition of social equality as distinct from justice is unproblematic. 
But if this is so, then we would have to say that an unjust society (due 
to inequality of power) is nevertheless a society where social equality 
exists (due to people not regarding inequality of power as superiority 
and inferiority conferring). This would, however, sound absurd 
especially among egalitarians. 
To be sure, Miller maintains that unless people are treated as 
equals in distribution, where distribution is used in the wider sense of 
political and welfare rights distribution, then they cannot be said to 
enjoy social equality (1999: 241). But then it is not obvious how social 
equality is distinct from distributive equality and in what sense social 
egalitarianism offers a distinct understanding of equality from the one 
offered by at least some forms of luck egalitarianism, such as 
Dworkin’s theory, according to which we accord each equal concern 
and respect when we treat each other as equals in distribution and 
political power. 
Miller could object to my argument saying that although social 
equality is not defined in distributive terms, it entails distributive 
equality or has distributive implications that are informed by the value 
of social equality (1999: 241). In a society where people regard each 
other as equals, they would treat each other accordingly with respect 
to distribution (widely understood). But such an answer leaves the 
problem of how social equality differs from distributive equality 
unsolved. Moreover, his claim that social equality “does not require 
that people be equal in power, prestige, or wealth” etc. would not 
make much sense, if it were the case that social equality requires that 
people be equal with respect to distribution. 
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More generally, the problem with Miller’s view can be 
summarized as follows. If social equality is how people regard one 
another independently of how they fare in distribution (widely 
understood), then social equality would be compatible with 
domination, which many social egalitarians would find objectionable. 
If, on the other hand, we judge whether social equality obtains 
depending on how people fare in distribution, then it seems that 
distributive justice provides the background against which we judge 
whether people treat each other as equals. This is not meant to 
undermine the importance of how people feel or regard themselves 
or what kind of attitudes they have towards each other. A society of 
equals is one where people feel they are treated as equals and regard 
each other as equals. But for the right reasons. This requires us to be 
able to judge whether people’s feelings, attitudes, beliefs etc. are 
reasonable or not. And we cannot plausibly do so, unless we have a 
theory against which we test their reasonableness. For example, we 
may judge someone’s complaint that he does not consider he is 
treated as an equal because he cannot satisfy his taste for expensive 
champagne to the same extent as someone who prefers cheap beer 
as unreasonable if we adopt equality of resources or basic capabilities. 
On the other hand, we may judge as reasonable someone’s 
complaint that he is not treated as an equal if we deprive him of part 
of his fair share of resources, because he thinks himself superior to 
others or he does not shake hands with them.3 Or, we may not think 
it unreasonable if someone complains because he has less wealth 
through no fault of his own than others who are wealthier because 
they have been born within a wealthy family, even if others treat him 
in a decent way. 
A more recent attempt to identify the ideal of social equality 
as distinct from distributive justice concerns has been made by Fourie 
 
 
3 See Stemplowska (2011: 133). 
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(2012). Fourie as well maintains that social equality is distinct from 
other justice-based inequalities, such as power, political or distributive 
inequalities (2012: 108, fn. 3, 111, fn. 9). She defines social equality as 
an opposition to social hierarchies, where social hierarchies are 
described “as expressions of inferiority and superiority, indicated by 
both an evaluation and an expression of that evaluation” (Fourie 2012: 
111), both of which are necessary for describing inequalities in social 
status (Fourie 2012: 113). Evaluation takes the form of someone being 
valued higher than another in terms of his worth as a person (Fourie 
2012: 113). When one is considered to be an inferior she is regarded 
as such because she is thought to be a lesser person in her moral 
worth. She points out that status inequality obtains not merely 
because there are social differences, but because of the way these 
differences are evaluated. But evaluation is insufficient to make it the 
case that there is a hierarchical social relationship, if such an 
evaluation were not expressed in individual behaviour and social 
policy (Fourie 2012: 113). 
So, Fourie seems to relate certain evaluations to moral worth. 
In other words, certain characteristics confer more moral value on the 
person that has these characteristics and this is morally objectionable. 
However, saying that people relate to each other as social equals 
when they respect (where respect takes the form of both an 
evaluation and expression of that evaluation) each other’s equal moral 
standing irrespective of their social differences is still a vague 
understanding of the social egalitarian ideal as distinct from 
egalitarian justice, where the primary concern is equal distribution 
widely understood. Besides all egalitarian theories, luck egalitarianism 
included, accept that human beings should be treated or respected as 
moral equals. So, respect of people’s equal moral standing would not 
suffice to establish that social equality is distinct from distributive 
justice. Egalitarian justice would condemn as unjust unequal 
distribution of wealth, power, political rights, opportunities and so on. 
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In this sense, they would condemn the unequal institutional 
distribution of such goods as unjust. 
However, “[w]ith an emphasis on the justice of institutions, 
distributive justice is often silent about informal inequalities in civic 
life, the workplace, individual behaviour within the family, 
associations and so on” (Fourie 2012: 116). Yet, this is still insufficient 
for establishing the distinctiveness of social equality as distinct from 
justice concerns. If there are certain background informal injustices 
that disturb egalitarian justice, then a theory of distributive justice 
should take these into account if genuine distributive equality is to be 
achieved. 
So, Fourie would have to show what makes social equality 
distinct from justice by showing how it goes beyond justice demands. 
In other words, she would have to show that there is something 
morally bad if people fail to treat each other as social equals even if 
they do not treat each other unjustly. Fourie in discussing why social 
equality is valuable points to the harmful effects of social inequality 
maintaining that “[s]omeone who is treated as inferior could suffer 
damage to her self-respect, or her ability to form her conception of 
the good could be compromised” (2012: 118-9). Note, however, that 
modes of interaction, for the purposes of the argument advanced 
here, should not include kinds of conduct that may be said to cause 
harm to the self-respect of the victims. That would be a justice 
violation and can be accounted for by an egalitarian theory of justice. 
Moreover, it is not always the case that those treated as inferior 
experience a harm to their self-respect. For example, Mr. Collins, in 
Pride and Prejudice, may keep his self-respect even if he regards 
himself inferior to his patron, Lady Catherine de Burgh. He may even 
be proud of successfully fulfilling his duties in his role as a clergyman 
and of keeping up with the expectations of his patron, who recognizes 
and respects him for responding successfully to the requirements of 
his role. But we could hardly call their relationship a relationship of 
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equals. As Miller has pointed out each social form “carries its own 
moral vocabulary” (1999: 240), so that self-respect can be compatible 
with hierarchical social forms if self-respect is based on values 
differing from one value system to another or on differing meanings 
of the same term within different value systems (1999: 241). 
However, a possible objection to my argument that Fourie’s 
account of social equality fails to provide a definition of it as distinct 
from justice considerations, is that the various injustices that I have 
recognised either are caused by or are the cause of social inequality 
(Fourie 2012: 114-5). “[T]hus a notion of social equality could provide 
a foundation for evaluating other inequalities and, more specifically, 
for example, for evaluating principles for the distribution of social 
goods” (Fourie 2012: 115). In this sense, “[u]nequal distributions of 
certain social goods could create hierarchies of social status” (Fourie 
2012: 114) or hierarchies of social status could create unequal 
distributions of certain social goods. However, such a reply still leaves 
the ideal of social equality unspecified, while it begs the question. 
What we are asking is what makes social equality distinct from 
distributive justice concerns. Answering that social hierarchies can 
create or can be created by other inequalities, thus implying that 
social equality is distinct from distributive justice concerns, simply 
begs the question. Moreover, as it was said just above, if social 
equality is defined in terms of respect of people’s equal moral 
standing which then functions as a foundation for evaluating other 
inequalities and principles for the distribution of social goods, then it 
is not clear how social equality differs from the commitment of luck 
egalitarianism that people have equal moral standing which then 
informs us of what distributive justice requires. 
More generally, we can say that both Miller’s and Fourie’s 
accounts of social equality as distinct from distributive justice 
considerations are unpersuasive. This is so, for they define social 
equality in terms of how we regard each other irrespective of our 
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inequalities along certain dimensions that the distributive paradigm 
theorises. This makes social equality at best an empty ideal. We 
cannot plausibly make sense of what it means to treat each other as 
social and political equals independently of how we fare in 
distribution broadly understood. On the contrary, it is in virtue of 
achieving distributive equality (broadly understood) that we show 
respect for people’s equal social and political standing. 
 
            b. The practice of equality: Scheffler’s case 
Scheffler has recently provided an account of social equality 
that he concedes is distinct from the distributive paradigm, but has 
distributive implications. He presents his ideal of equality as one that 
focuses on the practice of equality (2015). He says that a society of 
equals should satisfy mainly two criteria. First, each person has a 
disposition to treat others as of equal moral importance. Second, this 
disposition is reflected in people’s deliberations over decisions of 
common interest, that is, interests that fall within the ambit of the 
relationship in question. They do so by each accepting that “the other 
person’s equally important interests—understood broadly to include 
the person’s needs, values, and preferences—should play an equally 
significant role in influencing decisions made within the context of the 
relationship”. Thus, “each of our equally important interests 
constrains our joint decisions to the same extent” (Scheffler 2015: 25). 
Scheffler calls this the egalitarian deliberative constraint (EDC). This 
seems to be a more promising approach than Miller’s and Fourie’s in 
that it claims that it gives “determinate content to the otherwise 
vague thought that the members of such a society regard one another 
as equals. It means that the equally important interests of each of 
them constrain social decisions to the same extent” (2015: 36). 
Three important things need to be noted here. First, on the 
one hand, EDC can be interpreted to be akin to a procedural right; 
namely, each person has an equal right to influence the outcome of a 
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deliberative process, that is, our “joint decisions” (EDC1). On the other 
hand, EDC may be understood to require only that people’s important 
interests should play “an equally significant role in influencing 
decisions” (EDC2). This does not necessarily imply a right to 
participate, which is how the former is often understood. For example, 
in a deliberative process we may be required to give equal 
consideration to a third party’s important interests. Scheffler is not 
very clear as to how we should make sense of EDC. Interestingly, EDC2 
would be closer to Dworkin’s theory, according to which people’s 
interests should be given equal consideration, which is not necessarily 
satisfied by people being given equal procedural rights and is 
independent of equal political power. If it is EDC2 that Scheffler has in 
mind, then it is unclear how his account differs from the Dworkinian 
account of equality and in this respect how his theory is spelled out in 
non-distributive terms. More interestingly though, if we take EDC to 
imply an equal procedural right, then it is unclear why distributive 
theories cannot account for the specific demand. In any case, given 
that EDC2 is close to Dworkin’s theory and given that Scheffler objects 
to the latter, in what follows, I shall consider the EDC1 interpretation 
of what social equality requires and examine whether it indeed can 
provide a distinct and more adequate to distributive egalitarianism 
reading of equality. Before that, let me note that EDC (in either form) 
does not imply that the outcome should be such that all parties end 
up equally well-off or that their interests are equally satisfied 
(Scheffler 2015: 28-30, 33). 
Secondly, the dispositions, attitudes, and motives people 
should have within an egalitarian society are not to be thought of as 
distributed equally between people. Although all people should 
display such attitudes, it is not the case that, where they all have such 
attitudes to an equal but low degree, the relationship is characterized 
as one between equals. Instead, “the egalitarian aim is not to equalize 
the relevant attitudes and dispositions but to maximize them: to 
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ensure that both parties exhibit them to the fullest” (Scheffler 2015: 
31). 
Thirdly, a society of equals will make distributive decisions, but 
such decisions are not to be informed by a distributive pattern of the 
sort suggested by distributive egalitarianism. Although EDC is meant 
to rule out certain distributive accounts as incompatible with the 
social egalitarian ideal, such as utilitarianism or luck egalitarianism 
(Scheffler 2015: 40-1, 42-3), the ideal of equality so understood is not 
meant to “yield any fully determinate principle for regulating the 
distribution of resources, not even a presumptive or prima facie one” 
(Scheffler 2015: 42). This is so, since the principles of distributive 
justice are to be informed by a range of values, of which equality is 
just one (Scheffler 2015: 43). Reciprocity and respect are important 
values that also figure in the complex ideal of equality and in principles 
of distributive justice (Scheffler 2015: 41). 
So, according to Scheffler the ideal of the practice of equality 
is not distributive. “It is not the view that there is something that 
should be distributed equally among the members of society” 
(Scheffler 2015: 37). People in a society of equals have the requisite 
dispositions and attitudes to the fullest possible extent to treat other 
people’s comparably important interests as of equal importance when 
making common decisions. 
I think Scheffler’s attempt to specify the ideal of social equality 
and point to its distinctively non-distributive character is unsuccessful. 
First, although Scheffler thinks that EDC gives determinate content to 
the vague requirement that we should regard one another as equals, 
more clarification is required as to what this means. What EDC says is 
that the equally important interests of each should have an equal 
influence in social decisions. Yet, as noted above, it is unclear how are 
we to judge that a social decision has been equally influenced by the 
important interests of all, namely, whether it is EDC1 or EDC2 that 
Scheffler has in mind. Given that EDC2 can be satisfied by Dworkin’s 
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distributive theory of equality of resources, I shall study the 
implications of EDC1. 
Consider, for example, Scheffler’s claim that EDC1 has 
considerable critical force when applied to cases of racial or ethnic or 
gender hierarchy or, for example, when considering gays’ claim on an 
equal marriage right that can be justified on account of their interest 
in getting married being as strong as heterosexuals’ interest in getting 
married (2015: 36). If what Scheffler says is sound, then it seems that, 
independently of the input test, and despite Scheffler’s view to the 
contrary (2015: 33-5), there should be an output test as well. This is 
so, since a fair decision-making procedure is not necessarily bound to 
bring about the right outcome and gays’ claim for an equal marriage 
right concerns the outcome of such a procedure. In the light of this, 
EDC1 is insufficient to satisfy the social egalitarian requirement that 
people’s interests should be given equal consideration, where this 
requires us to look at the outputs of a joint decision.4 
Scheffler may respond that in a society of equals, unjust 
outcomes would be unlikely, since people do have the requisite 
dispositions. However, that a certain unjust outcome would be 
unlikely in a society of well-disposed individuals does not refute my 
claim that to judge whether an outcome is just or unjust, we need an 
outcome test that has procedure independent criteria of what counts 
as right or wrong, just or unjust. So, a society of equals is one that 
satisfies both an input and an outcome test. Secondly, it is not clear 
why we should think that in a diverse society, where people have 
different and opposing values, interests and needs, they would 
necessarily reach the right decisions even if they are well-disposed by 
simply applying Scheffler’s EDC1. There is a question of how 
 
 
4 On the other hand, EDC2 can provide an output test, but Scheffler seems to deny 
that the EDC should be so interpreted (2015: 33-5). 
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conflicting interests are to be resolved in such a society and it is not 
clear how adopting EDC1 would help us deal with it. 
To see why, let us see how Scheffler deals with situations of 
conflicting interests. I shall give two quotes: 
a) In discussing how EDC1 is to be applied in personal 
relationships, Scheffler examines the possibility that people may have 
diametrically opposing values, in which case it may be impossible to 
arrive at a joint decision. He thus concludes that “[t]his gives people 
who want their relationships to be conducted on a footing of equality 
a (defeasible) reason to seek out others who share their most 
important values, at least for their most comprehensive personal 
relationships” (Scheffler 2015: 27). 
b) When he examines the application of EDC1 within the 
political context, he says that given the anonymity of the relationships 
and the impossibility of individualised knowledge of the interests of 
our co-citizens, EDC1 is to be satisfied by relying “heavily on 
normalized assumptions about the characteristic needs and interests 
that members can be assumed to have” (Scheffler 2015: 36). 
Given the above quotes, it is not clear how Scheffler would 
deal with conflicting interests within political society. He seems to 
suggest that in our personal relationships we usually seek people with 
whom we share common values. Although this may be what people 
usually do when choosing friends or partners,5 and although people 
can end their relationship6 in cases where their values change in a way 
that they become conflicting, this is not an available option when it 
 
5 Note, however, that fairness considerations may be raised with respect to our 
capabilities to choose friends and partners. See, for example, Williams (2002b). 
6 Certain issues of justice may arise when we decide to end a personal relationship, 
such as a marriage, but I am not going to discuss them here. The parents-children 
relationship presents a more complicated case with respect to our right to end a 
personal relationship. 
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comes to our political relationships. We cannot simply say that 
because we disagree with each other with respect to our 
comprehensive values we may end our political relationship. If a 
society of equals is to have any value, it has it because each person 
can live according to her own conception of the good even if her 
conception differs sharply from her co-members’. 
The second quote suggests that at the level of political 
decisions, EDC1 is satisfied by heavily basing our judgements about 
other people’s needs, preferences and values “on normalized 
assumptions about the characteristic needs and interests that 
members can be assumed to have” (my emphasis). However, it is not 
clear how we should make sense of the process of arriving at political 
decisions: is it a self-deliberative process or a collective deliberative 
process? If it is the second, then it is not clear why we have to base 
our judgements about people’s interests on normalised assumptions 
about the characteristic needs and interests they can be assumed to 
have. If anything, a collective deliberative process is meant to track 
people’s needs and interests, through giving them the public space 
along with certain opportunities to articulate and explain their needs 
and interests and make reasonable claims about their satisfaction 
upon each other. On the other hand, if it is a self-deliberative 
procedure, then Scheffler’s claim about normalised assumptions 
compromises much of the force his argument may otherwise have. 
One problem is that there is going to be wide dispute over what 
“normalised” means. More importantly though, and relatedly, making 
normalized assumptions about people’s needs and interests may lead 
to stereotyping and social stigma, as well as failure to address the real 
needs and interests especially of those who are least advantaged 
(broadly understood). 
A possible reply could be that normalised assumptions should 
not be understood in the way I have presented above. Instead, people 
should choose principles that secure those goods necessary for each 
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to be able to live according to her conception of the good. This is the 
familiar Rawlsian idea of basic liberties, in which people have a 
fundamental interest in securing, whatever else they may want. In the 
same sense, Scheffler could mean that normalised assumptions about 
people’s interests refer to those basic conditions necessary for each 
to be able to live according to her own conception of the good. Yet, 
this doesn’t show that social egalitarianism is a distinctively non-
distributive ideal, namely distinct from equality of power, 
opportunities, wealth and so on, which is the focus of the distributive 
paradigm. In Scheffler’s understanding of a society of equals, people’s 
comparably important interests should have an equal influence on 
collective decisions. This requires equal liberties, equal political 
power, equal opportunities related to the deliberative process, along 
with an outcome test. Equal respect for people’s moral standing 
requires that people are equal along certain social and political 
dimensions. 
In sum, I have argued that Scheffler’s recent attempt to specify 
the ideal of social equality as distinct from distributive justice is 
unsuccessful. This is so, since his requirement that people’s 
comparably important interests should play an equally significant role 
in influencing decisions cannot be satisfied unless we have an input 
and outcome test that is spelled out in distributive terms. In a society 
of equals, all people should have equal political rights, freedom of 
expression and association, freedom of thought and conscience, equal 
access to public fora and to information, alongside adequate 
resources and education. These are some criteria of fairness that the 
deliberative process should satisfy, so that each person has a fair 
opportunity to influence the outcome. Yet, they do not suffice to 
make sure that the outcome will indeed be fair or just, as we have 
seen in the case of homosexual people’s claim to an equal marriage 
right. Scheffler’s claim that what makes the ideal of social equality 
distinct from distributive justice is its special focus on people’s 
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dispositions, attitudes, etc. towards each other is unsatisfactory. As I 
have already stated, we cannot account for what the right attitude is 
unless we have a theory of justice against which we judge what the 
right attitude is and it is unclear how such a theory can be spelled out 
in non-distributive terms, when we ask how the abstract requirement 
that we should treat each other as equals should be interpreted. 
Scheffler has not been successful in giving determinate content to this 
requirement that can be distinct from distributive concerns and that 
a theory of distributive justice cannot account for. 
 
             c. State attitudes: Schemmel’s case 
According to Schemmel, what fundamentally matters, from 
the point of view of social justice, is not that institutions aim at 
bringing about a certain distributive pattern, but how they do it, what 
attitudes they express (Schemmel 2011), which may mean that 
bringing about a certain distributive pattern may conflict with the 
proper egalitarian attitudes. Schemmel points to the fact that focusing 
on the attitudes expressed by institutions, we can evaluate some ways 
of bringing about a certain outcome as more or less just depending on 
the attitude in question and independently of the outcome brought 
about. The distributive paradigm, however, does not have the 
resources to do so (Schemmel 2011: 125). Schemmel presents a case 
where there are several ways in which a particular distribution might 
be produced. But the different ways in which this particular 
distribution is produced are morally relevant from the point of view of 
equality, something that luck egalitarianism does not have the 
resources to point out.7 The case he presents (Schemmel 2011: 127) 
 
7 For a similar point, namely that recipient-oriented theories are blind to how a 
specific distributive result has come about, namely whether it is the outcome of 
natural luck or more importantly of domination or more generally social and political 
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consists of a group of people being worse-off than others due to lack 
of access to a vital nutrient V essential for good health. This may be so 
for the following five reasons: the state: 1) legally prohibits people of 
this group from having access to V; 2) legally authorises private 
subjects to refuse selling V to those people; 3) “foreseeably and 
avoidably engender[s] (but do[es] not specifically require[s] or 
authorize[s]) the shortfall” by not mitigating the position of those so 
poorly-off that they cannot afford to buy V; 4) does not effectively 
deter those who illegally refuse to sell V to the disadvantaged group; 
5) fails to mitigate the disadvantaged group’s bad luck in not being 
able to metabolize V due to a genetic defect by offering the required 
treatment. In all five scenarios, the outcome is the same distributively 
speaking, but since the causes of this outcome have different moral 
importance, each scenario is overall morally more or less bad or more 
or less just as a result. According to Schemmel, going from scenario (1) 
to (5) the moral badness or injustice reduces. Schemmel’s example of 
the distribution of V nutrient seems to be posing a problem of unequal 
power. In one or other way those who are more powerful control the 
distribution of V and are able to cause a disadvantage to the deprived 
group. Schemmel’s basic focus, however, concerns not the injustice 
found in the distribution of V or of the power to control the 
distribution, but how to evaluate the injustice found in these cases 
with respect to who causes it and how. This is related to the message 
that is communicated by action or inaction. Different ways of behaving 
may end up with the same outcome but communicate different 
messages. His objection to the distributive paradigm is that the latter 
can only judge the outcome as just or unjust, but not the way it has 
come about. In this sense, luck egalitarians would judge the state’s 
failure to mitigate the group’s 
 
injustices, see Forst (2013: 14-7, 22). Note, however, that Forst raises this point 
against Sen’s capabilities approach. 
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brute bad luck in the last scenario as equally unjust as the state’s 
direct exclusion of the group from having access to V. He concedes 
that the first scenarios (1-4) are instances of exclusively social injustice 
while the latter is not (Schemmel 2011: 132). As such Schemmel’s 
objection states that causing harm is more objectionable than not 
preventing it (2011: 130). Moreover, the examples he gives, point to 
the doctrine of double effect that can account for the intentions of 
certain institutional actions in bringing about certain outcomes 
(Schemmel 2011: 138). In this respect, it does matter how harm has 
been caused and whether it is intended or not in our considerations 
of justice. This further points to the distinctiveness of the social 
egalitarian position that injustice is socially created by the way people 
interact with each other, either interpersonally or through the 
institutions, and is not the upshot of natural distribution. 
Yet, it is not clear that the distributive paradigm cannot 
account for the injustice or moral badness in conduct that exists in the 
V-scenarios that a social egalitarian would diagnose. It is evident to 
me that Dworkin’s theory of equality can account for the sort of 
injustices or moral badness that Schemmel maintains only social 
egalitarianism can account for. In all scenarios of the V-example 
someone is causing harm, except for scenario 5, according to 
Schemmel. In scenarios 1 and 2 the agents intentionally wrong some 
people, while in scenarios 3 and 4 the state doesn’t act on the direct 
intention to cause harm, but it “knows” about the harm and can 
prevent it, although it does not. Note, however, that the same holds 
true of scenario 5 that, according to Schemmel, doesn’t count as an 
instance of social injustice. In the first two cases, it is straightforward 
discrimination against the disadvantaged, since the state denies the 
right to V to some people, thus it treats them as of lesser moral worth, 
since their interest or stakes in V is not taken into account. In scenario 
3, people are not considered as of lesser moral worth, but wealth 
inequalities are such that make it impossible for those who are 
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disadvantaged to afford to buy V. Finally, in scenario 4, the 
disadvantaged are victims of discrimination other than state 
discrimination, but the state knowingly fails to stop such 
discrimination. In this case, there are two different wrongs taking 
place. First, some individuals straightforwardly discriminate against 
other individuals, that is, they treat them as of lesser moral worth. 
Secondly, the state doesn’t treat the discriminated as of lesser moral 
worth, but it doesn’t prevent the discriminators from doing so. Can 
Dworkin’s theory account for the badness or injustice of the way 
inequality of access to V has been brought about in each case? 
Certainly, the outcome is equally unjust. But has Dworkin’s 
distributive model anything to say with respect to how this outcome 
is brought about? Yes. 
Dworkin’s distributive model is straightforwardly against not 
giving equal consideration to each person’s interests with respect to 
rights to use certain resources or to exercise liberties. His theory of 
liberty is explicit on this (Dworkin 2000: ch. 3).8 This is certainly morally 
worse or more unjust, as judged from the point of view of Dworkinian 
resourcism, than the state’s conduct in scenario 3, where it fails to 
mitigate people’s poor economic condition. The latter is not as bad as 
the former in that the state recognises the equal moral 
 
 
8 Note here that Dworkin’s theory is better suited to account for the kind of injustice 
that is of social egalitarian concern than Schemmel’s account is. According to 
Schemmel harm is partly identified by the fact that a group of people is 
disadvantaged by not having access to V. In other words, Schemmel would judge it 
as unjust if some people were disadvantaged, that is, had a poor health, by not being 
given an equal right to access V. On the other hand, according to Dworkin’s theory 
of equality, people are treated unjustly if they are not given an equal right to access 
V even if they do not have any interest in using V and thus would not be 
disadvantaged by prohibiting them from using V. This does not, nevertheless, 
preclude that we constrain certain people’s liberties, if this is required to preserve 
true opportunity costs. 
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worth of persons, but has a defective conception of what this means 
and so employs a defective conception of distributive equality. This is 
supported by Dworkin’s view of the relation between justice and 
legitimacy (2011: 321-2), according to which the state is legitimate to 
the extent “it strives for its citizen’s full dignity even if it follows a 
defective conception of what that requires” (2011: 322).9 
Scenario 4 is more complex. On the one hand, there is non-
institutional discrimination against the disadvantaged and on the 
other hand there is no state protection against non-institutional 
discrimination. Dworkin’s theory of distributive equality would 
certainly condemn the state’s failure to protect people from 
discrimination and it would evaluate this as not as bad as scenario 3 
to the extent that the state both recognises the equal moral worth of 
persons and has the proper account of distributive equality. Yet, 
distributive equality is upset by private discrimination. Dworkin insists 
that we have reason to condemn and take measures to prevent it for 
that reason. His theory of true opportunity costs and how these may 
be affected by discriminative attitudes and treatment, as well as the 
inclusion of the principle of independence in his theory of 
liberty/constraint system as a constraint on such attitudes do support 
my argument.10 Moreover, judging from the Dworkinian viewpoint, 
we may even regard the injustice in scenario 4 as worse than the 
injustice in scenario 3. Suppose a black disabled person cannot walk 
through the street either due to having not been provided with a 
wheelchair because the state hasn’t properly identified him as a 
rightful recipient of welfare provisions or because a group of white 
 
9 Similarly, Dworkin distinguishes between human and political right in that the 
former is a more abstract and thus fundamental right “to be treated as a human 
being whose dignity fundamentally matters” (2011: 335) that every government 
must respect “even if it fails to achieve a correct understanding of more concrete 
political rights” (2011: 335). 
10 On the principles of the liberty/constraint system, see chapter 1. 
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people don’t let him do so and the state does nothing to stop this. A 
Dworkinian distributivist would find the second case morally worse 
than the first. This is so, because in the second case there’s a 
constraint on a person’s liberty to act as he wishes, it is an arbitrary 
imposition on his liberty, while in the first no such constraint is 
involved, but lack of a means to make effective use of his liberty. 
If my analysis so far is right, then it seems that Schemmel’s 
concern that the state should show equal concern and respect for 
people does not differ from Dworkin’s commitment. Even so, 
Schemmel could respond that the distributive paradigm regards it as 
morally bad or unjust that people are treated in certain ways only to 
the extent such treatment figures in the distributive outcome (2011: 
125). One way to understand this is to think of examples where the 
outcome is equally fair in distributive terms, yet the way it is achieved 
differs with respect to how institutions bring about the desired 
outcome. So, for example, in one case A divides the resources in what 
he thinks a fair way without asking B and the outcome is X (Schemmel 
2011: 128), while in another case both A and B divide the resources 
and the outcome is the same, X. According to social egalitarians, the 
second case is more just than the first, since both individuals had a say 
over the distribution of resources, while in the first case A has treated 
B unjustly in that he has ignored his equal right to express his view 
over how he thinks distribution should be made. The distributivist, 
however, cannot evaluate the first case differently from the second. 
So long as the outcome is fair, it doesn’t matter how it has been 
brought about. Yet, this is not necessarily true. 
First, we should notice that the problem posed here seems to 
be spelled out in distributive terms: B’s complaint in the first case 
concerns the distribution of political power over distributive decisions. 
So, it is not clear how the alleged social egalitarian complaint here has 
a non-distributive character. Secondly, according to Dworkin’s theory 
of equality, people are entitled to equal 
 
177 
 
procedural rights in political11 and distributive procedures. If people 
are denied an equal say, then they are not treated as equals. A society 
that treats each member with equal concern and respect cannot be 
one that denies each member equal political rights, for that would 
diminish their equal moral standing. Moreover, as we’ve seen in 
chapter 1, Dworkin’s theory of equality is based on a first person 
perspective on the responsibility/luck distinction. This requires that 
distribution is sensitive to people’s judgements over what constitutes 
a disadvantage for their life, which further requires that people have 
an equal say over distributive arrangements as well as the fullest 
possible liberty compatible with the liberty of others. Institutions that 
fail to respect this requirement do not treat people as equals. So, it is 
constitutive of equality of resources that people both have an equal 
say over how distribution is to be made and the fullest possible liberty 
compatible with the liberty of others, otherwise the distribution 
cannot satisfy the two conditions of fairness, that is, envy-freeness 
and non-arbitrariness. In other words, according to Dworkin, we 
cannot plausibly determine what a fair distribution is, independently 
of considerations of what constitutes a fair background institutional 
arrangement. In this sense, Schemmel’s objection that luck 
egalitarianism cannot account for the injustice of “institutional 
attitudes” fails with respect to Dworkin’s theory. 
On the other hand, Schemmel’s objection could be said to be 
similar to Scheffler’s objection that Dworkin’s equality of resources is 
an administrative conception of justice (2003: 34-9). The objection 
would have it that if state institutions are to show the right attitude— 
namely, respect—to people, they must be so arranged that questions 
over what distribution should obtain should be decided by people 
themselves. Dworkin’s theory presupposes what a just distribution is 
and admits that democratic processes may not arrive at the right 
 
11 See Dworkin’s theory of political equality (2000: ch.4, 2011: ch. 18). 
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result. In this sense, there seems to be a tension within Dworkin’s 
theory between what he takes equal treatment to be within the 
economic and political sphere. On the other hand, Schemmel could 
maintain that a social egalitarian theory can avoid this tension, 
because distributive arrangements are arrived at through giving each 
person an equal say with respect to how these should be settled, so 
that distributive decisions, being the outcome of a procedure that 
shows the right attitude, themselves reflect equal treatment. Two 
replies are available here. First, as it stands it is not an objection 
against Dworkin’s theory failing to account for what attitude state 
institutions should show. Secondly, social egalitarians ought to be 
concerned not simply with each person having an equal procedural 
right but with decisions arrived at through fair processes being 
themselves just or fair or show equal concern for the interests of each. 
This requires that we have independent criteria for assessing the 
justice or fairness of a certain outcome, even if this outcome has been 
produced by a fair procedure.12 If the social egalitarian concern is that 
people do not live under relations of domination, it matters 
fundamentally not only that people have equal procedural rights, but 
that outcomes of political procedures are themselves just. If that is so, 
then Schemmel has not been successful in defending his argument 
that “how institutions treat people has relevance to social justice that 
is independent of, or at least not reducible to, the distributive effects 
of such treatment” (2011: 125, my emphasis). 
 
To sum up, according to Schemmel the ideal of social equality 
demands that state institutions show the right attitude towards 
people, that is, show equal respect by affirming their equal social and 
political standing. This is independent of the distributive 
 
 
12 Anderson’s claim, for example, that “[w]e need range-constraining rules in a 
system of pure procedural justice” (2008: 262) speaks to this direction. 
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consequences of political decisions. Luck egalitarian theories focus on 
what the right distributive outcome is, neglecting that what matters 
ultimately from the point of view of social equality is how a certain 
outcome has been brought about and more specifically whether a 
certain outcome is the result of the state having acted unjustly by not 
having shown the right attitude towards each member. This cannot be 
spelled out in distributive terms. Against this, I have argued that 
Dworkin’s theory of equality can properly account for the kind of 
injustices that are of concern to social egalitarians. This is so, for, 
according to Dworkin, the fairness of a distributive outcome depends 
on how this distributive outcome has been produced. One obvious 
reason why this is so, is that people should be equally positioned to 
be able to exercise their responsible agency with respect to how they 
want to lead their lives. In the scenarios presented by Schemmel, 
people are in many ways prevented by so doing and this is what is of 
ultimate importance. So, it does not simply matter that some people 
are worse-off than others, but we should be able to see how and why 
this inequality has been produced, in order to then judge whether it is 
unjust or unfair. 
Let me note, however, that we should avoid the following 
misunderstanding. I said that a fair political procedure does not 
necessarily lead to just or right outcomes with respect to distribution 
that we are here discussing. But I also said that Dworkin’s equality of 
resources judges an outcome as just or unjust based on how this has 
been produced. This may seem to contradict the former claim. But it 
does not. For we are talking about two different things. To understand 
this, we can think that in a political procedure we are faced with the 
question of what principles of distributive justice should be adopted. 
There may be several answers to this. One of them, and according to 
Dworkin the right one, is that it is equality of resources that should be 
adopted, namely that in order for distribution to be fair we should 
adopt a procedure that tracks people’s exercise of responsibility and
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in order for this to be so people should be equally positioned to 
exercise their responsible agency. So, equality of resources, itself 
being a procedural distributive theory, may be the outcome of a fair 
political procedure. 
 
In this chapter, I examined what I call the attitudinal account 
of equality. More generally, it seems that the latter supposes that 
egalitarian dispositions, attitudes and so on are a sufficient condition 
for bringing about the right outcome. I am unpersuaded by this, 
however. I certainly do agree that an egalitarian ethos is necessary, 
but as such it is insufficient to inform us about what we should do if 
we are to respect each other as social and political equals. Moreover, 
such an argument over the sufficiency of an egalitarian ethos to bring 
about the right outcome does not refute the claim that the 
rightness/fairness/justice of an outcome is such not because people 
with egalitarian motives produce it, but because people who aim at it 
are acting in an egalitarian manner. In this sense, Dworkin’s thought is 
that people show equal respect and concern to each other, if in their 
economic arrangements, for example, they strive for equality of 
resources. But according to Dworkin, equality of resources is not just 
because well-disposed people strive for it. Instead people should 
strive for it if they are to show equal respect to each other. Finally, it 
is interesting to note an important difference between Rawls, from 
whom social egalitarians take inspiration, and advocates of the 
attitudinal conception of equality. According to Rawls, people develop 
a sense of justice when they live under a well-ordered society, that is, 
under social arrangements that are just (1971: ch. VIII). This is to say 
that people who follow the principles of justice will, over time, develop 
a sense of justice and will be bound by them. On the other hand, 
attitudinal social egalitarians seem to hold that people with an 
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egalitarian ethos will establish just social arrangements. According to 
my opinion, Rawls’ view is far more plausible. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Social Egalitarian Interpretation of Equality II: The 
Democratic Participatory Conception 
 
 
In the present chapter, I shall focus on what I call the 
democratic participatory conception of equality, in which I have 
classified Young’s ideal of “city life” and Anderson’s “democratic 
equality”. Both accounts have largely influenced social egalitarian 
thinking. However, as I said in chapter 4, they fail in giving an attractive 
interpretation of non-domination. Or, so I shall argue. 
More specifically, in section (a), I study Young’s criticism to the 
distributive paradigm as well as her account of social equality. As is 
known, Young meant to develop her account of social equality as an 
alternative to what she calls the liberal distributive paradigm (in which 
she also includes Rawls’ theory, on which many social egalitarians 
draw), not specifically to luck egalitarianism. Her criticism thus is 
advanced against liberal egalitarian theories more generally. 
However, Young’s analysis of domination and oppression, as 
well as her argument that the distributive paradigm ignores the 
institutional structure that determines distributive arrangements and 
it wrongly theorises in distributive terms non-material goods, such as 
decision-making power, rights, opportunities and self-respect, has 
strongly influenced social egalitarians, who usually situate themselves 
within the liberal tradition that Young criticises. Social egalitarians 
share her criticism with respect to the distributive paradigm, although 
they advance it against luck egalitarianism specifically, not generally 
against all liberal egalitarian theories. So, it is worth examining 
whether Young’s arguments provide a successful account of non-
domination. I argue that from a liberal point of view they do not and 
they do not because Young rejects the basic liberal theoretical tenets,
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especially as these have been developed by liberal egalitarians and 
more specifically by Rawls. Moreover, I argue that her criticism of the 
distributive paradigm rests on her having misconceived how liberal 
egalitarians make sense of distributive justice. From a liberal 
egalitarian point of view, distributive justice concerns how institutions 
are organised and what people can do in relation to one another if 
they are to respect each other as equals. As such, I argue that 
Dworkin’s theory is attentive to this demand, while it does not face 
the kind of problems that Young’s theory of domination faces. 
In section (b), I argue that Anderson’s ideal of “democratic 
equality” is more promising in that, unlike her fellow social 
egalitarians, it seems to give determinate content to the demand that 
people should relate to each other in a non-dominating way. However, 
I maintain that she is ambivalent with respect to the role of 
responsibility within her democratic equality. This is so, for she seems 
to be oscillating between two different strategies each of which has 
unfortunate implications given her overall commitments to the ideal 
of social equality and given this, her “democratic equality” fails to be 
an attractive account of non-domination. More specifically, the first 
strategy makes access to basic capabilities conditional upon 
responsible conduct. Adopting this strategy would make “democratic 
equality” susceptible to the moralising and intrusive judgements 
objections as well as to the abandonment of the imprudent victim 
objection. The second strategy suggests unconditional access to basic 
capabilities and as such cannot account for certain dominating forms 
of conduct because it is not responsibility-sensitive. 
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             a. The ideal of “city life” 
Young raises two main objections against the distributive 
paradigm.1 According to her, on the one hand, the latter ignores the 
institutional structure that determines distributive arrangements. As 
such it ignores the fact that economic inequality is primarily rooted in 
relationships of domination and oppression.2 “Domination consists in 
institutional conditions which inhibit or prevent people from 
participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their 
actions. Persons live within structures of domination if other persons 
or groups can determine without reciprocation the conditions of their 
action, either directly or by virtue of the structural consequences of 
their actions. Thorough social and political democracy is the opposite 
of domination”. “Oppression consists in systematic institutional 
processes which prevent some people from learning and using 
satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognised settings, or 
institutionalized social processes which inhibit people’s ability to play 
and communicate with others or to express their feelings and 
perspective on social life in contexts where others can listen” (Young, 
1990: 38).3 
On the other hand, Young accuses the distributive paradigm of 
theorizing non-material goods such as decision-making power, rights, 
opportunities and self-respect in distributive terms (1990: 15-38), 
thus it fails to appreciate that the latter are “a function of social 
 
 
1 Young includes also Miller in the distributive paradigm, who is usually categorised 
as a social egalitarian (1999: 16-7). For Miller’s answer to Young’s critique see (1999: 
14-17). 
2 For the view that luck egalitarianism can, however, be sensitive to Young’s five  
faces of oppression (1990: 48-63), see Barry N. (2006). 
3 See also Young (2000: 31-2), where she identifies the opposite of domination as 
self-determination and the opposite of oppression as self-development, which she 
interprets “along lines similar to the values Amartya Sen calls equality as 
capabilities” (2000: 31). 
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relations and processes” (1990: 16, cf. 2001: 8). Instead, rights should 
be better understood not as something that is distributed, but as 
“institutionally defined rules specifying what people can do in relation 
to one another” (Young 1990: 25). In the same sense, opportunities 
are not things to be distributed. When we talk of opportunities, we 
rather refer to a “condition of enablement, which usually involves a 
configuration of social rules and social relations, as well as an 
individual’s self-conception and skills” (Young 1990: 26). Thus, “a 
person has opportunities if he or she is not constrained from doing 
things, and lives under the enabling conditions for doing them” (Young 
 1990: 26). This means that a person, besides needing material 
resources for “doing things”, also needs the structural background for 
doing so. Finally, for people to have self-respect, the possession of 
material goods, though important, is not enough. Self-respect has to 
do also with how one regards himself, how others regard him, 
whether he is autonomous or whether he has power in decision-
making processes and so on (Young 1990: 26-7). 
According to Young, the ideal of a society of equals takes the 
situated self as its central focus which contrasts with the liberal 
conception of “the authentic self [as] autonomous, unified, free, and 
self-made, standing apart from history and affiliations, choosing its life 
plan entirely for itself” (1990: 45). People experience and understand 
themselves through their identities that determine their life plans, 
preferences, desires, needs, ambitions and so on. In this sense, group 
identities matter fundamentally to people. A society of equals then 
should respect first and foremost people’s different group identities. 
In doing so, it should aim not at autonomy but at empowerment. 
According to Young, the two concepts differ in that the first is 
“a closed concept, which emphasizes primarily exclusion”, while the 
second is “an open concept, a concept of publicity, rather than 
privacy” (1990: 251). Autonomy is an exclusionary concept, in the 
sense that it understands “an agent, whether individual or collective, 
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[to be] autonomous to the degree it has sole and final authority to 
decide on specific issues and actions, and no other agent has the right 
to interfere” (Young 1990: 249). On the other hand, empowerment 
requires “participation of an agent in decisionmaking through an 
effective voice and vote. Justice requires that each person should have 
the institutionalized means to participate effectively in the decisions 
that affect her or his action and the conditions of that action” (Young 
1990: 251). Decision-making power should be decentralised if it is to 
be democratised. Moreover, since empowerment requires decision-
making power over the issues that affect one’s life, such power should 
be as well exercised over activities taking place within what we call 
civic society, and more primarily in the workplace. In this sense, 
“[t]horough social and political democracy is the opposite of 
domination”.  
Her normative ideal of “city life” is the unrealised possibility of 
the actual, our “given experience of cities” (Young 1990: 238).4 
“[S]ocial justice in the city requires the realization of a politics of 
difference” through giving political representation to social groups 
(Young 1990: 240).5 Yet, this politics, unlike liberalism, does not rest 
on the faulty assumption that there is a universal moral point of view, 
to which public reason appeals and through which individuals can 
reach common principles of justice. Rather, the public, according to 
her ideal, makes differences visible; social groups can affirm their 
difference by being empowered through political participation in 
decision-making, which should be radically decentralised, so that 
individuals are able to have an effective voice and vote over the issues 
 
4 See also Rawls’ similar thought that one of political philosophy’s roles is realistically 
utopian and a theory of justice should be a realistic utopia (1999: 11, 2001: 4, 13). 
5 See also Young’s Inclusion and Democracy (2000), where she advances her 
conception of inclusive deliberative democracy, where political institutions are 
arranged so as “the particular perspectives of relatively marginalized or 
disadvantaged social groups to receive specific expression” (2000: 8). 
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that affect their life. People within cities live together and are bound 
to one another in a single polity, having common problems and 
interests, “but they do not create a community of shared final ends, 
of mutual identification and reciprocity” (Young 1990: 238). On the 
contrary, people’s differences in the public life of the ideal city 
“remain unassimilated, but each participating group acknowledges 
and is open to listening to the others. The public is…a place where 
people witness and appreciate diverse cultural expressions that they 
do not share and do not fully understand” (Young 1990: 241). 
Young’s analysis, especially of domination and oppression, has 
been very influential. Yet, the normative aspect of her theory seems 
to face serious problems. A first thing to note regards the kind of 
group identities that should be respected. Is it the case that all such 
identities should be respected? What about groups whose identity is 
formed by morally defective beliefs, such as Nazis or religious 
fundamentalists? It is true that their identities are of fundamental 
importance to their life as other kinds of identity are for people, such 
as sexual, gender, cultural identity, etc. The fact that we rightly 
consider Nazis and fundamentalists as immoral does not make their 
identities of lesser importance to their life. If that is so, would 
prohibition of certain actions related to such kinds of group 
identification count as oppression or domination? If we should 
“promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without 
oppression” (Young 1990: 47), how are such conflicts between certain 
identities to be resolved? The problem is not that Young would not 
condemn such kinds of identity, but that her normative framework 
cannot provide us with successful solutions. Why? 
In her post-modern reading of the individual,6 people as 
subjects are different or basically asymmetric in a way that they 
 
 
6 Young, however, does not identify herself as post-modernist. Rather, she draws on 
several theoretical approaches (1990: 7-8). 
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cannot fully understand each other. More importantly, the self is the 
locus of many identities, sometimes even incompatible or 
contradictory ones. The person experiences this difference and basic 
asymmetry within herself, thus she does not fully comprehend herself 
(Young 1990: 232). If that were true, it would have considerable 
political consequences. Young criticises liberal theories for relying on 
the universality of the principle of impartiality as a condition of public 
reason (1990: 102-107, cf. ch. 4), since it excludes particular groups 
especially the less powerful. She also disputes the traditional 
dichotomy between private and public, which corresponds to the 
dichotomy between particularity and universality (Young 1990: 116-
121). This is related to her post-modern reading of the individual. If 
the post-modern self is not united as the liberal tradition understands 
it, then there is considerable discontinuity between people that 
identify themselves with a diversity of different identities, sometimes 
incompatible and contradictory. Impartiality presents a common 
moral point of view that is illusive in the face of difference and more 
importantly it is oppressive, since what we take to be a universal point 
of view is in practice nothing more than the point of view of the 
powerful. Given that people with diverse and often contradictory 
identities have to live together in a non-dominating and non-
oppressive way, it is unclear how this is to be achieved if individuals in 
the post-modern era cannot find principles of justice that are 
acceptable to all. 
Rawls and post-Rawlsian liberal theory in one or another way 
point to the need for public justification of principles of justice. This 
requires that we reach a common moral point of view, if principles are 
to be acceptable to all. But for the post-modern individual this is 
nearly impossible. Although Young maintains that the “mutual 
intersubjective transcendence…makes sharing between us 
possible…The sharing, however, is never complete mutual 
understanding and reciprocity. Sharing, moreover, is fragile” (1990:
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231). So, it seems that the post-modern condition makes full 
emancipation impossible. Domination would seem fatal after all. 
Following Young’s definition of domination, we can say that non-
domination exists, when people participate in determining with 
reciprocation the conditions of their actions. Yet, note that the fact of 
participation cannot by itself ensure that people do actually 
determine the conditions of their actions. Moreover, and relatedly, to 
the extent that the post-modern self cannot reach a universal point of 
view, as Young maintains, and to the extent that non-domination 
requires that people live according to principles that they affirm, then 
it is unclear how non-domination can ever be achieved in the face of 
difference, as this is understood by Young. 
Moreover, post-modernism celebrates individualism in a more 
radical way than liberalism. As we have seen, Young criticises 
liberalism for regarding “the authentic self [as] autonomous, unified, 
free, and self-made, standing apart from history and affiliations, 
choosing its life plan entirely for itself” (1990: 45). But, if the authentic 
self of the liberal tradition unifies individuals through the common 
moral point of view, the post-modern self being situated, with diverse, 
incompatible and contradictory identities, disconnects itself from 
others in a more radical way. There is no common moral point of view, 
but only the point of view of the situated individual. True, Young thinks 
that it is possible to some extent to occupy the point of view of others 
through our shared group memberships, but this does not refute my 
claim at the beginning of the paragraph. Because the individual can 
only have a partial point of view, it can never achieve complete mutual 
understanding; “sharing is fragile”. This is a different vision from the 
liberal one, according to which the individual as a moral agent can 
reach a common moral point of view by abstracting from her 
(historical) self. 
It is interesting to note that what makes impartiality 
impossible, according to Young, makes it possible within the Rawlsian 
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social union: difference. As we will see in chapter 7, Rawls’ ideal of 
social union requires diversity and difference, since it is “through the 
social union founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members 
that each person can participate in the total sum of the realized 
natural assets of the others” (1971: 523). Within political society 
people can advance more complex lives by adjusting their plans to the 
plans of others through principles of justice that all affirm and act upon 
(Rawls 1971: 528). Complex lives cannot be realised without letting 
diversity flourish. Young criticises Rawls’ theory because, as she 
maintains, the kind of impartiality to which it aspires is impossible. Yet, 
it seems that in the Rawlsian social union impartiality is possible 
exactly because of the differentiation and diversity through which 
people come to realise their political nature and further their moral 
nature, that is, their nature as free and equal moral persons. In the 
social union people express their moral nature when they act from 
principles of justice that they collectively choose and publicly affirm. 
Young’s criticism of the impartiality to which Rawlsian and 
more generally egalitarian liberalism aspires is based on an 
unfortunate reading of the latter. This is partly due to the fact that she 
misinterprets the principle of equal treatment that liberal conceptions 
of justice invoke. She says that the Enlightenment promoted equality 
in a way that tried to transcend difference. Differences in sex, race, 
ethnicity, and so on were not anymore treated as justifying unequal 
liberties and political rights. All people came to be regarded as equals 
in their moral capacity and “equal social status for all persons requires 
treating everyone according to the same principles, rules and 
standards” (Young 1990: 158). On the contrary, the politics of 
difference that understands “equality as the participation and 
inclusion of all groups sometimes requires different treatment for 
oppressed or disadvantaged groups” (Young 1990: 158). However, 
keeping in mind Dworkin’s distinction between treating people 
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equally and treating them as equals (2000: 11), Young’s criticism of the 
liberal tradition seems misplaced. Treating people as equals implies 
that we should treat people by applying the same abstract egalitarian 
principle; it does not require that we treat people equally, that is, in 
the same way. The abstract egalitarian principle may require us to 
treat people differently if we are to treat them as equals. So, although 
historically her diagnosis may have some plausibility, it is not the case 
that a liberal theory cannot accommodate the demands of the politics 
of difference. This is not to deny that liberal theories may have ignored 
the importance of difference. This has indeed been the case and it is 
true that social movements have helped draw our attention to it. But, 
it is not true that a liberal theory doesn’t have the theoretical 
resources to deal with the demands posed by these social movements. 
On the other hand, respect for difference does not require us to 
respect every identity. Racists, neo-Nazis, religious fundamentalists, 
even if they may be oppressed and dominated in the sense meant by 
Young, are unreasonable. And although liberal democracy would not 
deny them an effective voice and vote, it would not recognise their 
identity as equally valuable and it would not provide them the means 
for its reproduction. Liberal democracy regards actions related with 
such kinds of social identity as objectionable, since such actions fail to 
treat others as equals. So, if Young objects to such practices on what 
ground does she object to them? 
Certainly, Young would object to such group identities. My 
point, however, is that it is not clear that her theory provides us with 
the resources to explain why we are not required to respect identities 
of this kind. Probably her claim would be that such groups are involved 
in oppressive structures so we are not required to respect their 
identities. However, her account of domination and oppression 
cannot provide sufficient justification for not respecting their 
identities. 
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For this to be so, Young’s definition of oppression and 
domination needs to incorporate a criterion of objectionability, in 
order to be plausible.7 Domination cannot simply be the institutional 
inhibition or prevention from co-determining the conditions of one’s 
action. It must refer to objectionable inhibition or prevention. 
Similarly, oppression should be understood as the objectionable 
institutional prevention from learning and using satisfying and 
expansive skills in socially recognised settings or the objectionable 
institutionalized inhibition of people’s ability to play and 
communicate with others or to express their feelings and perspective 
on social life in contexts where others can listen. Yet, I am unsure what 
criterion of objectionability can be invoked that is not in some sense 
universal.8 Moreover, I am unsure in what sense the demand for 
 
 
7 Young identifies five “faces” of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, 
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, violence (1990: 48-63). Yet, she needs to 
incorporate a criterion of objectionability to these too. For example, she defines 
marginalization as the exclusion of a group of people from “useful participation in 
social life” (Young 1990: 53), which is related with some group identity. Yet, it is not 
clear that it would be objectionable if a neo-Nazi were marginalized as a neo-Nazi. 
Similarly, it would not seem objectionable if the particular perspective of say ISIS 
supporters were rendered invisible. Note that we may have other strategic reasons 
for not rendering such identities invisible or marginalized. But we have these 
reasons with the aim to stop their reproduction, not because we have to respect 
them and provide the conditions of their reproduction. 
8 Young would probably object that it’s impossible to identify general criteria for 
saying that a practice or an institution is dominating or oppressive and that what 
counts as domination or oppression is, in part, context dependent (1990: 257-60). 
However, we should distinguish between abstract general accounts of oppression 
and domination and the different forms of domination and oppression we may 
encounter in different cultural and historical contexts. As Young says “[t]he criteria 
I have developed by thinking through the experience of oppressed groups in the 
United States have no reference, for example, to the specific experience of peasants, 
a major and usually oppressed social group in the Southern Hemisphere” (1990: 
258). Nevertheless, there is an abstract account of oppression that applies in 
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empowerment, for the abolition of oppression and domination, the 
demand for equality in other words, has any value if equality is not a 
universal moral value. 
Perhaps I am uncharitable to Young, for it could be said that 
Young does not deny that people have equal moral standing, but 
instead she insists that if we are to respect people’s equal moral 
capacity, then they should be given equal decision-making power to 
determine themselves the principles of justice that are to govern their 
common life. Theories of justice that arrive at principles by abstracting 
from real people are ignoring their differences, their unique way of 
reasoning that is determined by their social identities.9 In doing so, 
such theories neglect the fact that the principles they recommend 
may have as a result that people end up being dominated. The 
problem though is that if we hold that people should have equal 
decision-making power over the terms of their common living, in 
virtue of their equal moral standing, something that liberal theories 
 
identifying the specific circumstances and conditions of oppression with respect to 
the different social groups to which she refers and the same holds true of 
domination. It is in this sense, that I claim that I find it hard to see how such an 
account of what counts as oppression and domination does not invoke universal 
criteria. 
9 See Rawls’ reply to the objection that certain theories, his included, make use of 
abstract conceptions and thus “withdraw from society and the world” (1993: 43-6). 
He claims that “[i]n political philosophy the work of abstraction is set in motion by 
deep political conflicts…We turn to political philosophy when our shared political 
understandings, as Walzer might say, break down, and equally when we are torn 
within ourselves” (1993: 44). So, abstraction “is a way of continuing public discussion 
when shared understandings of lesser generality have broken down. We should be 
prepared to find that the deeper the conflict, the higher the level of abstraction to 
which we must ascent to get a clear and uncluttered view of its roots” (Rawls 1993: 
46). Young’s view of the post-modern situation as one where the individual finds 
herself within diverse and sometimes contradictory and incompatible identities 
demands, contrary to Young’s view, that our practical method reaches greater 
abstraction the greater the diversity of identities is. 
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do as well assert, does not suffice to erase the injustices Young 
diagnoses. For, it may be the case that oppressed groups’ interests are 
ignored even if heard. 
Within the Rawlsian society that Young criticises, people 
should be able to justify their claims upon each other according to 
principles and standards that are acceptable to all, that is, principles 
that people can affirm from their different personal points of view. 
Equal liberties and political rights, equal opportunities for equally 
motivated and equally talented people, equal access to resources to 
make the use of their liberties meaningful, are principles that people 
arrive at from the original position. They are principles that people 
from every situated position can affirm and no one can reasonably 
reject and that can help us test the justice or injustice of real politics. 
But, note that people enter the original position not as some abstract 
entity but by putting to one side facts about themselves and not 
employing these facts as premises in arguments for principles of 
justice.10 
In a participatory democracy of the sort supported by Young, 
people, having equal decision-making power, should arrive at 
collective principles of justice through their deliberative process. But 
how are we to judge their decisions as right or wrong, as just or unjust, 
if we do not have an outcome test? How are we to say that certain 
groups are treated justly by the collective decision? We cannot simply 
assume that participatory democracy, even in the radical form 
envisioned by Young, would result in unoppressive decisions. Young 
maintains that “[b]road democratic planning is more likely to result in 
rational and just distributive decisions…than hundreds of autonomous 
 
 
10 Rawls does not deny that individuals’ identities may be fragmented, but he 
contrasts this with the political conception of the person, where the person is 
understood to have a political or institutional identity that remains the same, even 
if her more concrete identity changes or is fragmented (1993: 29-35, cf. also 27-8). 
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public and private units attempting to maximize their perceived 
interest” (1990: 254). However, by saying this Young implicitly 
recognises that there is a certain just or right decision that is 
independent of the rightness of the decision-making procedure 
itself.11 People are more likely through deliberation to arrive at just 
decisions, but just decisions are not just in virtue of them being the 
outcome of democratic deliberation. So, although Young’s analysis 
offers some useful insights with respect to the diagnosis of oppressive 
and dominating relationships, her normative framework is inadequate 
in giving satisfying answers to the problem of justice. 
Having said that, let me turn to Young’s second objection 
against the distributive paradigm, namely that the latter theorises 
non-material goods, such as rights, respect, opportunities and 
decision-making power in distributive terms, thus failing to appreciate 
their distinctively relational nature. However, we should note that not 
all theories concerning distribution are concerned strictly speaking 
with the “comparison of the amounts of goods [people] possess” 
(Young 1990: 18). This is especially true of Dworkin’s theory with 
which I am concerned in this dissertation. Such an understanding 
would highly misinterpret its essence. Young’s reading of distributive 
justice as a comparison of the amount of goods people possess fails to 
appreciate Dworkin’s distinction between treating people equally and 
treating them as equals (2000: 11), that I mentioned above. In the first 
case, treating people equally with respect to the distribution of 
material goods or resources would require that people have as equal 
an amount of these goods or resources as possible. Saying that 
distributive theories compare the amount of resources people have 
 
 
11 For a criticism that the account of inclusive deliberative democracy, that Young 
develops in her Inclusion and Democracy (2000), appeals to two contradictory views 
of justice, namely pure procedural justice and imperfect procedural justice, see 
Eggleston (2004). 
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falls under this conception of equality. Equality of resources, however, 
is not concerned with comparing the amount of goods people possess. 
Rather, its focus is on whether background opportunities for people 
to form and live according to their own conception of the good have 
been fair. This doesn’t mean that opportunities are distributed 
equally, if this means that we take some opportunities from one and 
give it to another, such as saying, for example, that A has three 
opportunities to go to the university, while B has one and so we need 
to take one opportunity from A to give it to B. That is just silly. Yet, 
there is a sense in which we should be able to compare the set of 
opportunities people have to lead their lives according to their 
conception of the good. And this concern does not contrast with 
Young’s understanding of opportunities. 
Young defines opportunities as a “condition of enablement, 
which usually involves a configuration of social rules and social 
relations, as well as an individual’s self-conception and skills” (1990: 
26). Equality of resources properly understood compares whether 
these conditions of enablement are fair among people. So, what 
matters is not whether one enjoys certain conditions of enablement, 
but whether he enjoys fair conditions of enablement. Certainly, such 
conditions are defined by social rules and there is a question of what 
constitutes conditions of enablement, such as resources, social 
relationships, development of talents and skills, self-respect and 
respect from others, and so on. But a theory of equality concerned 
with people being treated as equals, will be concerned with 
comparing whether the conditions of enablement have been equal 
(where equal does not necessarily mean the same), not simply 
whether one has the required conditions of enablement. 
Considering Young’s definition of rights as “institutionally 
defined rules specifying what people can do in relation to one 
another” (1990: 25), it is not clear why Dworkin would think 
otherwise. Equality of resources is concerned with what rights people 
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have to act as they wish in a way that all are respected as equals. But 
more importantly, according to equality of resources, rights as rules 
should not only specify what people can do in relation to one another, 
but what is fair or just to do in relation to one another. To do this, a 
kind of comparison is necessary to judge whether rights are equal and 
whether rules that specify our liberties and freedoms are just. For, 
example, if I have a right to vote and you don’t, all else being equal, 
then there is a sense that I have something that you lack, namely 
decisive political power over issues that both affect us. Or, consider 
Dworkin’s baseline liberty/constraint system that describes what 
“rights to certain designated freedoms” (2000: 127) people have in 
relation to one another. Dworkin’s theory of liberty is concerned with 
what rights people have to act as they wish in a way that is fair or just. 
It requires that the auction takes place against the liberty/constraint 
system that ascribes maximum freedom of choice to all (on the 
condition that the principles of correction, security, independence and 
authenticity are not violated). This means that people have equal 
liberty to form their conception of the good and bid for the resources 
they think necessary for their life plan, when freedom is maximized. If 
it were the case that some activities were prohibited (not ones that 
conflict with the principles noted above), then all people would be 
equal in their freedom, but they would not have equal liberty. 
Decision-making power is another relational good that, 
according to Young, the distributive paradigm inappropriately 
theorizes in distributive terms. According to Young, decision-making 
power should be effective. As she says, empowerment requires 
“participation of an agent in decisionmaking through an effective 
voice and vote” (Young 1990: 251). Distributive justice theories are 
concerned with the participation of agents in decision-making power 
through an equally effective voice and vote. This requires not only 
some kind of comparison of the opportunities people have to have an 
effective voice but an outcome test as well so as to judge to what 
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extent the outcome of collective decision-making has actually been 
influenced by their interests (broadly understood). 
Finally, with respect to self-respect, as Young notes, the 
possession of material goods, though important, is not all that 
matters. Self-respect has to do also with how one regards himself, how 
others regard him, whether he is autonomous or whether he has 
power in decision making processes and so on (Young 1990: 26-7). 
Certainly, this is right. Nevertheless, what distributive justice theories 
are concerned with is not that people do have self-respect, but 
whether there are those conditions available to all on equal terms to 
be able to develop respect for themselves. Rawls, for example, talks 
of the social bases of self-respect. This points more to the social 
dimension of self-respect than to the psychological dimension. 
Psychologically people have the need to respect themselves, they 
need to have a sense of themselves as worthwhile. This requires that 
society provides them with the conditions that enable them to 
develop a self-conception with which the individuals can feel satisfied. 
But a just society provides to all the conditions, insofar as these are 
under its control, to be equally able to develop their self-respect. A 
liberal theory would consider it regrettable, if a person can have self-
respect only by dominating others, such as when a gay-averse person 
thinks that a liberal society that ascribes equal liberty to all and gives 
the liberty and opportunity to homosexuals to reveal their identity in 
public is one that does not provide him with the social bases of self-
respect by respecting his gay aversion and what this entails. But it 
would not consider that such a person is treated unjustly. A liberal 
egalitarian theory holds that self-respect is of fundamental 
importance to people, but it is not concerned with whether all people 
have equal self-respect. In this sense, liberal egalitarian theories don’t 
hold that self-respect should be distributed equally. That is certainly a 
meaningless thought. Rather, they are concerned with whether all 
people have equal opportunity to develop self-respect. This however 
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requires a kind of comparison, namely whether people equally have 
the necessary social conditions of self-respect. 
A possible response is that self-respect is based among other 
things on how other people regard us and on being able to develop 
certain meaningful relationships with one another, such as loving 
relationships or friendships. The distributive paradigm cannot 
satisfactorily account for such kind of goods. Once again, distributive 
justice theories are concerned with the social conditions of self-
respect. This means that if one is not able to develop meaningful 
relationships due to his social conditions, then liberal egalitarians have 
every reason to attend to his situation. Suppose, for example, that a 
person cannot form loving relationships due to him being ugly, as 
ugliness is defined by the prevailing social norms. The distributive 
paradigm would suggest that social norms should change, on account 
of them being objectionable. 
So, although Young’s analysis of oppressive and dominating 
relationships is thought provoking, her normative enterprise with 
respect to justice and equality is less satisfying than it might first 
appear. Her ideal of “city life” depends on radically decentralising 
decision-making power mainly through giving political representation 
to social groups. This is supposed to remedy the ills of oppression and 
domination. I argued that this would be insufficient for egalitarian 
justice. Democratic participation is one aspect of what it means to 
treat each other as equals. Yet, it does not ensure that decisions 
arrived at through democratic procedures are just. Moreover, and 
relatedly, the demand that people live undominated lives requires 
that people live according to principles of justice that are acceptable 
to all. But this kind of acceptability requires that people can reach a 
common moral point of view, something that Young denies. It seems 
then that her ideal of non-domination and non-oppression runs 
counter to her post-modern reading of the individual and 
consequently to the determinative role of difference in the 
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impossibility of reaching a common moral point of view. However, 
arguing that people with different comprehensive values can reach 
common principles of justice does not entail ignoring the importance 
of people’s identities. But, given reasonable pluralism there should be 
a way in which we are able to reach common principles of justice, that 
is, principles that are acceptable to all, against which we can test the 
justice or injustice of participatory democracy’s outcomes. Certain 
forms of the distributive paradigm aim at providing the background 
against which claims upon each other can be made according to 
principles acceptable to all. Young’s critique of the distributive 
paradigm, namely, that it ignores the institutional structure that 
determines distributive arrangements and that it inappropriately 
theorizes non-material goods in distributive terms, is based on serious 
misunderstandings. First, theories belonging to what Young calls the 
distributive paradigm, such as Rawls’ and Dworkin’s, concern 
themselves with how state institutions are to be arranged in a way 
that social relations are conducted on a footing of equality. Secondly, 
as we have seen, such theories are concerned not with the distribution 
of non-material goods, but with fair access of all to non-material 
goods. 
 
            b. Democratic equality 
Anderson, perhaps the most well-known figure in the 
contemporary social egalitarian tradition, although she espouses 
Young’s conception of social equality as absence of oppression and 
domination, doesn’t criticise the liberal tradition. Indeed, her 
democratic ideal is properly situated within it. As she says, “[t]o live in 
an egalitarian community…is to be free from oppression to participate 
in and enjoy the goods of society, and to participate in democratic 
self-government” (Anderson 1999: 315). So, like Young, Anderson 
maintains that in a society of equals people should have access to a 
set of enablements—she names them capabilities—and an effective 
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voice and vote in decision-making procedures. A community of equals 
is democratic, where democracy should be understood “as collective 
self-determination by means of open discussion among equals, in 
accordance with rules acceptable to all. To stand as an equal before 
others in discussion means that one is entitled to participate, that 
others recognize an obligation to listen respectfully and respond to 
one's arguments, that no one need bow and scrape before others or 
represent themselves as inferior to others as a condition of having 
their claim heard” (Anderson 1999: 313). Thus, unlike Young, 
Anderson recognises the need for common public rules against which 
interpersonal justification takes place (cf. also Anderson 2010). 
Anderson’s democratic equality then requires procedural rights in a 
participatory democratic regime, namely equal voting rights as well as 
a right to public deliberation. On the other hand, procedural rights are 
insufficient in securing freedom from oppression and domination. In 
this sense, Anderson proposes that basic capabilities to act as a human 
being, as a participant in a system of co-operative production and as 
a citizen of a democratic state are necessary as well (1999: 317). 
Capabilities are sets of functionings that a person doesn’t actually 
achieve but is free to achieve (Anderson 1999: 318). A society of 
equals should guarantee to all people those conditions that will make 
them equally capable of functioning as citizens. But in order for one 
to be able to function as a citizen, she should be able to function as a 
human being by being provided “effective access to the means of 
sustaining one's biological existence… and access to the basic 
conditions of human agency” (Anderson 1999: 317), as well as an 
equal in civil society, where this requires being able to participate in 
civil society’s activities as well as in society’s system of co-operative 
production (Anderson 1999: 317 -8). 
Given her ideal of democratic equality, Anderson maintains 
that the fundamental difference between luck egalitarians and 
advocates of social egalitarianism lies in the kind of justification given 
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for attending to people’s inequalities along the lines of equal power, 
opportunities, capabilities and so on (Anderson 2010). Based on this, 
she accuses luck egalitarians of justifying equality on an inappropriate 
ground. Luck egalitarians justify equality along certain dimensions on 
account of the fact that luck should not affect how well we are doing 
in our life compared to others and accordingly inequalities are justified 
if traced to people’s responsible choices. Anderson disputes this. We 
cannot plausibly base our egalitarian duties to each other on the fact 
that luck has been somehow uncharitable to us. When we are 
addressing claims of equal treatment to others, we do so not because 
we are less lucky than them, but because we legitimately want to be 
able to govern the conditions of our life on equal terms with others. 
Because what ultimately matters to people is that they do not live 
under oppressive and dominating conditions, which means that they 
should be free to form the terms of their life without being interfered 
with by the arbitrary wills of others, responsibility for one’s bad 
condition should not figure in our account of equal treatment when a 
person’s unfortunate condition translates into him being under 
relations of oppression and domination. In this sense, responsibility 
for one’s bad choices cannot plausibly justify inequalities, when such 
inequalities result in dominating and oppressive relationships. 
In the light of this, Anderson proposes that in a society of 
equals compulsory insurance would be adopted and would be 
justified not on paternalistic grounds, as would probably be the case 
under luck egalitarianism.12 In a society of equals people are required 
 
12 I take Anderson to propose compulsory insurance or general taxation judging from 
the following extract: “Democratic equality passes no judgment on whether it would 
be prudent or imprudent for any given individual to purchase health insurance. It 
tells the person who would not purchase insurance for himself: "You have a moral 
worth that no one can disregard. We recognize this worth in your inalienable right 
to our aid in an emergency. You are free to refuse this aid once we offer it. But this 
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freedom does not absolve you of the obligation to come to the aid of others when 
their health needs are urgent. Since this is an obligation we all owe to our fellow 
citizens, everyone shall be taxed for this good, which we shall provide to everyone. 
This is part of your rightful claim as an equal citizen” (1999: 330-1, my emphasis). 
See also her claim a few pages before that the approach of democratic equality “is 
to insure only against the losses of certain types of goods: to distinguish between 
guaranteed and unguaranteed types of goods within the space of egalitarian 
concern, and to insure individuals only against the loss of the former (Anderson 
1999: 327, my emphasis). Williams, though, seems to criticize Anderson for not 
addressing the question over how universal access to certain goods guaranteeing 
basic capabilities is to be achieved. According to Williams, those rejecting pure forms 
of luck egalitarianism, that is, forms that permit the imprudent to suffer certain 
forms of absolute deprivation, can appeal to two versions of the sufficiency view, 
internalizing sufficientarianism and externalizing sufficientarianism. Based on this 
distinction, he maintains that Anderson “fails to recognize that there is a price to be 
paid for maintaining individuals' access to those goods since doing so requires a 
more restrictive conception of economic liberty or a less restrictive conception of 
our liability to bear the costs of others' exercising their liberty” (Williams 2006: 503). 
I think Williams is only partly justified in offering this criticism to Anderson, since she 
is not very clear with respect to the issue in question. Contrast, for example, 
Anderson’s above quote with her claim that if a certain activity is risky, “then justice 
permits a tax on that activity to cover the extra costs of medical care for those 
injured by engaging in it” (1999: 328). The first quote seems to appeal to 
externalising sufficientarianism, while the second to internalising sufficientarianism. 
Yet, to my view, Anderson is not offering an incoherent view. As I understand her, 
what she seems to maintain that under democratic equality we are all required to 
pay compulsory insurance or general taxation for medical care and where people 
are engaged in risky activities (but not ones related to people’s capacity as 
participants in the productive system, 1999: 329), then special taxes or compulsory 
insurance (or outright prohibition) should apply on these specific activities “to cover 
the extra costs for those injured by engaging in it” (my emphasis). The problem, yet, 
lies elsewhere. While general taxation or compulsory insurance for certain goods is 
justified on account of them being our obligation to guarantee them to all our fellow 
citizens, special taxation or compulsory insurance for specific risky activities, that is 
to be paid by those engaging in those activities, seems to be justified on paternalistic 
grounds, although Anderson herself does not admit it. She says that “[b]y making 
smokers pay for the costs of their behavior ex ante, democratic equality preserves 
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to pay insurance to provide to all the necessary conditions of their 
freedom as non-domination. Scheffler’s earlier criticism of the luck 
egalitarian paradigm shares Anderson’s worry over the proper 
justification of justice-based duties and, in the light of this, he 
maintains that the distributive paradigm regards equality in some 
currency as in itself valuable and it doesn’t try to anchor it in a broader 
conception of equality as a moral value (2003, 2015). Distributive 
justice has value, according to social egalitarians, because of how it 
affects people’s relationships. So, what is of moral value is not that 
people are equal with respect to their distributive shares, but that they 
have equal moral, social, and political standing. These are two distinct 
ways of understanding the ideal of equality. 
Having said that, there are two objections I want to raise 
against Anderson’s view. The first regards her objection to the 
justificatory basis of luck egalitarianism. The second concerns her view 
of what non-domination consists in. With respect to the justification 
 
their freedom and equality over the course of their whole lives” (Anderson 1999: 
329). If a person is made to pay for the costs of her behavior ex ante, so as her 
freedom and equality to be preserved, although she might have wanted to spend 
this extra money otherwise, how else can we characterize state’s imposition of this 
taxation or insurance if not as paternalistic? Anderson, though, says that such kind 
of policy is not paternalistic, but is justified on account of our obligation to provide 
to each other what is necessary to be related as social and political equals. Her 
argumentation, however, is problematic. If that were our obligation, then why 
should only smokers pay this tax? Such a tax is paid by smokers for medical care to 
be provided to them not to others. In this sense, it is not an obligation we owe to 
each other and thus it is imposed on smokers on paternalistic grounds. Of course, 
Anderson could reply that we have an obligation to ourselves as well to preserve our 
liberty and equality, but then on what ground would she justify her claim that we 
are free to refuse medical care or other goods necessary for acting as equal citizens? 
Answering that one has an obligation to herself to provide those necessary 
conditions to herself to act as an equal citizen, even if she does not make use of 
these conditions would seem absurd, but even if not absurd, it still is paternalistic if 
the state so intervenes to make us fulfill our obligations to ourselves. 
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requirement, Anderson holds that for principles of justice to be 
acceptable to all, interpersonal justification is required (2010). Luck 
egalitarian principles of justice cannot be interpersonally justified. The 
main reason why this is so, is that luck inequality cannot be a plausible 
basis for duties of justice to arise, since duties require that the duty 
bearer is substantively responsible for bringing about or preventing 
from obtaining, or mitigating and so on, the injustice in question. Since 
how luck is cast on us is beyond people’s power, then luck inequality 
cannot generate any justice-based duties. No-one is responsible for 
luck inequality. 
Yet, not all forms of luck egalitarianism need to consider it as 
unjust that people are born with natural differences. As we have seen 
in chapter 1, equality of resources certainly does not hold that view. 
True, in discussing the problem of differential justification, Anderson 
(2010) contrasts the social egalitarian view with what she calls desert-
catering luck egalitarianism,13 the main proponents of which—she 
claims—are Cohen, Arneson and Roemer, while she just mentions in a 
footnote that Dworkin’s theory “occupies an ambiguous position 
between these camps” (2010: 1, fn. 2), without giving any further 
explanation as to what this means. To the extent, however, Anderson 
wishes to demonstrate not only that desert-catering luck 
egalitarianism is not the proper basis for justice-based duties, but also 
that it is only social egalitarianism that can ground such duties, she has 
to reject as a plausible basis for grounding such duties all forms of luck 
egalitarianism, Dworkin’s included. As I will argue in the next chapter, 
Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources does not only offer a 
plausible basis for grounding justice-based duties to each other, but 
his theory better accounts for the social egalitarian demand of non-
domination. 
 
 
13 For the distinction between desert-catering and responsibility-catering luck 
egalitarianism, see Anderson (2008). 
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Let me turn to the second objection against Anderson’s view. 
As I have argued throughout this and the previous chapter, the social 
egalitarian positive project of showing what arbitrary interference 
consists in has not been successful in giving a determinate content to 
what the ideal of non-domination. However, it is fair to say that this is 
not true of Anderson’s project. As we have seen above, in her view 
basic capabilities guarantee people’s social freedom, that is, their 
freedom as non-domination. Arbitrary interference occurs when 
people are denied the social guarantees of their freedom. This view of 
what a society of social and political equals requires contrasts with the 
luck egalitarian ideal which, according to Anderson, by incorporating 
responsibility into its principles of justice, doesn’t guarantee the social 
bases of freedom as non-domination. On the contrary, people are 
vulnerable to domination and subordination in the light of their 
imprudent or poor choices. However, Anderson’s use of basic 
capabilities to account for what constitutes arbitrary interference 
suffers from certain drawbacks that make it unattractive. 
Anderson is somewhat ambivalent with respect to the role of 
responsibility within her democratic equality. She maintains that all 
people should be guaranteed unconditional access to certain types of 
goods (Anderson 1999: 327) necessary for functioning as a social and 
political equal, that are “prerequisites to exercising responsible 
agency” (Anderson 1999: 328). By offering “equality in the space of 
capabilities, which is to say opportunities or freedoms[,] [i]ndividuals 
still have to exercise responsible agency to achieve most of the 
functionings effective access to which society guarantees” (Anderson 
1999: 328). So, according to Anderson, people should have 
unconditional access to certain goods necessary for functioning as 
social and political equals, such as, say, health care and basic income 
enough to guarantee a decent life, while they are responsible for how 
they lead their lives. 
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On the other hand, however, she maintains that an able-
bodied adult would have access to a decent income on the condition 
that he responsibly performs his job duties, assuming that there is a 
job available (Anderson 1999: 328). These are two conflicting 
strategies. People should either have or have not unconditional access 
to basic capabilities. In defence of Anderson, one could argue that 
what she means by a “decent income” is an income that is above what 
is necessary to secure basic capabilities. In this respect, all people 
should have unconditional access to basic capabilities and decent 
income is conditional upon responsibly performing one’s job duties. If 
that is so, then Anderson’s position is not ambivalent as I claim. I 
accept the plausibility of this way of understanding her claim. 
However, when she criticises Van Parijs’ proposal of unconditional 
basic income, she objects to it, for, among other reasons, providing 
insurance coverage to lazy, able-bodied people, that is, people who 
can work but choose not to (Anderson 1999: 299). This implies that 
basic income should be conditional upon responsible conduct. In any 
case, since Anderson is not clear about whether responsibility should 
play any role in the provision of basic capabilities, it is worth 
examining both strategies. As I shall argue, however, both strategies 
are susceptible to certain problems. This is to say that she is not only 
ambivalent with respect to the role of responsibility within a society 
of equals, but she would probably be disappointed to find out that 
each of the two strategies, between which she oscillates, have serious 
unfortunate consequences given her overall commitment to the social 
egalitarian ideal. 
If one opts for the second strategy, then it is not obvious how 
she can avoid making justice principles responsibility tracking. 
Moreover, such a strategy would be vulnerable to certain objections 
that Anderson as well as other social egalitarians have raised against 
luck egalitarianism, to which, however, equality of resources is not 
susceptible. More specifically, it would be vulnerable to the objection 
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that responsibility tracking theories of justice make moralising 
judgements about the use of people’s freedoms and are calling for 
intrusive policies from the part of the state in order to judge who has 
acted in a responsible way and who has not, as well as to the harshness 
objection. To see this, consider the case, where basic health care 
provision is conditional upon responsible conduct. Suppose that a 
person is at least partly responsible for having developed cancer due 
to her not living according to certain health standards.14 Or, consider 
that a monthly stipend is due to a person on the condition that she 
acts in a responsible way, such as not spending her stipend to organise 
beach parties. It is obvious—it seems to me—that such a strategy 
would make social egalitarianism vulnerable to the three objections 
mentioned above. First, it demands that people make use of their 
freedom in what it considers to be responsible conduct, thus it is 
vulnerable to the moralising judgements objection. Second, it requires 
that we should judge how far responsible a person is for her situation, 
thus it is vulnerable to the intrusive judgements objection. Third, once 
we have identified a person as responsible for her plight, this strategy 
does not regard it as objectionable if that person is left unhelped, thus 
it is vulnerable to the harshness or the abandonment of the imprudent 
victim objection. 
It is worth noticing that although making basic capabilities 
depend upon responsible conduct results in democratic equality being 
susceptible to the objections discussed above, equality of resources, 
 
 
14 One could object here that this is not Anderson’s view, considering the following 
example that she uses to illustrate what democratic equality looks like. She gives the 
example of the smoker who develops lung cancer and maintains that under 
democratic equality she would be provided with wealth care provision, but she 
would still be burdened with certain welfare costs of her imprudent conduct (1999: 
327). I accept this. But we should notice that this kind of policy falls under the second 
strategy I shall shortly describe. Given her ambiguousness about which of the two 
strategies she favours, it is necessary to examine the implications of both strategies. 
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although it is responsibility tracking, escapes the specific objections. 
As I will argue in chapter 6, according to equality of resources 
insurance provision is conditioned only upon the insurance decisions 
people make, not upon how responsibly they lead their lives. This is to 
say that health care provision, for example, depends upon what the 
individual has insured herself against and not on whether she is 
(partly) responsible for bringing it about that she has developed 
cancer. I have also argued why equality of resources is not vulnerable 
to the harshness or abandonment of the imprudent victim objection 
in chapter 2. However, notice that even if it were true that equality of 
resources is vulnerable to the abandonment objection, there is a sense 
in which abandonment would be less objectionable given the reasons 
equality of resources (in its crude version) provides for justifying it 
than it would be if we were to adopt the point of view of democratic 
equality and more specifically its second strategy. To see why consider 
the different reasons each of the two conceptions of equality would 
provide with respect to the imprudent car driver. Under equality of 
resources, the latter would be refused medical care in case he had 
decided not to purchase the requisite insurance coverage. Under 
democratic equality, he would be refused medical care for bringing it 
about that he had a car accident through his careless car-driving, even 
if it were the case that he paid insurance under the compulsory 
insurance scheme that democratic equality requires. This is certainly 
even more objectionable than refusing one medical care on account 
of her antecedent insurance decisions given as well what the available 
redress for avoiding such consequences would be. 
Coming to the first strategy, namely that of unconditional 
access to basic capabilities, the latter seems to suffer from not being 
able to properly account for certain aspects of dominating conduct 
and this is so for not being properly responsibility sensitive. To see this 
let us study the following example. 
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Suppose Anna and Bella are equal in their abilities, talents and 
opportunities. Anna chooses to work and earn money, while Bella 
prefers to be a surfer. As a result, she lacks the necessary conditions 
for functioning as a social and political equal. Anna can subsidise Bella 
without she herself becoming unable to function as a social and 
political equal. She earns enough money to provide for both herself 
and Bella access to basic capabilities. If responsibility should not figure 
in our principles of justice, as Anderson claims, and access to basic 
capabilities should be unconditional, then Anna should subsidize Bella, 
despite Bella being in a disadvantageous position through her 
responsible choice, for, unless Anna subsidises her, she will be 
vulnerable to domination and oppression. The question now is if we 
object to Bella’s attitude, on what ground do we object to it?15 Surely, 
we don’t object to it on the ground that her conduct makes Anna less 
able to function as an equal citizen, for Anna can still function as a 
social and political equal. However, there is a sense in which Anna is 
dominated and exploited by Bella that cannot be explained through 
basic capabilities. Anna has to subsidize Bella’s plan of life at the 
 
 
15 Alternatively, one can say that this is not objectionable and go on to justify what 
I here call a dominating relationship by adopting Van Parijs-like justification of basic 
income (1992, 1995, 2004, 2013), but this is not Anderson’s option, since she is quite 
emphatic in rejecting “real freedom for all” in favour of which Van Parijs argues, 
mainly on account of the fact that the level of basic income guaranteed 
unconditionally to all by the latter’s proposal is objectionably inattentive of people’s 
special needs, such as disabilities or pregnancy, that would require a much higher 
level of secured income (1999: 298-9, 312, fn. 69), and of the fact as well that 
providing insurance coverage to lazy, able-bodied people, that is people who can 
work but choose not to (1999: 299). Yet, Anderson gives, I think, a wrong picture of 
Van Parijs’ proposal. The latter suggests that such basic income should be available 
to all individuals unconditionally, whatever else they may be entitled to and 
whatever additional provisions adjusted to one’s specific needs, such as disabilities 
or pregnancy, one should receive. Rather Van Parijs’ proposal suffers from other 
drawbacks that would require more space to address. 
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expense of her plan of life. This contrasts with Anderson’s view of 
justice-based duties. 
As Anderson says, people in a society of equals have a 
“fundamental obligation…to secure the social conditions of 
everyone's freedom” (1999: 314), but they are not obliged to support 
each other’s life plans. People having been guaranteed the social 
conditions of their freedom are then responsible for forming the kind 
of life they wish and for the consequences that their chosen kind of 
life may have (Anderson 1999: 328). 
Nevertheless, Anna ends up subsidizing Bella’s life style. This 
consequence is due to Anderson’s concern that under responsibility-
sensitive accounts of justice people are in danger of losing access to 
their equal opportunities to certain goods necessary for functioning as 
social and political equals. The redress for this is unconditional 
provision of basic capabilities. But, first, not all forms of luck 
egalitarianism support the view that opportunities are available on the 
condition that people act responsibly. Under Dworkinian equality of 
resources, for example, people are responsible for making use of their 
equal opportunities. And secondly, she should acknowledge that 
people should themselves be responsible as well for being able to act 
as social and political equals. This means that it is not only the case 
that we should treat each other as social and political equals, but that 
we also have personal responsibility with respect to how we make use 
of the social conditions of our freedom provided publicly, so that we 
do not end up being in a dominated and oppressed position. This is 
important, since if personal responsibility is not a justice requirement, 
then we may end up dealing with the following implausible situation. 
Suppose that we do eventually adopt an unconditional-
provision-of-basic-capabilities policy. Suppose now that Bella makes 
very bad use of her monthly stipend, say she spends the largest part 
of her income to organise beach parties once a month, and as a result 
she ends up starving for the rest of the month, she’s homeless due to 
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her being unable to pay her rent and her health becomes poor. She 
thus ends up in a position of being at the mercy of others. Social 
egalitarians, by stressing the importance of non-domination and non-
oppression, have to continue to make transfers to Bella until she so 
acts so as not to be in a vulnerable position. This is a similar problem 
to the expensive tastes one. It seems that Bella’s functioning as a social 
and political equal is very expensive. This outcome is due to social 
egalitarians not being clear with respect to what they mean by saying 
that a society of equals is one where domination and oppression have 
been erased or mitigated. Let me explain. 
There is a distinction that should be drawn between realised 
non-domination and the conditions required for a society to realise 
non-domination. Non-domination occurs when people do not actually 
live under dominating and oppressive relationships. However, making 
the social conditions of non-domination available to all, does not 
necessarily entail that we do actually live in a society where 
domination and oppression does not exist. So, social egalitarians need 
to clarify their claim that the social egalitarian ideal is a society of 
social and political equals. More precisely, they should be clear what 
the aims of the social egalitarian ideal should be. On the one hand, 
they can say that a society of equals should aim at making people 
equal in their opportunities to function as equal citizens. On the other 
hand, they can say that a society of equals should make people equal 
in their functioning as equal citizens. Although the second would be a 
highly desirable state of affairs, it would be a highly undesirable aim 
for a society to pursue. This is so, for, it would require either unfair 
treatment of some individuals, combined with problems of 
unsustainability, or paternalistic treatment of Bella-like people, who 
would have to be forced to be free, to use a famous statement. So, 
although a society of actual non-domination is highly desirable, it is so 
when it is people themselves that succeed in actually functioning as 
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social and political equals through using the social conditions of their 
freedom in a responsible way. 
Given this distinction, the question addressed to social 
egalitarians would be whether being vulnerable to the wills of others, 
through irresponsible conduct, is objectionable or not. Social 
egalitarians have to bite the bullet and say either that it is not 
objectionable, in which case they have to reconsider their aversion to 
responsibility-sensitive principles of justice; or, that it is objectionable 
at the cost of publicly subsidizing expensive life-styles or adopting 
paternalistic policies.16,17 
Summing up, I have argued that Anderson has criticised the 
luck egalitarian paradigm on the ground that the principles of justice 
the latter supports fail the justification requirement essential to a 
society of social and political equals. According to her view, certain 
distributive considerations should be justified in virtue of equal social 
and political relationships, not on account of the fact that luck has 
 
16 Note that in case we take Anderson’s view that those able to work but choose not 
to are not to be subsidised seriously, then it is questionable how she can escape the 
harshness objection (see chapter 2), as well as the objection from the point of view 
of egalitarian motives/incentives/attitudes (see chapter 3) that she raises against 
luck egalitarianism. 
17 There is a third approach that social egalitarians could adopt, suggested by 
Williams (2006), according to which, in order to protect people from being 
vulnerable to absolute deprivation, we can make them bear the cost of some of their 
risky choices themselves or tax them if they do. Williams calls this internalizing 
sufficientarianism, which he contrasts with externalizing sufficientarianism—the 
view studied here—where the costs of people’s imprudent choices are shared by all 
through general taxation or compulsory insurance. To the extent, though, social 
egalitarians reject (even weak) paternalism, and to the extent such an approach is 
based on paternalistic grounds (see fn. 12 above), such an approach cannot be 
available to social egalitarians without compromising their view. Moreover, if they 
welcome such an approach, then they seem to share much ground with Dworkin, 
who proposes compulsory insurance on paternalistic grounds and whom especially 
Anderson has criticized for that reason. 
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been uncharitable to some compared to others. Against this I claimed 
that this is not true of Dworkin’s theory, a claim for which I shall 
provide support in the next chapter. I also maintained that Anderson, 
unlike most of her fellow social egalitarians, has tried to give a 
determinate content to the vague idea of what it means to treat each 
other in a non-dominating way. However, I argued that she is 
ambivalent with respect to the role of responsibility within her 
democratic equality. In fact, she seems to be oscillating between two 
different strategies each of which has unfortunate implications given 
her overall commitments to the ideal of social equality. The first 
strategy makes access to basic capabilities conditional upon 
responsible conduct. Adopting this strategy would make “democratic 
equality” susceptible to the moralising and intrusive judgements 
objections as well as to the abandonment of the imprudent victim 
objection. The second strategy, which suggests that people should 
have unconditional access to basic capabilities, cannot account for 
certain dominating conducts, because it is not responsibility-sensitive, 
a problem that Dworkin’s theory properly understood does not face. 
 
In this and the previous chapter, I argued that there are two 
ways of interpreting what social equality is: the attitudinal 
interpretation and the democratic participatory interpretation of 
social equality. Yet each fails to properly account for the social 
egalitarian demand that people’s relationships should not be 
characterised by domination. By this I do not mean to suggest that 
social egalitarians do not offer valuable insights with respect to how 
we should understand the value of equality. As I have several times 
maintained throughout my thesis, I share most of the social egalitarian 
concerns. My objection, though, lies in the fact that, first, social 
egalitarians have been uncharitable to Dworkin’s theory, which 
properly understood is attentive to the social egalitarian demand of 
non-domination and, secondly, that they are wrong in ignoring the 
responsibility-sensitivity requirement. In the
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next chapter, I will argue that responsibility properly understood is 
constitutive of non-domination, not an enemy to it, and that to the 
extent Dworkin’s theory is responsibility-sensitive, it can better 
account for the basic social egalitarian commitment to non-
domination. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Responsibility and Non-Domination 
 
 
As mentioned several times throughout this thesis, according 
to social egalitarians, the proper egalitarian aim is to respect people’s 
equal social and political status. In order for this to be so, people 
should be free from arbitrary interference, that is, from domination. 
Given the non-domination requirement, I argued that social 
egalitarians can object against Dworkin’s theory on the ground that, 
although it aims to interpret what it means to relate to each other as 
equals, his overall theory—and his equality of resources specifically— 
violates, rather than gives substance to, the social egalitarian demand 
of non-domination, since the principle of responsibility that is central 
to equality of resources is morally implausible. There are two reasons 
why this may be so. First, because it permits objectionable power 
inequalities and, secondly, because it is expressive of or generates 
morally objectionable attitudes, motives or incentives. 
As I said in the introduction, my aim in this dissertation is 
twofold. The first has a negative character and is meant to reject the 
claim that equality of resources is susceptible to the two objections. 
The second is positive and is meant to provide argumentation about 
why responsibility, properly understood, is constitutive of a society of 
equals. In chapters 2 and 3, I explained why equality of resources is 
not susceptible to the objection that it is a morally implausible 
doctrine. In this chapter, my aim is to provide a positive case in favour 
of the view that responsibility is constitutive of the requirement of 
non-domination. As such, I think that Dworkin’s account is not only 
attentive to the social egalitarian demand that people should relate to 
each other
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as social and political equals, but it provides a better understanding of 
non-domination than the proposed social egalitarian accounts, exactly 
because it builds upon a conception of personal responsibility that is 
constitutive of equal social and political relationships. This is to say, 
personal responsibility and non-domination are two sides of the same 
coin, something that social egalitarians fail to see, since they reject the 
ethical and political importance of the former. On the one hand, I 
cannot be personally responsible for how I lead my life unless certain 
conditions are available that make the exercise of my personal 
responsibility possible on equal terms with others. On the other hand, 
I cannot live under conditions of non-domination, if I am not 
personally responsible for how I lead my life. It is people themselves 
that should form a conception of the good and live accordingly on 
equal terms with others. Equality of resources provides the structure 
against which people can determine the conditions of their life on 
equal terms with others. 
Moreover, Dworkin’s account properly understood gives a 
determinate content to the otherwise vague idea that people should 
relate to each other in a non-dominating way, something that certain 
social egalitarian accounts have failed to substantiate. Non-
domination has been traditionally understood as freedom from 
arbitrary interference in one’s actions by the will of others and the 
state. But as such it is an abstract idea and has to be explained. 
Dworkin’s account, unlike social egalitarian ones, provides such an 
explanation, by fleshing out what a fair choice structure is, which can 
be used as our yardstick against which we can judge what arbitrary 
interference consists in. In this way arbitrary interference takes a 
determinate form. This is to say, we cannot account for what arbitrary 
interference is, unless we have an account of what a fair choice 
structure is. Equality of resources provides a principled account of the 
determinate content of this choice structure. 
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Having said that, in section (a), I shall argue that the basic 
commitment of Dworkin’s theory is to specify under what conditions 
people can be thought to live in a non-dominating way. In this respect, 
personal responsibility, of which consequential responsibility is 
constitutive, is an essential part of non-domination, not an enemy to 
it, as social egalitarians maintain. I thus examine how we should make 
sense of consequential responsibility, that is, under what conditions 
we should hold people consequentially responsible for their 
preferences, choices and so on. I argue that there are justice-relative 
and agent-relative conditions that are jointly necessary and sufficient 
for ascribing consequential responsibility. I then, in section (b), 
proceed to examine more closely what justice-relative conditions 
require and also argue that making sense of consequential 
responsibility in the way I suggest we should do within the Dworkinian 
context does not engage us in the metaphysical question over free will 
and determinism, an objection that social egalitarians have raised 
against luck egalitarianism. Finally, in section (c), I examine what 
agent-relative conditions require, while I also consider and reject 
certain objections regarding the relation between capacities and 
consequential responsibility. 
 
             a. Personal responsibility and equality of resources 
According to Dworkin, what we owe to others is based on the 
ethical idea of living in dignity (2011: ch. 9). The conception of dignity 
should be interpreted to include the principle of self-respect, namely 
that each person should treat the success of his life as having objective 
importance, and the principle of authenticity, namely, that each 
person has a special, personal responsibility to create a life that he 
endorses (Dworkin 2011: 203-18). These two principles of dignity are 
integrated into morality. The principle of self-respect points to how 
we should treat others. It says that I cannot rationally regard my life 
as having objective importance, if I do not, at the same time, recognise 
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that other people’s lives are of equal objective importance (Dworkin 
2011: 254, 260). This has implications for the second principle as well. 
I cannot, in the name of leading my life as I see fit, diminish other 
people’s dignity and their special responsibility for leading an 
authentic life. If they are to lead an authentic life, as I am—which is 
entailed by the principle of self-respect—and if self-respect requires 
equal respect for the lives of others, then it follows that I should 
respect other people’s personal responsibility for leading an authentic 
life by not unjustifiably usurping options otherwise available to them. 
Consequential responsibility is responsibility for the 
consequences of a person’s choices—as these are informed by her 
preferences, tastes, ambitions, ideological convictions and so on. 
Understood this way, consequential responsibility, which is the focus 
of this chapter, is constitutive of people’s dignity. Why? As it was said 
just above, living authentically, as the second principle of dignity 
prescribes, ultimately requires that a person lives according to a way 
of life that she endorses. For a person to live a life that she endorses, 
she should be responsible for creating that life. She should be the 
ultimate judge of what constitutes a good life for her and she should 
strive to live accordingly. But a person cannot be held responsible for 
how her life goes, that is, a person cannot satisfy the second principle 
of dignity, if she does not determine the terms of her life.1 At the same 
time, she should respect other people’s personal responsibility to live 
according to their own way of life, as the first principle of dignity 
requires. This entails that she should respect their equal right to 
determine the terms of their life. Now, as we have seen, non-
domination requires that people are equally able to determine the 
terms of their life. Given what it was said just above, an authentic life 
is a life of non-domination. Personal responsibility has a central role 
with respect to the demand that we determine the terms of our living, 
 
 
1 This is one reason why Dworkin is hostile to equality of welfare (2011: 355). 
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since being responsible for one’s life requires that one determines the 
terms of her life. Responsibility and non-domination seem to be two 
sides of the same coin. But to respect each other’s equal dignity, we 
are required to provide to all people those conditions necessary for 
being able to exercise their personal responsibility on equal terms. 
Consequential responsibility is a necessary aspect of personal 
responsibility and as such of non-domination. Unless people are 
responsible for the costs of their choices, they violate the second 
principle of dignity, namely other people’s personal responsibility to 
make something valuable out of their lives. By doing so, they 
arbitrarily interfere in their life by unjustifiably usurping choices 
otherwise open to them. This still is quite abstract, however. For what 
is said here is that consequential responsibility is required if people 
are to live in a non-dominating way, that is, in a way that others do not 
have the capacity to arbitrarily interfere in their life, but it does not 
say when it is appropriate to hold people consequentially responsible 
for their choices; thus it does not specify what a fair choice structure 
is, the violation of which would consist in arbitrary interference. This 
is what I shall try to examine in what follows. 
Given the two principles of dignity as these are integrated into 
morality, living authentically is not just living as one would wish. Living 
authentically means seeking “a way to live that grips you as right for 
you and your circumstances” (Dworkin 2011: 209). So, leading an 
authentic life is not living independently of one’s circumstances, but 
in response to one’s circumstances: “we all live in an ethical culture 
that provides, at any time, the palette of recognisable ethical values 
from which possibilities can be drawn…[I]t is not possible to live a life 
of medieval chivalry in Brooklyn now: that life required a social and 
even political background of which no sufficient vestiges remain” 
(Dworkin 2011: 211). 
This is the essential background against which we can make 
better sense of consequential responsibility. Let me explain. Dworkin 
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makes a distinction between living a good life and living well, where 
“living well means striving to create a good life, but only subject to 
certain constraints essential to human dignity” (2011: 195). So, 
creating a good life is constrained by the requirements of the 
principles of self-respect and of authenticity as these are integrated 
into morality. This partly determines what the circumstances are to 
which we should respond. We should strive to create a good life under 
circumstances of justice. Thus, living authentically means living 
according to one’s conception of the good on equal terms with others. 
I can live well when I live under circumstances of justice and it is 
appropriate to be consequentially responsible for my choices when 
these choices are made under circumstances of justice. 
Having said that, I shall make the distinction between 
genuinely endorsed (GE) preferences and justice-relative-authentic 
(JRA) preferences. Although Dworkin seems to use endorsed and 
authentic preferences interchangeably—that is, he claims that people 
should be held consequentially responsible for their choices flowing 
from their genuinely endorsed or authentic preferences—I think it is 
better to keep them distinct. A person’s GE preferences are not 
necessarily JRA preferences. A person is consequentially responsible 
for her choices when the latter flow from her JRA preferences, that is, 
when made under the conditions I shall shortly describe. So, JRA 
preferences can be properly considered as consequential or liability 
responsibility conferring.2 A person may make choices flowing from 
her GE preferences even when not all the conditions obtain and 
especially the justice-relative conditions. For example, a woman’s GE 
desire to become a mother and raise her child by herself is not 
necessarily consequential responsibility conferring, if certain 
 
 
2 In chapter 6 of Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin distinguishes between different 
kinds of personal responsibility (2011: 102-4). Consequential responsibility here 
refers to what in Justice for Hedgehogs Dworkin calls liability responsibility. 
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conditions of justice are not satisfied. On the other hand, a person’s 
JRA preferences are not necessarily GE preferences. For example, a 
person may really endorse a life of medieval chivalry, but to the extent 
this is not available in our times, he has to revise his preferences. His 
revised preferences, though, given that the necessary and sufficient 
conditions obtain, can be JRA. So, under what necessary and sufficient 
conditions are our preferences/choices justice-relevant-authentic, 
that is, consequential responsibility conferring? 
I take it that a person is not (fully) consequentially responsible 
for her preferences or choices, with which she identifies, if: 
a) She lacks the epistemic capacity, that is, “some minimal ability to 
form true beliefs about the world, about the mental states of other 
people, and about the likely consequences of what [she does]” 
(Dworkin 2011: 226). 
b) She lacks the normal degree of the regulative capacity, that is “the 
ability to make decisions that fit what we might call [her] normative 
personality: [her] desires, preferences, convictions, attachments, 
loyalties, and self-image” (Dworkin 2011: 226). 
c) She has not developed to a sufficient degree her epistemic and 
regulative capacities. 
d) She did not have the fullest possible opportunity compatible with 
the opportunities of others to form and reflect on her convictions, 
attachments and projects, an opportunity to influence the 
corresponding opinions of others. This requires that the legal system 
should guarantee the fullest possible set of liberties to all people 
necessary for them to deliberate upon their convictions, values, 
beliefs, preferences and so on (Dworkin 2000: 160). 
e) Her choices/preferences are (partly) the outcome of or influenced 
by historical or present institutional and non-institutional injustices, 
such as racism or sexism etc., that is, when the principle of ethical 
independence (Dworkin 2011: 212) has been violated. 
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f) She has not been provided with the fullest possible opportunity set 
compatible with the opportunity set of others to be able to insure 
herself against certain unwelcome consequences of her 
preferences/choices. 
Conditions (a)-(b) are ones that are agent-relative, while 
conditions (c)-(f) are justice-relative, and taken together they are 
necessary and sufficient for ascribing consequential responsibility to 
people. 
 
             b. Justice-relative conditions 
I shall discuss only briefly justice-relative conditions, since 
most of them have already been discussed throughout this thesis. 
Condition (d) is uncontroversial. People cannot be said to have the 
fullest possible opportunity compatible with the opportunities of 
others to form and reflect on their convictions, attachments and 
projects, or an opportunity to influence the corresponding opinions of 
others, under a non-liberal regime that forbids freedom of expression 
(and non-expression), of association, of religious or other ideological 
commitments and access to the widest available literature and other 
forms of art (Dworkin 2000: 160).3 Moreover, people should have 
access to the public educational system of one’s society,4 which, I 
 
3 Although I maintain that condition (d) is pretty much uncontroversial, the liberties 
it prescribes are not themselves uncontroversial. This is especially true of the  
freedom of speech. For example, there is controversy over whether hate speech 
should be prohibited or be free and exposed to critical assessment. 
4 This does not rule out that private schools and generally private educational 
institutions can exist. Besides a public educational system is not the same as public 
educational institutions. By public educational system I mean education offered to 
people on public reasons. In this sense, there may be private schools whose 
curriculum should respond to public educational criteria. On the other hand, there 
may exist private schools whose educational purpose and focus is different from the 
purpose set by public standards of education, such as religious schools. Children can 
be free to attend such schools, but they should receive public education as well. 
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maintain, should be neutral with respect to reasonable doctrines of 
what constitutes a good life.5 Access to public education is necessary 
for people to be able to form authentic choices. Note that by access 
to the public educational system, I don’t mean merely that one should 
have had the opportunity to get an education, but one should have 
actually been educated. This is also required by condition (c). Having 
the epistemic and regulative capacities (which I discuss below) cannot 
itself be sufficient for one to be able to form JRA preferences, unless 
one has developed to a normal degree these capacities through 
education. 
Condition (e) requires that people should be able to form their 
preferences in an ethically independent manner. That people’s 
choices should not be influenced by past or present unjust 
institutional and non-institutional practices is widely accepted. That 
 
 
Note also that private schools should be free to offer religious or other non-public 
education but only under certain conditions. For example, teaching that encourages 
religious intolerance, violence, racial hatred, enmity against certain groups and so 
on should be prohibited. 
5 Although the right to access to a public educational system is also pretty much 
uncontroversial, it is true that certain controversial issues arise with respect to what 
neutral public education is, as well as with respect to the right of some often 
religious groups (such as the Amish) to refuse sending their children to public 
schools. Although I do not have the space to develop my arguments here, my view 
is that schools should give the opportunity to children to develop so far as possible 
their capacities for (self) understanding, critical assessment, deliberation, co-
operation and problem solving, as well as their athletic abilities. This would require 
(except, of course, literacy) access to the fullest possible degree to a wide range of 
fields of knowledge, such as mathematics, physics, philosophy, politics, economics, 
(world) history, modern technology, health issues (sex education included) and art. 
Moreover, I think that parents belonging to certain religious or other groups do not 
have the right to prohibit their children from attending public education. Although 
parents have the right to raise their children according to their own values, this right 
is not unconditional. But as I said, space restricts me to a simple statement of my 
view. 
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the legal system should form just institutions and protect us from 
unjust non-institutional practices is as well widely supported. This 
requires first that a system of liberty should ensure the widest 
possible freedom for people to realise their conception of the good 
compatible with the relevant freedom of others. This entails that 
people should be free to choose and act as they see fit on the 
condition that they do not restrict other people’s equal freedom. Such 
liberties are required by the principle of abstraction in Dworkin’s 
liberty/constraint system (constrained by the principle of security). 
These freedoms (as well as those required by condition (d)) form what 
we may call the institutional guarantees of ethical independence. 
On the other hand, there may be non-institutional arbitrary 
constraints to preference formation, that is, people’s preferences may 
be the outcome of oppressive social norms that affect people’s 
socialisation. Such norms may prevail in a society despite the fact that 
its legal system is appropriately just. For example, women may be 
raised to think of themselves as most suitable for housekeeping and 
childrearing and may form their aspirations to conform to what is 
socially considered to be their appropriate role within society. 
Moreover, women who do not conform to social norms may find it 
much harder for their ambitions to be fulfilled, such as, for example, 
an ambition to become a politician, because people do not trust their 
abilities in the specific field. Or, think of people who have been the 
victims of prejudice, such as racial discrimination. Such people may, 
on the one hand, be disadvantaged by other people’s prejudiced 
preferences towards them, but they may also be disadvantaged due 
to their preferences being the outcome of oppressive socialisation. 
Such unjust social norms usually are the outcome of past (institutional 
and non-institutional) injustices. In any case, we have seen that 
equality of resources calls for different forms of remedial measures. 
Finally, condition (f) requires that people have equal 
opportunities to insure themselves against unwelcome consequences 
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of their preferences/choices. This makes it safer for people to form 
and act on preferences they would not otherwise have or which they 
would be required to revise. Suppose, for example, that a person has 
a preference both for making a career and becoming a parent. Her 
choice will certainly be influenced by the set of options available to 
her through the insurance market. As we have seen in chapter 1, an 
objection against Dworkin’s equality of resources is that to the extent 
one identifies with some of her circumstances, then she is 
consequentially responsible for them. For example, a disabled person 
who identifies with his disability would not be entitled to the 
wherewithal necessary to overcome some of the disadvantages of his 
disability, just because he identifies with it. This, however, rests on the 
common interpretation of equality of resources. As I said in chapter 1, 
according to my interpretation, the insurance market is meant to give 
people equal opportunities to guard themselves against the risks of 
living in the way they want. For example, parents are entitled to 
subsidies, not because they have to show that they regret their 
decision to have children, but because they have insured themselves 
against the risk of not being able to meet the costs of raising a child. A 
blind person is entitled to social benefits not because he has to show 
that he regrets being blind, but because he has insured himself against 
not being able, due to his blindness, to meet certain of his needs and 
satisfy some of his preferences. For example, a blind person may 
identify with his blindness and may also have a strong desire to study. 
The fact that he welcomes his blindness is not itself a reason for not 
being provided with the wherewithal to study, say, having access to 
the Braille system, so long as his insurance decisions support this.6 So, 
the insurance scheme is meant to provide to all people equal 
opportunities to guard themselves against not being able to live 
according to what they value more in their life. 
 
 
 
6 See also fn. 29 of Chapter 1. 
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The fact that identification is not a sufficient condition for 
consequential responsibility also gives us an answer to a distinct 
objection against equality of resources that I have not so far examined. 
The objection says that holding people consequentially responsible for 
what they identify with, as the common interpretation of equality of 
resources suggests, is not always fair, for what people identify with is 
not (or is not always) within their control, that is, they do not (always) 
choose to identify with their preferences, and thus asking people to 
bear the costs of what they have not chosen to identify with is unfair.7 
This naturally leads to the free will problem. However, as I said in 
chapter 1, this way of reading equality of 
 
 
 
7 This is indeed one of the reasons why Cohen criticises Dworkin’s cut between the 
person and her circumstances and for his suggestion that his cut between control 
and luck better captures Dworkin’s underlying concern (1989). See also Matravers 
(2002a, 2002b) who argues something like the following. If the crucial thing for 
personal responsibility is that one is satisfied with his preference X, then he should 
be responsible for his second order desire to want X. Matravers’ argument can be 
thought to point to Strawson’s diagnosis with respect to moral responsibility, 
namely that no account of moral responsibility can meet the “regression 
requirement”, according to which for one to be responsible for X he must also be 
responsible for its causes (Strawson 1986: 8, 26-30, 49-50). Similarly, the case of the 
identification requirement for consequential responsibility that is at issue here can 
be said to be vulnerable to the “regression requirement”. This is so, for if one is to 
be responsible for his second order desire to want X, he should be so in the causal 
control sense. We cannot say that one is responsible for his second order desire to 
want X, because he identifies with this second order desire. For one thing, one must 
show that one is responsible for identifying with his second order desire by showing 
that he is responsible for its causes. Moreover, identification can more naturally be 
seen as an act of one’s will, so that when one says that he identifies with X, he cannot 
plausibly mean that he identifies to identify with X, but rather that he wants to 
identify with X, thus pointing to his will. But if this is so, then the problem of free will 
persists, contrary to Dworkin’s insistence that his account is a compatibilist one 
(2000: ch. 7). 
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resources, namely that people should bear the cost of those 
preferences with which they identify, is false. Or, at least, so I argue. 
According to my view, equality of resources asks us to form a 
view about what it would be reasonable to insure ourselves against 
and at what level, given that we are all equally positioned against 
certain risks. In this sense, a person who truly wants to become a 
parent and values this as fundamental for his life to be good will be 
provided insurance if he has made the relevant insurance decision, not 
if he shows that he would prefer not to have this preference or that 
he has been raised to have this preference and so he had no control 
over what has brought it about that he has this preference. That’s why 
considerations over free will are irrelevant. To understand this, we can 
assume that a person is responsible in the causal control sense for 
bringing it about that she has a preference for becoming an F1 pilot. 
The fact that it was in her control that she developed this preference 
is not a reason for denying her compensation in the event she has an 
accident and becomes disabled. If she has insured herself against the 
possibility of ending up disabled as a result of her choice to become 
an F1 pilot, then compensation should be provided to her for that 
reason. Moreover, the fact that she can insure herself against this 
possibility may have been one determinate reason in her judgement 
and self-deliberation to develop this preference. That’s why it is crucial 
to see first that the insurance scheme is a condition of consequential 
responsibility and secondly that judgements over causal control are 
not central to the conception of responsibility equality of resources 
employs. 
Consequential responsibility should be understood as a 
relational notion (Dworkin 2011: 103). As such it is meant to capture 
not the fact that I have been causally responsible for my choices, 
preferences and so on or not, but the fact that there are certain costs 
of my preferences, choices and so on that I cannot pass to others if I 
am to respect them as equals. The sort of costs that are of concern 
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here are costs that a person would not be willing to insure herself 
against given her fair share of resources and equal insurance 
opportunities. So, it does not matter whether a person has formed her 
preferences freely as required by the control-based account of 
responsibility or whether her preferences are affected by her 
socialisation (so long as her socialisation is not characterised by 
injustices) or indeed whether determinism is true. What matters is 
what people would choose to insure themselves against and what 
they would not, given that they are equally positioned against certain 
risks. For example, a person may choose not to insure herself against 
certain costs, even if she knows that she is not causally responsible for 
these costs. One obvious reason for doing so is because she does not 
regard such costs as burdensome when she takes suitable alternatives 
into account. Certain welfare costs are an example of this. Or, consider 
the possibility that I could lose the sight of one eye. I may decide not 
to insure myself against this possibility, because first I do not think my 
life would be worse if only one of my eyes were properly functioning 
and secondly because, even if I would not want this to happen to me, 
I have other more important projects to which I want to spend my fair 
share of resources and which are not affected by the fact that I may 
become half-blind. We are required to pay certain costs of our 
preferences not because it was in our control to have these 
preferences or because we identify with them, but because we would 
not be willing to pay insurance coverage for them given our fair share 
and our deliberations about what matters more in our life. 
 
             c. Agent-relative conditions 
Before going on to examine the agent-relative conditions more 
closely, let me note that Dworkin introduces the epistemic and 
regulative capacities as conditions for judgemental responsibility 
(2011: ch. 10). According to Dworkin, “[s]omeone has judgemental 
responsibility for some act if it is appropriate to rank his act on some 
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scale of praise or criticism” (2011: 103). He advances his account of 
capacity control as the best answer to the free will challenge.8 
Judgemental responsibility though is different from 
consequential responsibility, which is what I am concerned with here. 
Consequential responsibility concerns the consequences that flow 
from people’s choices as these are informed by their preferences, 
convictions and so on and is not due to people for having acted in a 
blameworthy or praiseworthy way, but depends on the decisions 
people make with respect to whether and what costs of their 
preferences, tastes etc. they are willing to bear and what they are not, 
given that they have equal opportunities, as these are specified by 
equality of resources, to insure themselves against certain risks. In this 
sense, the fact that a person may decide to devote her life to saving 
the world’s poor, which is to many a praiseworthy enterprise, is not a 
reason from the point of view of justice to ask for more than her fair 
share. On the other hand, the fact that a person has been blamelessly 
involved in a car accident is not a reason from the point of view of 
justice to refuse him 
 
 
8 This is the familiar problem of the incompatibility between determinism and free 
will, namely that if determinism is true then no one can be really said to fully control 
what has brought it about that one has acted, decided, chosen etc. in the way he 
has. In other words, agent responsibility requires causal responsibility (For the 
distinction between causal, agent, moral and consequential responsibility see Knight 
and Stemplowska (2011: 11-15)) and thus moral responsibility is plausible only if 
free will is true. Hard determinism and libertarianism are both incompatibilistic 
views of free will and determinism (Lippert-Rasmussen 2005: 46). Frankfurt has 
argued against the incompatibilistic view that moral responsibility and free will can 
be compatible with determinism (1969, 1971). For a rejection of Frankfurt’s 
compatibilist view see, for example, Wideker (1995) and Kane (1996; 2005). For a 
similar line of thought see also Ginet (1996) and Wyma (1997). For a reply to 
Wideker and Kane, see Mele and Robb (1998) who provide more refined Frankfurt-
style cases to validate Frankfurt’s compatibilist view. Another kind of objection to 
Frankfurt has been called the “Flicker of Freedom” strategy (Fischer 1999: 109-10; 
Kane 2005: 85-7).
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medical treatment, in case he needs it, if his insurance decisions 
support this. In any case, the relevant capacities that are conditions 
for judgemental responsibility can qualify as necessary (but not 
sufficient) conditions for consequential responsibility as well, and that 
is the focus of this chapter. 
That people should have the capacity to a minimum degree to 
form true beliefs about the world as well as the capacity to match 
decisions with their aims are ones that all, or almost all, would agree 
are required for people to be responsible for their choices and 
decisions.9 It is more controversial what the minimum threshold of 
 
9 There is a distinct question concerning the basis of equality, that is, what 
grounds there are for treating people as having equal moral worth. Usually, answers 
take the form of people being treated as moral equals in virtue of possessing certain 
capacities at a certain minimum. This is indeed a controversial issue. The problem I 
discuss here, however, is somewhat different. It regards when it is appropriate to 
hold people consequentially responsible for their choices and this is distinct from 
the question of when it is appropriate to treat them as equal moral agents. One 
basic difference can be assumed to be that not all those qualifying as moral agents 
can be properly held consequentially responsible for their choices. Certainly 
consequential responsibility depends upon one having qualified as a moral agent, 
but being a moral agent does not necessarily mean that one is consequentially 
responsible for her choices. Of course, this depends upon what we take the basis of 
equality to be and different answers to this will probably produce different answers 
to the connection between moral agency and consequential responsibility. For 
example, suppose that we assume that people are equal moral agents in virtue of 
each possessing “a distinct subjectivity with the kind of structure that gives rise to a 
sense of time, reasons-responsiveness, and the interests that rational aims 
generate” (Sher 2014: 28). People with certain mental defects or children can satisfy 
this requirement and qualify as moral agents whose interests should be given equal 
moral consideration, concern, respect and so on. On the other hand, children, for 
example, have not developed certain capacities required for consequential 
responsibility, such as the “ability to form true beliefs about the world, about the 
mental states of other people, and about the likely consequences of what [we do]”. 
Moreover, it could be claimed that, given a certain account of what justifies treating 
people as equal moral agents, ascribing consequential responsibility to people who 
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these capacities should be10 and to a great degree this is up to 
scientific judgement. Yet, what is most controversial regarding the 
relation between capacity and responsibility that is of concern here 
relates to the following line of criticism. Different people possess 
these capacities to different above-the-threshold degrees. If 
responsibility is (at least partly) conditioned on possessing these 
capacities, then people’s responsibility should vary depending on the 
degree of their possession of these capacities. If this is so, then the 
person/circumstance distinction cannot account for or casts doubt on 
the enterprise of justifying the significance of responsibility within a 
theory of distributive justice and thus the requirement of 
responsibility-sensitivity should be abandoned or be more moderate. 
Yet, I think this is mistaken. 
To see why, it is useful to examine what those capacities refer 
to. Take, first, the epistemic capacity, that is, our “ability to form true 
beliefs about the world, about the mental states of other people, and 
about the likely consequences of what [we do]”. Saying that this is a 
necessary condition for a person to be consequentially responsible, 
we cannot plausibly mean that Albert Einstein should have a greater 
degree of consequential responsibility than I do, because I cannot 
adequately grasp the general theory of relativity. He was much 
smarter than I am, but this is not a proper basis for saying that he 
should bear a greater degree of consequential responsibility than I do. 
 
 
lack or have not developed the relevant capacities required for consequential 
responsibility, is to treat them as moral unequals. In any case, this issue needs 
further elaboration and consideration, but I do not have the space here to develop 
further arguments. My point is rather limited. To the extent we agree that at least 
some aspects of our moral personality justify consequential responsibility, then we 
must assume possessing certain capacities relevant to consequential responsibility 
at a minimum threshold as necessary. It is this claim I assume to be the least 
controversial. 
10 See, for example, Arneson (2015) about the arbitrariness of the threshold. 
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Neither is it reasonable to say that Freud should bear a greater degree 
of consequential responsibility than I do, because he is a specialist in 
recognising the mental states of other people while I am not. We need 
to make better sense of what kind of epistemic capacity is required 
for consequential responsibility to be due. To do so, I shall take stock 
of Dworkin’s distinction between the model of impact and the 
challenge model in his discussion of what a good life is from a liberal 
point of view (2000: ch. 6). 
According to the model of impact, a person’s life is more 
valuable the greater the impact her life has on the objective value of 
the world (Dworkin 2000: 251-3). According to the model of challenge, 
a person’s life has value to the extent she has lived it in a way that has 
responded to her circumstances in an appropriate way (Dworkin 2000: 
253-4).11 Einstein’s life is better than mine and indeed better than 
most people’s life who have ever lived according to the first model. 
But, according to the second model both my life and Einstein’s life may 
be good lives, independently of the impact we’ve made on the world, 
given that we have appropriately responded to our situation. Given 
this distinction we might say that the epistemic capacity necessary for 
consequential responsibility is the very same capacity necessary for 
being able to live a good life according to the challenge model. This 
capacity does not require that one is great at physics or 
psychoanalysis, but only that he has the ability to understand certain 
truths at a basic level about how the world is.12 
Take next the regulative capacity, that is, our “ability to make 
decisions that fit what we might call [our] normative personality: [our] 
 
11 See also Dworkin (2011: 195-9). 
12 As I maintain above, it does not suffice that we have the capacity to understand 
certain truths about the world, but that we actually know them. A person who  
possesses the epistemic capacity cannot be consequentially responsible for her acts 
if she has not realised this capacity. Being able to understand that a gun can kill is 
different than actually knowing that a gun can kill. 
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desires, preferences, convictions, attachments, loyalties, and self-
image”. The regulative capacity is a more plausible basis than the 
epistemic one for Dworkin’s critics to maintain that to the extent 
people possess it to different degrees, they should bear differential 
consequential responsibility. If we consider that the ability to fit 
decisions to our conception of the good depends on our innate 
abilities to deliberate, choose and act prudently, and given that such 
abilities belong to our circumstances, then to the extent people do not 
possess those abilities to an equal degree, it is fair that they do not 
bear the same degree of consequential responsibility. To meet this 
challenge, we need to make the following distinction between having 
a desire, preference, conviction, and so on and choosing the 
appropriate means to satisfy them or live accordingly. Dworkin’s critics 
should be careful to make it clear where their objection applies. 
On the one hand, they could maintain that people’s formation 
of their desires, preferences, convictions etc. partly depends on their 
innate abilities to deliberate, choose and act prudently. So, what 
people identify with is affected by those abilities. But people have 
differential innate skills to deliberate, choose and act prudently for 
which they cannot be reasonably held responsible, since such skills 
belong to their circumstances (Arneson 1999: 496, 2002: 371; 
Scheffler 2005: 11, 13). If that is so, then people’s choices are, at least, 
partly influenced by their circumstances. Thus, the identification 
requirement is influenced by people’s circumstances. This has as a 
consequence that the connection between identification and 
responsibility is rendered problematic. For, if people are responsible 
for what they identify with, and if identification is partly determined 
by factors that belong to people’s circumstances, then they are either 
held responsible for their circumstances, which are normally seen as 
outside of the sphere of personal responsibility, or they should not be 
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held, at least fully, responsible for what they identify with.13 Because 
some people’s specific capacities are poor, it is unfair to hold them 
fully consequentially responsible for their desires, preferences, 
convictions, etc. and thus consequential responsibility should be 
somehow proportioned to the degree they possess these capacities.14 
 
13 A distinct objection, especially with respect to control-based accounts of choice, 
and with respect to Dworkin’s identification-based account in case the latter 
collapses into the former, is that the principle of responsibility so construed is 
impracticable, that is, it cannot be implemented in real world policies. This is so, 
since the necessary information [for tracking responsibility] “is technically 
unfeasible and physically impossible to collect” (Arneson 1989: 87, cf. Arneson 1999: 
495; Cohen 1989: 934; Roemer 1995: 2). If this is so, then why should we be 
bothered theorising the role of responsibility in determining distribution? Related 
to this criticism is the view, advanced though in a different context (namely, as a 
reply to the harshness objection), that in the real world there is almost no case that 
could “pass the ‘pure option luck’ test” (Voigt 2007: 403; cf. Barry N. 2006). But, 
again if there are no pure option luck cases in the real world, why should we be 
bothered theorising the role of responsibility in determining distribution? Political 
philosophy’s role is, as Rawls has famously stated, “realistically utopian: that is, as 
probing the limits of practicable political possibility” (2001: 4, cf. 1999: 11). So, a 
theory of justice should be a realistic utopia, that is, inform us of “how far in our 
world (given its laws and tendencies) a democratic regime can attain complete 
realization of its appropriate political values” (Rawls 2001: 13). In this respect, luck 
egalitarianism disregards or ignores this requirement. But, if luck egalitarianism fails 
in its role to provide for a realistically utopian conception of justice, it consequently 
fails in its reconciliatory role, that is, its role as a political philosophical doctrine to 
reconcile us with our society and its history (Rawls 2001: 3-4). This is so, since, as 
Rawls puts it, a realistic utopia “extends what are ordinarily thought to be the limits 
of practicable political possibility and, in so doing, reconciles us to our political and 
social condition’’ (1999: 11). 
14 This is related to the social egalitarian objection that luck egalitarianism is morally 
implausible, since in order to track people’s responsibility for their acts, decisions 
and so on, the state would have to make intrusive judgments of how they have made 
use of their freedoms (Anderson 1999: 289, 305, 310; Scheffler 2003: 21, Carter 
2011). This is so, since people’s abilities to act prudently or responsibly are partly 
shaped by their innate abilities, character traits and so on (that are themselves 
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But how are we to judge that people’s specific capacities are 
poor? The objection implies a correlation between the specific 
capacities and the desires, preferences, convictions and so on that 
people actually have or develop. So, when they say that the specific 
capacities are poor, the objectors imply that had these been of a 
greater degree, their desires, preferences, convictions and so on 
would be different from what they are.15 But different in what sense? 
There should be a standard against which we can judge that a 
person’s desires, preferences, convictions, etc. are not as they would 
have been. This standard can be provided by what would be 
objectively prudent for one to want. We could then say that people 
who do not want what is objectively prudent for them, lack the 
specific capacities to the same extent as others do who want what is 
objectively prudent for them, and so they should not be held fully 
consequentially responsible for their desires, preferences and 
convictions. But this is not what anti-perfectionist liberals want to say 
and certainly this is not 
 
influenced by people’s social environment and circumstances of upbringing) and are 
partly due to their own effort (which is as well at least partly affected by one’s genes, 
social and upbringing environment). So, the state would have to track people’s 
responsibility by determining what part of, say, one’s effort is due to luck and what 
part is due to his choice alone, or whether one’s imprudent decision is owed to 
factors that are beyond her control and so on (Miller as well advances the similar 
thought (though in the space of desert considerations and how these may be 
affected by considerations about luck) that choices and efforts are influenced by 
people’s circumstances (1999: 143-9)). But such a policy would be humiliating and 
demeaning. However, if my argument presented here that equality of resources 
does not need to rest on such kinds of evaluations, then the present objection would 
be invalid with respect to equality of resources. 
15 We should be careful not to confuse this with the fact that people’s desires, 
preferences and so on are influenced by their productive talents. Productive talents 
are different from the capacities under consideration here. So, I may decide not to 
become an astrophysicist, although I would want to, because I know I lack the 
specific skills required for pursuing such a career. But this does not mean that I lack 
the regulative capacity under discussion here.
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required by equality of resources. According to the latter, people 
should be free to choose to live according to their own conception of 
the good. No such objective standard as to what a good life consists in 
is acceptable. Moreover, the challenge model tells in favor of this. This 
is not to say that there are not certain restrictions with respect to the 
life people can pursue. But these restrictions are put from the point of 
view of justice, not from the point of view of some comprehensive-
philosophical, religious or ideological-doctrine. What is required is 
that people have the capacity to form a conception of the good. To the 
extent they have this capacity, we can no longer say that this capacity 
is possessed in degrees, for that would commit us to an objectionable 
objective standard of what a good life consists in. 
This does not mean, however, that there aren’t any 
unreasonable conceptions of the good. But a conception of the good 
being unreasonable does not necessarily mean that the person who 
adopts such a conception lacks the relevant capacity. It may be the 
case that an unreasonable conception of the good is a sign of someone 
lacking the capacity to form a conception of the good. One such 
example would be people suffering from mental or serious 
psychological defects. Such people may have and indeed sometimes 
do have strong desires, preferences, convictions, but they probably do 
not satisfy the first and/or the second condition. On the other hand, 
not all people holding unreasonable conceptions of the good are 
lacking the relevant capacity. Neo-Nazis, religious fundamentalists, 
racists, or people like the Medici prince do not lack the capacity to 
form a conception of the good, even though their conception of the 
good is unreasonable. It would not be reasonable to hold that all those 
involved in the atrocities during World War II were insane or that the 
slavery regime in the USA was due to some kind of collective insanity. 
Other factors may be involved in explaining such phenomena that 
usually characterise social groups, but they cannot be explained by the 
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fact that a person lacks the mental and psychological capacities to 
form a conception of the good. 
On the other hand, Dworkin’s critics could point to people’s 
abilities to deliberate, choose and act prudently with respect to what 
the appropriate means are for the satisfaction of their desires, 
preferences and convictions. It is these capacities to which the 
regulative capacity refers.16 They could thus say that because some 
people’s above-the-threshold regulative capacity is poorer than 
others’, it is unfair to hold them consequentially responsible for their 
choices to the same extent as those whose relevant capacity is better. 
However, the question here is similar. How are we going to judge that 
a person has a poor regulative capacity? Are we to say this when a 
person does actually fail to decide prudently? This would be a poor 
answer. It is one thing to decide imprudently and another not to have 
the capacity to decide prudently. There are many factors that may 
explain an imprudent decision, which we should try to eliminate or 
mitigate, as condition (d) requires for example, but these factors do 
not have to do with our internal capacity. Are we to say that people 
have decided imprudently judging by the fact that they have ended-
up worse-off than others? But, having better prudential capacities 
does not necessarily lead one to be in a less disadvantageous position. 
Great artists or scientists that died in poverty and received after-death 
recognition were not for that reason less capable of making prudent 
choices. But more importantly, it would be questionable whether we 
would be justified even to say that, because they ended-up in poverty, 
their decisions were imprudent, because they themselves may not 
have minded living in poverty if they were to perform great art. 
 
 
16 See also Dworkin who maintains that “what is prudent depends on that person’s 
own individual needs, tastes, personality, and preferences” (2000: 313, see also p. 
492, fn. 7), thus he identifies prudent choices as ones that match one’s conception 
of the good. 
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But we have another, more important, reason for rejecting the 
critics’ objection. What matters is that the person thinks and feels 
satisfied with the decisions he makes in the sense that those decisions 
reflect his preferences, convictions and so on. Saying that a person has 
an above-the-threshold poor regulative capacity would be to deny him 
the status of being able to judge what is good for him and how he 
should act and decide in the light of his conception of the good. This is 
not meant to imply that people do not regret having made some of 
their decisions or that they may not—over the course of their life— 
change their convictions, preferences and so on. But we should be 
careful not to confuse this with their capacity to make prudent 
choices, that is, choices that match their convictions, preferences, 
desires and so on. When we regret having made a certain decision we 
do not regret that we lacked the capacity to choose wisely or that we 
did not have the relevant capacity to a greater degree, but that, 
although we had this capacity, we chose unwisely. Otherwise we 
would not be able to judge that a decision was unwise.17 
 
 
17 Let me note one possible objection to my present argument. When people look 
back on their lives, and the choices they made when they were younger, they often 
think that their capacity to judge wisely was weaker. Must they always be mistaken 
in thinking so? To answer this objection, we need to keep in mind that my arguments 
about agential capacities are meant to be understood against the distinction 
between having a capacity and having developed this capacity (besides condition (c) 
above requires that people should develop to a sufficient degree their epistemic and 
regulative capacities). My argument says that, given the Dworkinian commitments 
to the challenge model etc., we cannot in principle make sense of the claim that 
people's agential capacities vary once they satisfy a certain minimum. Of course, 
variations are possible when we talk of people's developed capacities. I do not deny 
this. I rather think that (in relation to my argument in the previous sentence) such 
variations are properly accounted for by the justice-relative conditions. So, for 
example, people may regret some choice they made in the past when they were 
younger, not because they lacked the relevant capacity, but because they had not 
developed it to a greater degree. This may be due, for example, to the fact that they 
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We can better appreciate this claim if we keep in mind that in 
Dworkin’s theory first person judgements are central to 
considerations of distributive justice. This is so, for if it matters how 
people’s lives go, it should matter from their point of view. It is or 
should be a basic tenet of liberal egalitarianism that people have a 
fundamental interest in being able to lead what they judge to be a 
good life. So, liberal egalitarianism should place the individual at the 
centre and by this it should mean to take her judgements, decisions 
and conduct seriously. First person judgements then are relevant to 
what justice requires. 
Having said that, how are we going to evaluate judgements of 
regret—as these are made from the point of view of the individual— 
and a person’s regulative capacity? To answer this, we should be able 
first to answer the following questions. When I regret having made a 
certain decision what do I specifically regret? Do I regret that I did not 
have the relevant capacity to a greater degree to choose wisely? Or 
that, although I have the relevant capacity, I chose unwisely? 
Apparently, it is the first question we are concerned with here. This is 
what the objection points to. So, what kind of judgement can we make 
from the first person point of view with respect to our regulative 
capacity? Can I say that a certain decision of mine that I regret is the 
upshot of my poor regulative capacity? People cannot make 
 
 
had not the fullest possible opportunity to reflect on their decisions, or their 
education was not valuable, or they experienced social oppression, or their 
experiences were not so rich and so on. Although, the distinction may not be familiar 
to the common sense understanding of what we mean that a person possesses a 
certain capacity, I think it is useful to use it in our assessment of the proportioning-
of-consequential-responsibility objection. The objection, recall, maintains that 
those capacities are innate endowments and as such belong to our circumstances. 
So, my concern here is what it means that people differ in their innate endowments 
before these have been affected by other factors that contribute to their 
development and as such are the concern of what I call justice-relative conditions. 
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judgements over the degree of their regulative capacity but by using 
their regulative capacity. But a person cannot say that her decisions 
would be wiser, had she the relevant capacity to a greater degree, for, 
to say this, she would need to actually have the relevant capacity to a 
greater degree in order to be able to judge what a wiser choice would 
be had she the relevant capacity to a greater degree. However, this is 
impossible.18 If it is through her regulative capacity that the person 
judges her decisions, she cannot judge her regulative capacity as 
inadequate, for if it were the case that her regulative capacity was 
inadequate, she could not judge her regulative capacity as well as 
decisions flowing from it as inadequate. 
Consider, yet a further objection to my argument. The critic 
could say that the fact that from a first person perspective we cannot 
make the kind of judgements over the degree of people’s regulative 
capacity does not mean that we are not justified in making such 
judgements from a third person perspective. And from a third person 
perspective, it is true that people possess the regulative capacity to 
different degrees. This is independent of people’s own judgements. 
But, if we were to judge from the third person point of view that a 
person’s regulative capacity is poorer than another’s, how could we 
do so? Suppose there are two people with the same ambition—say, 
to become a doctor— they have equal talents required for becoming 
a doctor, they have equal opportunities, but make different decisions 
with respect to how they are to achieve their aim. Now, one of them 
succeeds in becoming a doctor, while the second does not. The critic 
says that, all else being equal, we can say that the second person’s 
failure is due to her poorer regulative capacity, and this is so, even if 
 
 
18 It is possible over time, of course, that people can judge some of their past 
decisions as imprudent. But this would be so because people improve or develop 
their capacities over their life, not because their innate capacities are poor. See also 
fn. 17 above. 
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he does not think his imprudent decisions were due to her poor 
regulative capacity. But now let’s see the error in this kind of 
argument. 
The argument implies that the individual can understand that 
he has made an imprudent decision, but that he does not understand 
that this is due to her poor capacity. But if she understands that she 
has made an imprudent decision then she can understand this 
because she has the requisite regulative capacity, as I have maintained 
above. So, for the argument to be plausible as an objection to my 
argument, it would have to claim that the person has failed to make a 
prudent decision, even if he does not think he has made an imprudent 
decision. But this is absurd. For if the individual does not think he has 
made an imprudent decision, it would mean that he wrongly considers 
that his ambition is fulfilled, which, of course, he does not. On the 
other hand, if he thinks that his ambition has not been fulfilled, then 
he should be able to judge that it has not been fulfilled due to his 
imprudent decision. But if he is able to judge that this is so due to his 
imprudent decision, then he has the relevant regulative capacity to 
make this judgement. So, the objection that people may have unequal 
regulative capacities as judged from the third person point of view 
fails. 
 
In sum, I have argued that consequential responsibility, that is, 
responsibility for the consequences of a person’s choices—as these 
are informed by her preferences, tastes, ambitions, ideological 
convictions and so on—is constitutive of what it means to respect 
each other’s equal dignity, that is, each other’s life as equally 
objectively important and consequently each other’s personal 
responsibility to make something valuable out of their life by being 
able to determine the terms of their life on equal terms. In virtue of 
this, I argued that consequential responsibility ascriptions are 
appropriate under certain conditions, namely justice- and agent- 
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relative conditions. I gave more space to discussing the agent-relative 
conditions, since the justice-relative conditions have been discussed 
in previous chapters. With respect to the epistemic capacity, I argued 
that we should make sense of it against a certain background 
regarding what it means to live a good life according to the challenge 
model. Based on this, I considered and rejected the objection that 
consequential responsibility should be proportioned to people’s 
differential degrees of the relevant capacity. With respect to the 
regulative capacity, I argued that there are two ways to make sense of 
it, only one of which is faithful to equality of resources and is properly 
sensitive to liberal standards. I then considered and rejected the 
objection that consequential responsibility should be proportioned to 
people’s differential degrees of the relevant capacity, since doing so is 
incompatible with first person judgements over people’s decisions.19 
 
So far I have argued that equality of resources properly 
understood provides an account of non-domination. As such 
Dworkin’s theory can be said to be properly situated within relational 
theories of equality rather than within luck egalitarian theories. So, 
what social egalitarians and Dworkin seem to share in common is the 
idea that equality is a value governing the relations between people, 
 
 
19 My argument about why, under equality of resources, consequential responsibility 
should not be proportioned to people’s differential degrees of the epistemic and 
regulative capacity answers to Carter’s challenge that any genuine egalitarian theory 
should satisfy the opacity test (see chapter 3). However, it is different from Carter’s 
argument because it does not rely on the idea that although people are different 
with respect to the relevant capacities we should turn a blind eye to these 
differences if we are to treat them as moral equals. Instead, my argument points to 
the fact there is no genuine standard to determine above-the-threshold differences 
in these capacities given the overall commitments of equality of resources. 
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thus the existence of certain—most notably social and political— 
relationships between people matters in a morally important way for 
people’s duties to one another, and so strong egalitarian duties are 
justified in virtue of some form of interaction or relationship between 
people. Dworkin’s theory, however, differs from certain accounts of 
what social equality consists in, in that it takes personal and thus 
consequential responsibility to be constitutive of non-domination, not 
an enemy to it, as social egalitarians have maintained. In this chapter, 
I have discussed how we should make sense of consequential 
responsibility within the Dworkinian context and I hope that I have 
provided a convincing case in favour of the view that the latter is 
constitutive of non-domination. If my arguments are successful then 
the Dworkinian context provides a better understanding of non-
domination than the proposed social egalitarian accounts, and so 
social egalitarians have to take personal responsibility seriously, if 
their project to account for what a society of social and political equals 
requires is to be promising. In what follows, however, my aim is to 
question social egalitarians’ and Dworkin’s shared view that justice-
based duties are generated in virtue of certain existing social and 
political relations. Instead, I shall argue that the idea that we should 
relate to each other as equals properly understood requires more 
strongly that certain relationships are constitutive of justice rather 
than simply triggering concerns of justice. 
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Chapter 7 
 
The Scope of Egalitarian Justice 
 
 
As I said in the Introduction and Chapter 1, there are two main 
commitments that characterise the social egalitarian tradition. The 
first one holds that equality is a relational ideal, that is, it regards the 
kind of relationships between people. The second one holds that if 
equality regards how people should relate to each other, then justice 
considerations are triggered in virtue of some morally important 
forms of interaction or relationships between people. Both of these 
commitments have led social egalitarians to oppose luck 
egalitarianism. If equality regards how people relate to each other as 
equals, then distributive justice does not have any independent value, 
as luck egalitarians hold, but it should be shown to be constitutive of, 
or instrumental to, or as flowing from the ideal of equal social and 
political relationships. On the other hand, if justice considerations are 
triggered in virtue of morally significant forms of relationships or 
interactions, then luck inequalities are not a legitimate basis for 
justice-based duties to arise, as luck egalitarians hold. In the previous 
chapters, my main focus was on the first social egalitarian 
commitment. The objective was to see how we can best make sense 
of what relating to each other as equals means and I proposed that 
the Dworkinian context properly understood offers a better basis to 
unpack the requirement that we should live in a non-dominating way. 
In this chapter, my focus is on the second commitment shared by both 
Dworkin and social egalitarians. I shall argue that the ideal of social 
equality properly understood regards morally significant forms of 
relationships or interactions as constitutive of justice, not as merely 
triggering justice considerations. Let me, first, briefly discuss how 
social egalitarians understand their second commitment and how it
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contrasts with the luck egalitarian commitment to the universality of 
principles of justice. 
Proponents of social egalitarianism contrast distributive 
equality with social equality by emphasizing the relational nature of 
the latter (Anderson 1999: 313, 2010), which they insist should be the 
focal point of theories of equality. While luck egalitarian theories are 
asocial (Arneson 2011: 42-3), social egalitarianism understands 
equality as “a moral ideal governing the relations in which people 
stand to one another” (Scheffler 2003: 21, cf. 2005: 17). The 
appropriate focus of justice-concern, according to social egalitarians, 
is not some kind of state of affairs, but how either individual or 
collective agents act (Anderson 2010: 2, 16-9). Luck egalitarianism, on 
the other hand, may be thought to regard justice as a property 
characterizing states of affairs, independently of whether individuals 
can have any influence on the quality of the state of affairs in question 
(Cohen 2008). If we hold that is in itself bad or unjust that some are 
worse-off than others through no fault of their own, we do so 
independently of whether we can do anything to change this 
inequality, which is considered to be a natural injustice.1 Social 
egalitarians deny this. Their emphasis is on the justice or injustice of 
actions. 
Furthermore, they point out that just or unjust actions are 
possible only within certain forms of relationships. We can act justly 
or unjustly only when we are in some way related or interacting with 
each other. When no such relationship or interaction obtains, no 
injustice can take place. This further points to what generates justice-
based duties. According to social egalitarians, the existence of 
certain—most notably social and political—relationships between 
people matters in a morally important way for people’s duties to one 
 
1 See Parfit on the distinction between deontic and telic egalitarianism (2000) and 
for discussion see O’Neil (2008). 
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another, and so strong egalitarian duties are justified on the basis of 
some form of interaction or relationship between people.2 Social 
egalitarians, nevertheless, recognise duties of humanity (Arneson 
2011: 47) that are generated independently of the existence of certain 
relationships. So, they could claim that we have a duty to transfer 
sufficient resources to a decent life to the world’s needy, for 
example.3 The justification of differential treatment on this account is 
based not on partial principles of morality, but on impartial ones that 
make different demands depending on the nature of the site of 
morality in question. That is to say, social egalitarians can take the 
view that humanitarian aid is required in order to treat non-members 
as equals, since treating a person as an equal is affected by the kind of 
relationship one has to that person. 
Based on this account of what equality is about, social 
egalitarians insist that it is not plausible to think that equality requires 
the mitigation of the consequences of luck in people’s lives as luck 
egalitarians assume (Anderson 1999, 2010; Scheffler 2003, 2005; 
Schemmel 2010), and so duties of justice are not triggered in virtue of 
natural inequalities (Anderson 2010). Injustice is primarily socially and 
politically generated. Of course, distribution should be attentive to 
some kinds of bad brute luck, but this is not justified in virtue of the 
assumed injustice of a person’s bad brute luck, but in virtue of our 
duty to relate to her as a social and political equal (Anderson 1999; 
Scheffler 2003, 2005; Forst 2012; 2014). The same would hold true 
even if a person suffers from bad option luck, if this renders her unable 
to function as a social and political equal. Social and institutional 
 
2 See, for example, Walzer (1983: 31, 33, 62), Miller (1995, 1998, 2007, 2009, 2013), 
Scheffler (2001, 2008, 2014), Anderson (1999, 2010), Satz (2005), Sangiovanni 
(2008), Schemmel (2010), Bohman (2004), Forst (2014). 
3 On the sufficiency doctrine, see Frankfurt (1987, 1997). Rawls’ duty of assistance 
to burdened societies (1999: 106) can be considered to be a sufficiency account of 
our duties to non-members. 
 
248 
 
arrangements that permit some members to fall below the threshold 
of what is required to be able to act as social and political equals fail 
to be just. According to this view, the demands of social and political 
equality are based “on the fact of universal moral equality” (Anderson 
1999: 313; cf. Scheffler 2003: 21-2). This means that social and 
political equality is “a necessary dimension of what it means to treat 
people as if they have equal moral worth” (Fourie 2012: 118). 
On the other hand, luck egalitarians do not consider 
interaction or relationship necessary for justifying justice-based 
duties. What matters is the fact that there exists a bad or unjust state 
of affairs that is sufficient to generate strong egalitarian duties, and 
this is so independently of whether any form of relationship or 
interaction obtains.4 However, this doesn’t mean that social 
relationships are of no moral concern to its proponents. Luck 
egalitarians would condemn hierarchical social relationships, but they 
do not generally conceive the structure of social relationships per se 
as a concern of justice. This kind of information about social 
relationships may figure as a means to the attainment of the 
equalizandum, but they are contingent factors not intrinsically 
significant ones to the ambit of justice (Arneson 2011: 42-3; Anderson 
1999: 313).5 Social egalitarians, on the other hand, stress the intrinsic 
 
4 See, for example, Arneson on the distinction between asocial and social 
interactionist accounts of justice (2011: 42-7). Arneson uses the term social 
interactionist for a broad range of theories of social justice (2011: 47, fn. 44) that 
support the view that “egalitarian justice principles apply only on the condition that 
some form of social interaction [is] in play” (2011: 43). Social egalitarians naturally 
fall into this category, but they do not exhaust it. Arneson includes Dworkin among 
social interactionists (2011: 46, fn. 43), for, according to the latter, membership in 
political communities generates strongly egalitarian duties (Dworkin 2011: ch. 14). 
5 Cohen being a value pluralist holds that luck egalitarian principles of justice may 
need to be compromised by a principle of community, if the inequalities justified by 
the former have harmful effects to the life of the political community (2009: 34, 74). 
Yet, this doesn’t mean that social relations are instrumental to realising principles 
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value of human social relationships. How people relate to each other 
has both instrumental and more importantly intrinsic value (Fourie 
2012: 117). Distribution may have a role to play in the construction of 
the ideal of equal social relationships, but it is insufficient to this end. 
We could say that distribution is the result of the kind of social 
relationships within society.6 
Dworkin partly shares the social egalitarian view in thinking 
that strongly egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of certain 
relationships that are significant in how our life goes. He treats 
political relationships as of special importance, since political 
associations are characterised by the fact of coercion.7 According to 
Dworkin, state coercion can be legitimate/justified to the extent 
people are treated as equals within the political community (2011: 
321-3), where he takes equality to have different dimensions and our 
task is to “build conceptions of these different dimensions of equality 
that fit with and draw upon one another, not suppose that either 
economic or political or social equality is more fundamental than the 
others” (2003: 190). So, although Dworkin’s equality of resources has 
been classified as a luck egalitarian theory, according to his view the 
kind of relationship we have to others triggers differential obligations 
to them. Membership in a political community triggers certain kinds 
 
of justice. It rather means that the principle of community, that is not a principle of 
justice, may be intrinsically valuable for reasons independent to justice-based 
reasons. 
6 See for example, Walzer (1983, especially ch. 1), Young (1990: 15); Anderson (1999: 
314); Forst (2014). 
7 Dworkin can be interpreted in this way, when he says that “[t]he comparative 
standard is indeed of the essence of certain special obligations…it is at the heart of 
certain political obligations: in your political capacity as a voter or official, you must 
do your part to ensure that your state shows equal concern for the fate of all under 
its dominion. That political obligation may in some way extend beyond national 
boundaries. But you do not, just acting as an individual, have any such obligation to 
all human beings just out of respect of their humanity” (2011: 275). 
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of duties and equal distribution as this is specified by equality of 
resources is one of them. 
However, I think that both the view that social relationships 
are instrumental to justice considerations and the view that we owe 
strong egalitarian duties only in virtue of morally significant forms of 
relationships are problematic. Although I do not agree with Arneson’s 
view that social and political relationships are only instrumentally 
important to egalitarian justice, there is something valuable in his 
diagnosis that in some respect the demands of egalitarian justice 
should not depend on people’s existing social and political 
relationships. If luck is an arbitrary factor of how one’s life goes, then 
it is equally arbitrary whether we are born in one or other political 
community. It is reasonable to hold that luck sharing should be 
universal and I think most luck egalitarians would to some extent 
accept that view. 
On the other hand, there is some force in the social egalitarian 
claim that the social and political context is constitutive of the fairness 
of distribution. However, the social egalitarian view that it is in virtue 
of our co-membership in a political community that we owe strong 
egalitarian duties to each other seems problematic as well. For, it is 
not sufficiently justified why universal moral equality requires that we 
relate to each other as social and political equals only when we 
already interact with or relate to each other in some morally 
important way. Why does it not require that we should interact with 
or relate to each other in some morally important way even if we do 
not already do so and that such interaction or relationship should take 
the form of social and political equality? In other words, it is not 
sufficiently justified what makes existing interaction or relationships 
morally relevant for egalitarian concerns to arise. 
So, there seems to be a tension between the luck egalitarian 
demand for strong egalitarian duties that are universal on the one 
hand and the social egalitarian demand that justice requires that we 
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relate to each other as social and political equals, restricting strong 
egalitarian duties to the domestic level or to existing interaction. Let 
me note, however, that one need not be a luck egalitarian to support 
the view that strong egalitarian duties are owed universally8 (and 
indeed one need not be an egalitarian to support the view that justice 
demands apply globally, although I will not be concerned with non-
egalitarian theories of justice here).9 It is one thing to say that 
distributive justice is universal in its reach and quite another to say 
what the proper distributive principle is. Moreover, I will here 
distinguish between universal and global. When I say that principles of 
justice are universal I mean that we owe egalitarian duties to each 
other independently of any existing interaction. On the other hand, 
 
 
8 Steiner, for example, proposes that all people should have a right to an equal share 
of the world’s resources (1994: 235–6, 262–5, 270, 1999). Barry as well has made a 
similar suggestion (1991a, 1991b). Caney suggests that equality of opportunity is the 
proper distributive principle (2003) (as well as priority of the worst-off, rights to 
subsistence and equality of payment for equal work (2005: 122-3)), but not in a luck 
egalitarian sense since his account does not depend on the luck-choice distinction. 
However, his argument about universal egalitarian duties depends, among others, 
on the arbitrariness of one’s birth place that is a matter of luck to her (Caney 2005: 
111). Moreover, although he argues for universal principles of justice, he maintains 
that “global economic rights…must be…compatible with ‘domestic’ theory” (2005: 
104). Pogge, although he has raised a similar objection about the arbitrariness of 
one’s birth place against Rawls’ restriction of the two principles of justice to the 
domestic level (1989: 247), is himself an interactionist. Although, his “global 
resource dividend” (1994b; 1998b; 2002; 2011) that requires taxation for the use of 
resources in one’s territory directed to the needs of the world’s poor could be 
thought to be an asocial theory of distributive justice, he nevertheless thinks that 
distributive duties are owed because inequality is the result of the institutional 
framework being set up by the wealthy nations for their benefit (Pogge 2002; 2010; 
2011). In this sense he invokes an interactionist vocabulary to frame his argument 
in favour of his global distributive principle. See also Nussbaum’s proposal for 
universal provision of basic capabilities (2006: ch. 4, 5). 
9 See, for example, Lomasky (2007). 
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we may say that principles of justice apply globally on account of some 
form of interaction that is global, that is, interaction that extends to 
all persons.10 
With those clarifications in mind, social egalitarians qua 
interactionists oppose the view that distributive justice is universal in 
its reach.11 Some social egalitarians suggest that principles of 
distributive justice (that are not luck egalitarian) apply beyond the 
domestic level but only on account of some form of interaction.12 
Dworkin, being himself an interactionist, also maintains that there 
should already be some form of interaction in place for justice 
demands to be triggered. On the other hand, luck egalitarians 
 
 
10 I should notice that I here use the notion of interactionist to include both what 
Pogge calls institutional and interactional accounts of justice (1992; 1994a; 1995).  
On the institutional account, people have duties to each other in virtue of their co-
sharing of institutions, while on the interactional account the existence of 
institutions is not necessary for justice demands to arise. This is a plausible 
distinction within the interactionist camp, and since my purpose is not to take a 
positive stance in favour of one or other but rather argue that existing relationships 
are not a necessary condition for justice demands to arise, I will continue to use the 
term interactionist accounts for all those accounts that hold the view that there 
should be a kind of relationship (institutionalised or not) for justice-based duties to 
be triggered. 
11 See, for example, Miller (1995, 2007, 2009, 2013), Scheffler (2001, 2003), Walzer 
(1983, 2004), Sangiovanni (2007, 2008), Nagel (2005), Blake (2002, 2011, 2012), 
Risse (2005, 2006), Freeman (2006, 2007). I will here include Rawls (1999), although 
all the relevant camps (state internationalists, globalists, universalists) draw on his 
work and are in a sense Rawlsian. However, Rawls himself is explicit about the 
restriction of principles of justice to the domestic level, which he justifies on, among 
other reasons, the special significance of associative ties between members of a 
liberal political community. 
12 See, for example, Pogge (1994b, 1998b, 2002, 2010, 2011), Beitz (1985, 1999, 
2000), Buchanan (2000), Schemmel (2007); Banai, Ronzoni, Schemmel (2011), 
Abizadeh (2006; 2007; 2008; 2012), Abizadeh and Gilabert (2008), Scanlon (1973), 
Miller R. (2010), Scheffler (2014). 
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maintain that principles of justice are universal in their reach, 
independently of certain social and political arrangements.13,14 
My aim then is to question the social egalitarian requirement 
that for justice-based duties to arise, some morally significant form of 
relationships or interaction should already exist. On the contrary, I 
argue that political association itself is constitutive of justice. This has 
implications for the universalist view. This is so, for, my view—like the 
universalist one—holds that morally significant forms of relationships 
or interaction is not an existence condition of justice, but—unlike 
universalists—I maintain that political association is constitutive of 
justice, not merely instrumental (Arneson) or of independent moral 
value (Cohen). 
Before moving on, let me note two things. Firstly, to the extent 
that interaction and relationship have that moral significance within 
the social egalitarian ideal, it is necessary that social egalitarians clarify 
what they take morally significant forms of interaction or relationship 
to be. What do they consider to be significant forms of interaction or 
relationship that are subject to justice demands? Certainly, political 
associations seem to be a quite clear case of a morally significant form 
of relationship. But this is not without problems. It will have to be 
determined so far as possible, what we take a political association to 
be. For example, if we take it to mean those who already share equal 
citizenship, then it would seem that there would be no justice demand 
to include those who lack this property, such as resident aliens, for 
example. Yet, this rightly strikes many as unacceptable. But absent 
political relationships, on what grounds would demands of justice to 
relate as political equals with those now excluded from the citizenry 
 
 
13 But see Tan (2008). 
14 Arneson is in line with this thought (2011). Temkin (2004a, 2004b) as well advances 
the view that we have reasons of justice to help the world’s needy, that are so 
through no fault of their own. 
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arise? Should we instead say that there is another way in which 
citizens and non-citizens interact and that this gives rise to justice 
demands? If yes, what would count as a morally significant form of 
non-political interaction that triggers justice demands? And if non-
political forms of interaction are morally significant, what form of just 
arrangements should these non-political forms of interaction take? 
Should they take the form of political association or some other form? 
I think social egalitarians need to provide sufficient answers to the 
above questions if their favoured ideal is to be persuasive. 
Secondly, as it might have become evident the discussion over 
the relational or asocial nature of justice gets us into the 
international/cosmopolitan justice debate, which I will consider to 
some extent. The conclusions drawn from the latter are relevant to 
the debate I am concerned with here, namely the scope of egalitarian 
duties. We could more appropriately say that the 
international/cosmopolitan justice debate is a debate over the scope 
of egalitarian duties. 
In what follows then, I shall suggest that there are two main 
strands within the social egalitarian camp that try to justify egalitarian 
duties on account of some form of interaction. The first I call statist 
egalitarianism, the second non-statist egalitarianism. I shall first 
present the arguments offered by statist egalitarians and consider 
some objections raised by the non-statist egalitarian standpoint 
against their view (section a1). I will then proceed to the arguments 
offered by non-statist egalitarians and suggest why they are 
unsatisfactory in justifying their claim that justice demands are 
triggered in virtue of existing interaction (section a2). My aim is not to 
diminish the general claim made by social egalitarians, namely that 
equality is a relational ideal guiding how we should relate to each 
other; but rather to maintain that the ideal of social and political 
equality is more demanding. I shall argue that the best conception of 
the social egalitarian ideal is the ideal of the good polity (section b). 
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Roughly speaking, this requires that all people are entitled to 
the goods of citizenship and justice that are interdependent: it is 
through membership in a political association that people can realize 
their moral nature as free and equal, by way of each living according 
to her own conception of the good according to public principles of 
justice, principles that accord each equal concern and respect. Being 
a citizen in the good polity means living according to common 
principles of justice. If all people are entitled to the goods of the good 
polity, then they are entitled to them independently of whether there 
exists any kind of relationship, interaction, or form of impact. If this is 
so, then strongly egalitarian duties cannot be assumed to be triggered 
in virtue of existing relationships, interactions, practices and so on. 
Finally, let me note that defenders of what I call non-statist 
egalitarianism can adopt either a strong or a weak view. On the strong 
view, strong egalitarian duties are generated only in virtue of some 
morally significant form of interaction, which is not necessarily 
restricted to the level of a single political community, but absent such 
interaction no obligations of justice exist. The weak view holds that 
individuals have duties of justice to form political associations, and in 
some cases to admit outsiders, but once someone has been admitted 
to them, they incur distinctive associative duties. My argument is 
certainly targeted against the strong view. I am sympathetic to the 
weak view. However, my view is stronger in that it requires not only 
acceptance of outsiders, but strong distributive egalitarian duties 
across members of distinct political communities, as well as the 
establishment of certain global social and political institutions that 
generate strongly egalitarian duties between members of distinct 
political communities. 
However, further argumentation would be required to make 
my case in favour of my view. This would have to get into interesting 
questions about what the implications of the ideal of the good polity 
are with respect to our duties to members and non-members, or how
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we should make sense of our duties as these are required by the ideal 
of the good polity. Although these are interesting questions, I shall not 
get into them here. My aim rather is to examine what the ideal of 
equality properly understood requires. The ideal of the good polity can 
then provide the proper moral framework from which considerations 
over the specification of the kinds of duty the ideal requires to 
proceed. This is a distinct (though related) enterprise, which, as I said, 
I shall not pursue here, but I shall restrict myself to making some 
preliminary remarks. 
 
            a. What kinds of relationship generate egalitarian duties? 
There are two strands of social egalitarianism. The first one 
maintains that strong egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of co-
membership in a single political community. For convenience, I shall 
call this statist egalitarianism. The other one maintains that strong 
egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of some morally significant 
form of interaction, which is not necessarily restricted to the level of a 
single political community. I shall call this non-statist egalitarianism. 
Non-statist egalitarians, thus, don’t restrict strong egalitarian duties to 
the domestic level, but they leave the possibility open for justice-
based duties to be global in their reach on account of morally 
significant interaction that exceeds interaction taking place within a 
single political community. In what follows, I shall consider the non-
statist egalitarian objection against statist egalitarianism that the 
latter has not provided sufficient justification for restricting justice 
considerations within the domestic level. I shall then argue that non-
statist egalitarians as well provide insufficient justification for their 
view that strong egalitarian duties are triggered only in virtue of 
existing interaction. 
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             a1. The non-statist egalitarian argument 
One of the most compelling arguments of statist egalitarians 
for the restriction of justice-based duties to the domestic level refers 
to the significance of the basic structure. Following Rawls, some statist 
egalitarians maintain that “the primary subject of justice is the basic 
structure of society” (Rawls 1971: 7, cf. 3) and thus strong egalitarian 
duties are owed to those who share a basic structure. Because there 
is no global basic structure, the scope of justice is restricted to the 
domestic level. However, statist egalitarians first need to explain what 
the basic structure is in order to justify their position. Abizadeh 
provides three ways in which we can make sense of the basic structure 
(2007).15 The basic structure might be interpreted to comprise: a) all 
those institutions that specify the fair terms of social cooperation 
between people (Rawls 1971: 7, 11)—this is the co-operation theory; 
b) all those institutions, the “effects [of which] are so profound and 
present from the start” (Rawls 1971: 7) for the life prospects of the 
individuals—this is the pervasive impact theory; c) the coercive 
institutions of a society—this is the coercion theory. Depending on 
which of the three interpretations we adopt, we can justify the thesis 
that the basic structure is the primary subject of justice (Abizadeh 
2007: 320) on account of it being necessarily instrumental for the 
realisation of principles of justice (the instrumental condition) or 
constitutive of the principles of justice (the constitutive condition) or 
a precondition of justice (the existence condition). 
Further Abizadeh distinguishes between the site and scope of 
justice, where the first one refers to “the kinds of objects (individuals’ 
actions, individuals’ character, rules, or institutions, and so on) 
appropriately governed by principles of justice, that is, to which the 
 
 
15 Although Abizadeh’s argumentation is meant to be addressed to the Rawlsian 
anti-cosmopolitans, its conclusions are relevant to the debate I am concerned with 
here, namely what grounds strong egalitarian duties. 
 
258 
 
principles of justice rightly apply”, while the second one to “the range 
of persons who have claims upon and responsibilities to each other 
arising from considerations of justice” (2007: 323). Depending on how 
each theory defines the site of justice and the justification offered for 
it, the scope of justice is also determined. The question then of the 
scope of justice is relevant to the question that concerns me here, 
namely what grounds strong egalitarian duties. Abizadeh’s 
argumentation aims at showing that none of the three interpretations 
of the basic structure serves as a justificatory basis for the restriction 
of the scope of justice to the domestic level. 
Yet, not all statist egalitarians appeal to the significance of the 
basic structure to justify restriction of the scope of strongly egalitarian 
duties to the domestic level. Dworkin develops his theory of 
associative duties, according to which, the kind of duties owed to 
others depends on the significance of the kind of relationships we 
have with them. Political obligations, being one form of associative 
duties, are generated in virtue of co-membership in a political 
community. Dworkin’s theory thus is also restrictive of the scope of 
justice, but I shall argue that, contrary to his view, it lends support to 
the conclusion that the scope of justice cannot plausibly be thought 
to be restricted to the domestic level. 
The co-operation theory 
According to the co-operation theory, the basic structure is 
instrumental for the realisation of principles of justice (Abizadeh 2007: 
325-329). It is meant to secure background justice by way of regulating 
the fair terms of social co-operation, against which individuals and 
associations or non-public institutions make transactions and 
agreements on fair terms. If that is so, then the scope of justice 
includes all people that already take part in social interaction, not 
social co-operation (Abizadeh 2007: 330-4). Social co-operation differs 
from social interaction and co-ordination in that the first 
“incorporates a moralized ideal that is a constituent of Rawlsian
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justice”, since it “is not a mere system of social coordination or 
interaction: it is a fair or just system of social interaction” (Abizadeh 
2007: 330). If this is true, then the demands of justice arise not when 
there is an existing shared basic structure or a shared scheme of social 
co-operation, as statists seem to suppose, but when there is any 
existing social interaction (Abizadeh 2007: 330-2). This is so, since 
when we say that the primary subject of justice is society’s basic 
structure, we cannot plaussibly mean that justice demands arise “only 
between persons whose social interactions are already conducted on 
fair terms, i.e., that demands of justice would not arise for persons 
whose social interactions are unjust” (Abizadeh 2007: 330-1). That 
would be perverse. On the other hand, it cannot mean that justice 
demands arise only when there is an already shared basic structure 
(Abizadeh 2007: 331). To the extent that a basic structure is a 
necessarily instrumental condition for the realization of justice, it 
cannot be assumed that it already exists; it may need to be formed for 
realizing the ideal of a fair or just system of co-operation. 
So, according to the co-operation theory, the existence of 
social interaction is a necessary and sufficient condition for demands 
of justice to arise (Abizadeh 2007: 331) and a shared scheme of social 
co-operation for mutual advantage, regulated by a shared basic 
structure is itself a demand of justice, not a precondition of it 
(Abizadeh 2007: 331, 333). 
The pervasive impact theory 
According to the pervasive impact theory (Abizadeh 2007: 341-
5), the basic structure of society comprises all those institutions that 
have pervasive impact on people’s lives and not only the basic 
institutions that regulate the fair terms of co-operation. The scope of 
justice then includes all those people the lives of whom are pervasively 
impacted by those institutions. Yet, note that impact does not 
necessarily require that there is an existing relationship. For example, 
a community’s activities may affect peoples’ lives in another
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community through causing environmental pollution (Abizadeh 2007: 
339), without any other form of interaction between them. In this 
sense, interaction may be said to be defined in a wider sense. If that 
is so, then strong egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of the 
pervasive impact both domestic and international institutions have on 
peoples’ lives. Thus, interaction (in this wider sense) is a necessary 
existence condition for justice and co-ordination or co-operation is a 
demand of justice. So, if the basic structure is interpreted in this way, 
then, given the interrelationships and interdependencies of the 
modern world, the statist egalitarian argument is defeated in virtue of 
the pervasive impact international and supra-national organisations 
have on people’s lives. 
The coercion theory 
According to the coercion theory, the basic structure 
comprises all those institutions that subject individuals to ongoing 
state coercion (Abizadeh 2007: 345-357), that is, legally enforced 
coercion. Abizadeh considers Blake’s (2002) and Nagel’s (2005) 
arguments regarding the relationship between state coercion and 
egalitarian justice. Their argument concerns how state coercion can 
become legitimate, that is, what justifies the state having authority 
over those over whom it claims dominion and against which it 
exercises coercion. Briefly, their argument is that egalitarian justice is 
owed to those over whom the state claims authority, in order for the 
latter to be
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legitimate. The state does not claim authority over outsiders16 and so 
no egalitarian duties are owed to them.17 
Abizadeh rejects the coercion view as implausible. First, he 
points to the empirical fact of ongoing state coercion against strangers 
(Abizadeh 2007: 348-9). Secondly, he points to the perverse 
consequences of such a view morally speaking. If we suppose, 
following Blake and Nagel, that state border coercion on outsiders 
doesn’t require justification of the sort required for insiders, because 
the state does not claim to have the same authority over outsiders 
that it has over insiders, then we subject outsiders to pure coercion 
(Abizadeh 2007: 351-2). States by denying authority over outsiders 
can treat them coercively without being accountable for their coercive 
practices and without being distributively responsible to them. But, if 
this is so, then we have no more reason to claim that a tyrant, who 
mistreats his subjects by imposing pure coercion without claiming 
authority over them, acts unjustly than we have for saying that a 
government that claims legitimate authority over its citizens acts 
 
 
16 Blake recognises other forms of coercion, such as the coercion put by states to 
outsiders not to enter their borders (2002: 280, fn. 30) or by international practices, 
such as forms of exploitative trade relationships, that they are as well in need of 
justification (2002: 280), since they are violating the principle of autonomy (2002: 
265), but he insists that distributive equality is justified only on account of the 
coerced shared liability of the state’s legal system (2002: 258, 264-5, 276, 280, 284). 
17 Instead Blake maintains that principles of sufficiency are most appropriate abroad 
(2002: 258). However, he maintains that “[i]f holdings of goods are relevant for the 
options they open up to us-as well as, perhaps, the ways in which they make access 
easier to options we already possess-then it does not seem that we necessarily gain 
any additional autonomy as our holdings increase past a certain level” and that “this 
fact…will have significant implications in the study of distributive justice” (Blake 
2002: 269), that is the appropriate concern for the domestic arena. This points to 
sufficientarian rather than egalitarian concern. Nagel, as well, recognises that 
minimum humanitarian morality requires us to respect and support human rights 
that are universal in their reach (2005: 131-2). 
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justly.18 This is perverse and so it cannot plausibly be the case that we 
owe strong egalitarian duties only to those with whom we share a 
common legal structure. 
Dworkin’s theory of associative duties 
According to Dworkin, the political associations we find 
ourselves in (as a matter of historical accident (2011: 317-9)), though 
necessary for our living well and having a good life, threaten our 
dignity, both by way of making our personal responsibility for leading 
authentic lives vulnerable to the domination of others and by way of 
failing to respect other people’s lives as equally objectively important, 
and also their personal responsibility to lead authentic lives by making 
them vulnerable to our dominion (2011: 320). This is the essence of 
coercion, we might say. It is both “essential to our dignity…[and it] also 
threatens to make dignity impossible” (Dworkin 2011: 320). We can 
avoid this by reciprocal deference to each other’s authority, by 
accepting an equal responsibility to obey collective decisions (Dworkin 
2011: 320), on the condition that these decisions respect each 
person’s dignity (Dworkin 2011: 384).19 
 
 
18 See Clayton and Stemplowska for a similar point against Dworkin’s account of 
personal morality and its asymmetry with the more egalitarian account of political 
morality with respect to egalitarian distributive justice across distinct political 
communities (2015: 318-9). 
19 Dworkin maintains that the decisions reached in a democratic regime should be 
both procedurally fair and aim at producing right results (2000: ch. 4; 2011: ch. 18). 
The criterion of both fairness and rightness is equal concern and respect. In this 
sense, that a democratic procedure should be fair does not necessarily point to 
majoritarian rule, for example, where each is accorded equal voting power and the 
result is judged as just or right because of the fairness of the democratic procedure 
(Dworkin 2011: 386). Waldron, for example, one of the most prominent defenders 
of majority rule, binds majority rule with fairness (1999a; 1999b, but see 2009: 1043 
fn. 1, where he distinguishes between majority rule and majority decision). One 
obvious difficulty with such an approach is the well-known problem of “tyranny of 
the majority”. Dworkin elaborates one such example of the sinking lifeboat unless 
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Dworkin regards political obligations as associative duties, 
namely we owe them to each other due to the distinctive character of 
the association in question. As he says, “we have distinct obligations 
of aid to those who are joined with us under a single collective 
government (Dworkin 2011: 271)” and that: 
 
“[we] have no duty to help someone just because his 
situation is in some way worse than [our] own…The comparative 
standard is indeed of the essence of certain special 
obligations…it is at the heart of certain political obligations: in 
[our] political capacity as a voter or official, [we] must do [our] 
part to ensure that [our] state shows equal concern for the fate 
of all under its dominion. That political obligation may in some 
way extend beyond national boundaries. But [we] do not, just 
acting as [individuals], have any such obligation to all human 
beings just out of respect of their humanity” (Dworkin 2011: 
275). 
So, in Dworkin’s account, we have strong egalitarian duties to 
those with whom we have a shared coercive legal structure. Our duty 
to aid takes a different form with respect to our political associates on 
the one hand and with respect to strangers on the other. In the first 
case, it is a strongly egalitarian duty; in the second, it takes the form 
of humanitarian aid.20 This differentiation, however, is not due to the 
use of partial principles, but of impartial principles of morality that 
 
one passenger is thrown over, where he maintains that lottery would be fairer than 
majority rule that could result in the drowning of the least favoured person (2011: 
387, cf. 483, fn. 9 where he provides a reply to Waldron (2010)). In this respect 
Dworkin suggests the view that a procedure for the improvement of democratic 
legitimacy, such as judicial review (1985: 33-71; 1986: 87-113; 1996: 32-3; 2000: 
209; 2011: 398), is not necessarily undemocratic (2000: 208; 2011: 398). This points 
to the correctness of decisions made by democratic rule that nevertheless fail to 
give equal respect and concern to some people. See Waldron’s responses to 
Dworkin (1998; 2006; 2009). 
20 For criticism of this asymmetry, see Clayton and Stemplowska (2015).
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make different demands depending on the nature of the site of 
morality in question.21 As we have seen, according to Dworkin, what 
we owe to others is based on the ethical idea of living in dignity (2011: 
ch. 9). The conception of dignity should be interpreted to include the 
principle of self-respect, namely that each person should treat the 
success of his life as having objective importance, and the principle of 
authenticity, namely, that each person has a special, personal 
responsibility to create a life that he endorses (Dworkin 2011: 203-
10). These two principles of dignity are integrated into morality. 
Regarding the first principle, if we are to respect ourselves, we 
have to respect other people’s lives as having equal objective 
importance (Dworkin 2011: 254, 260). This is the guiding principle of 
morality. However, this principle might be thought to conflict (at least 
in some cases) with the second principle of dignity. If we think that 
our life is of special importance to us and that we should make 
something valuable out of it, then this would seem under certain 
circumstances to require us to act against the first principle. So, it 
seems that the two principles of dignity offer us no clear guidance with 
respect to what we should do when our interests (broadly 
understood) and the interests of other people are in conflict. It is in 
this context that our duty to help becomes relevant. When do we have 
a duty to help others who are in a worse situation than we are without 
at the same time having to sacrifice our critical interests? To solve the 
conflict between the two principles, we have—Dworkin maintains— 
to turn to the idea of having the right attitude to others rather than 
showing equal concern for their well-being (2011: 273). We do not aim 
to make other people’s lives as good as our own. This would be 
impossible, since we cannot have a metric of what a good life is that 
all can share (Dworkin 2011: 273).22 Thus, the concept of attitude 
 
21 Blake makes a similar assertion (2002: 258-61). See also Nagel (2005: 126, 132-3). 
22 This is related to his criticism to equality of welfare (Dworkin 1981b; 2000: ch. 1).  
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helps us to answer to the demands of morality. We should treat other 
people’s lives as having equal objective importance by showing the 
right attitude. In this sense, Dworkin’s view is that the right attitude 
towards fellow citizens and strangers differs. We respect other 
people’s lives as equally objectively important by showing the attitude 
that is right, where the right attitude depends on the context in 
question.23 So, according to Dworkin (and statist egalitarians more 
generally), we owe certain duties of aid to all people on humanitarian 
grounds,24 but stronger egalitarian duties of aid are generated in 
virtue of the moral relevance of the context.25 But what is distinctive 
about political associations, membership in which generates strongly 
egalitarian duties? 
Dworkin interestingly seems to base his argument in favour of 
associative duties and political obligations specifically on his account 
of harm. His argument can be interpreted as follows. Some 
relationships are necessary for living a dignified life, that is, a life of 
self-respect and authenticity. Political associations are of special 
importance to our dignity, in the sense that they provide the crucial 
framework within which we lead our lives. They do so by shaping the 
 
 
23 This is indeed the view generally of interactionists, to the extent they all recognise 
that stronger duties of aid arise within certain, morally relevant, contexts. The  
difference between statist and non-statist egalitarians is not that stronger duties of 
aid do not depend on the context in question, but they differ about the context 
itself. 
24 Note that the duty not to harm others seems to apply in all cases, independently 
of whether there are further reasons for special duties to arise, such as political  
associations (one exception is Hobbes, though, who holds that in the state of nature, 
there is no justice or injustice and in this respect harming others is neither just nor 
unjust). In this sense, it seems that our duty not to harm others applies equally to 
both compatriots and strangers; it applies to all human beings qua human beings 
(see, for example Nagel 2005: 126-7, 131-2; Blake 2002: 259-60). On the other hand, 
it is our duty to help that is more disputed within political philosophy. 
25 See also Nagel (2005: 120, 125-6, 130-2) and Blake (2002: 258-60, 264-5, 272). 
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opportunities people have to lead authentic lives. Dworkin assumes 
that an authentic life is one in which the person decides for himself 
what a good life is given the options available to him. An authentic life 
is one of non-domination (Dworkin 2011: 212). On the other hand, the 
principle of self-respect points to how we should treat others. It says 
that I cannot regard my life as having objective importance if I do not, 
at the same time, recognise that other people’s lives are of equal 
objective importance (Dworkin 2011: 254, 260). This has implications 
for the second principle as well. I cannot, in the name of leading my 
life as I see fit, diminish other people’s dignity and their special 
responsibility for leading an authentic life. If they are to lead an 
authentic life, as I am, which is entailed by the principle of self-respect, 
and if self-respect requires equal respect for the lives of others, then 
it follows that I should respect other people’s special responsibility for 
leading an authentic life by not usurping options otherwise available 
to them. So we should find a way in which we can create a framework 
that will provide us with the conditions of non-domination, a 
framework where each can equally lead an authentic life. This is the 
political framework, our political association. 
Now, if one is to have control over how her life goes, then she 
needs to have control over her body and property (Dworkin 2011: 
288). This right to property is fixed by political arrangement (Dworkin 
2011: 288). So, in one sense the political community is necessary for 
fixing our distributive shares, the resources rightly put at our disposal 
in order to lead our life in an authentic way (Dworkin 2011: 352-4). 
This is not sufficient, of course, for an authentic life, but it is necessary 
that we do have some resources at our disposal. Moreover, the 
resources put at our disposal should be so distributed that they reflect 
equality in the opportunities we have to lead our life authentically. 
This is required by our duty to respect other people’s lives as equally 
objectively important and thus respect their personal responsibility 
for making something valuable out of their lives. But this further
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points to the fact that in order for one to lead an authentic life she 
should not be usurped of the choices otherwise open to her. In this 
sense, the distribution of resources should, so far as possible, reflect 
people’s ethical independence, that is, people’s right to make their 
own decisions about their life (Dworkin 2011: 368-71). Distribution of 
resources and liberties together fix the range of opportunities open to 
people. The political community then becomes of moral relevance, 
since it is necessary for our dignity. Our duty not to harm others seems 
to be the grounding principle behind this line of thought. 
According to Dworkin, the two principles of dignity help us see 
what harm is and when we have a duty not to harm others. He 
distinguishes between three kinds of harm: competition, deliberate 
and unintended harm (Dworkin 2011: 287-291). Although competition 
harm is necessary for leading our lives, deliberate harm is not. We do 
compete with each other in order to get a job, for example, and the 
fact that only one will get the job is a harm to her co-competitors, but 
it is not objectionable. Competition harm may require that access to 
opportunities has been arranged in a fair way,26 before we can say that 
it is competition harm we are talking about. Otherwise, it would 
probably be deliberate harm. If I am not given or am prevented from 
obtaining the opportunities that should be otherwise available to me 
then harm is inflicted on me. This is so, since the principle of 
authenticity requires that I have personal responsibility for my life; but 
to have personal responsibility for my life, I need to have control over 
my body, a certain amount of resources and the liberty to use them 
both. But since possession of resources and how I can use them are 
defined by the political arrangements of the community of which I am 
a member, then it follows that usurpation of opportunities amounts 
to deliberate harm. 
 
 
26 For criticism of Dworkin’s account of competition harm, see Clayton and 
Stemplowska (2015). 
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Deliberate harm (or at least most forms of it, especially with respect 
to property rights) seems to presuppose the political community. For 
only then can I know what is rightly mine and thus know what would 
constitute harm to me. 
This seems to be suggesting that certain forms of harm can 
only be identified within a political community. But, if I am not related 
to you politically, I impose no harm on you. Yet contrary to Dworkin’s 
view, I think that it is not only not the case that it is only within the 
political community that justice concerns are generated, but it is also 
the case that failing to relate politically is itself an injustice, so that we 
cannot plausibly say that absent political relationships no harm is 
imposed on anyone. I shall say more on this in the next section. For 
now, it suffices, I think, to point out that if political associations are 
necessary for the dignity of people, then people owe it to each other 
to form political associations, where each can have an equal 
opportunity with all others to live according to their own conception 
of the good, and so existing political communities cannot be a 
necessary condition for justice demands to arise. Rather, political 
associations are constitutive of justice. The fact that we do already live 
within existing political associations is not sufficient to make it the 
case that we owe strongly egalitarian duties only to those with whom 
we are already politically related. And although Dworkin says that 
“[t]here is no nonhistorical answer to the question: on what principle 
should people be divided into political communities” (2011: 381),27 I 
 
 
27 Yet, Dworkin maintains that “[s]till, the boundaries created by accidents of history 
remain the default. We are born into political communities….If we rule out a one-
world global democracy…(which is impossible and would in any case raise all the old 
questions when the necessary subdivisions were created), we rarely find a 
persuasive argument for correcting what history has achieved” ((Dworkin 2011: 
382). So, he seems to base his argument for the restriction of egalitarian duties 
within existing states on the fact that, although the existence of states as we know 
them is a result of “historical and geographical accident” (2011: 319), there is no 
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think that we can have an answer to the normative question of what 
our duties to each other are independently of whether we belong to 
distinct existing political communities by referring to what respect for 
human dignity requires. Accordingly, existing state coercion is not a 
necessary condition for justice demands to arise. Coercion may be 
instrumentally necessary for political obligations,28 but it cannot 
generate them. 
 
In sum, I have argued that relational egalitarians can be 
divided into mainly two groups, statist and non-statist egalitarians. 
Some statist egalitarians base their arguments for the restriction of 
 
 
“persuasive argument for correcting what history has achieved”. However, this 
latter claim needs further clarification. Discussions over legitimacy and justice are a 
clear way of trying to correct what history has achieved, when what has been 
achieved is slavery, colonialism, imperialism and so on. On the other hand, it may 
simply point to the geographical boundaries of nation-states. There is no sufficient 
reason why boundaries should change. Absent any claims of secession, such a claim 
would be reasonable, but it would be of almost no force against a cosmopolitan, 
who could say that I do not much care about geographical boundaries per se, but 
about the scope of justice. Keep the boundaries as they are and give people across 
them due consideration. This means that what is of moral relevance is not 
boundaries, but the powers a state exercises over its subjects within its territory and 
over strangers out of it. If what is meant then by what history has achieved is the 
sovereign state, then it is not clear why there is no persuasive argument for changing 
what history has achieved, if what has been achieved is injustice, domination of 
some over others, poverty and so on. If on the other hand, what is meant by that 
statement is that there is no persuasive argument with respect to how the state has 
historically come to exercise its authority and how it exercises it now, then why 
would Dworkin want to advance a theory of equality that each state should appeal 
to in order to act justly and legitimately? 
28 See Dworkin who says that [i]t would be better if laws and citizens were both 
sufficiently just so that neither the threat nor the fact of coercion were ever 
necessary” (2011: 367), pointing to the fact that coercion is instrumentally necessary 
for principles of justice and does not give rise to them. 
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egalitarian duties within a single political community on the Rawlsian 
argument that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of 
society and so egalitarian duties are generated between people who 
share the same basic structure. States in the real world uniquely 
possess the characteristics of a basic structure, thus strong egalitarian 
duties are owed to co-members of each single state. Taking stock of 
Abizadeh’s analysis, we can make sense of the basic structure as the 
institutions that fix the fair terms of co-operation between its 
members, or as the institutions the effects of which have pervasive 
impact on people’s lives from the start, or as the coercive legal 
structure. Each theory defines the site and scope of justice differently, 
but each theory cannot provide the statist egalitarian with a 
satisfactory justification for her claim that egalitarian duties are 
restricted to the domestic level. 
If the statist egalitarian adopts the co-operation theory, he will 
be disappointed to find out that fair co-operation cannot be 
understood as an existence condition, but as a demand of justice, 
while the basic structure is a necessary instrumental condition for the 
realization of justice. Thus, the scope of justice cannot be plausibly 
restricted to the state level, but it should extend to existing 
relationships that should be arranged according to the demands of fair 
co-operation. If he adopts the pervasive impact theory, he is bound to 
admit that people’s lives are affected both by national and 
international institutions as well as by non-institutional practices. If 
that is so, then the scope of justice includes all those whose lives are 
affected by those domestic and international institutional and non-
institutional practises. Finally, if he goes for the coercion theory, he 
will have to justify why state coercion exercised on outsiders is not in 
need of the same kind of justification based on egalitarian concern 
given to those within it. If his answer is that justification of coercion is 
only necessary to those over whom the state claims authority, this 
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would have perverse effects, since it would seem that pure coercion 
would not count as unjust. 
Finally, I have studied Dworkin’s theory of associative duties, 
as another theory of statist egalitarianism, and argued that if political 
association is necessary for people’s dignity, it cannot be the case that 
existing political associations are a necessary condition for justice 
demands to arise, but rather political association is a demand of 
justice. If that is so, the theory of associative duties cannot justify the 
restriction of egalitarian duties to the domestic level. Notice, however, 
that the objection I have advanced against Dworkin’s view draws from 
a cosmopolitan perspective, rather than from the non-statist 
egalitarian perspective from which the objections against the other 
statist views have been advanced. 
In what follows, I shall consider whether the non-statist 
egalitarian argument in favour of the claim that strong egalitarian 
duties are generated in virtue of some morally significant form of 
existing interaction or relationship, which is not restricted to the level 
of a single political community, is a successful one. 
 
             a2. The non-statist egalitarian argument. 
             The necessary existence condition in the co-operation theory 
Going back to the site/scope distinction, Abizadeh has 
maintained that depending on how we interpret the basic structure, 
namely the site of justice, we can specify the scope of it. If the site of 
justice is the basic institutions for the regulation of social co-
operation, then the scope of justice is all those people engaged in 
social interaction. According to the co-operation theory then, justice 
demands that interaction should be regulated in a fair or just way 
through a shared basic structure that is composed of those institutions 
necessary for the regulation of social co-operation. But it is not 
entailed that the scope of justice refers to people who already 
interact. What we are told is that co-operation (as a moral ideal) is 
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required by justice, that is, that people should relate to each other in 
a just way and this can be best done through a basic shared structure 
(the instrumental condition). But we are not told why co-operation 
through a shared basic structure should involve only people who 
already interact in some morally important way. Abizadeh is clear that 
on the cooperation theory “where there is no social interaction, the 
demands of justice do not arise” (2007: 331). He justifies this claim by 
maintaining that “[b]ecause on the cooperation theory the point of 
justice is to regulate social interaction, social interaction is a necessary 
and sufficient existence condition of justice” (Abizadeh 2007: 331). But 
he does not justify the claim that “the point of justice is to regulate 
social interaction” or to be more precise, he does not justify the claim 
that the point of justice is to regulate existing social interaction. So in 
simply affirming this, nor does he justify the claim that, where social 
interaction does not exist, demands of justice do not arise. If the site 
of justice is to tell us something about how to specify its scope, then 
on the co-operation theory, it certainly does not tell us that its scope 
coincides with existing interaction. There needs to be an independent 
argument in favour of the claim that demands of justice arise only 
when there is social interaction and this argument cannot come from 
how the site of justice is defined in the co-operation theory. So, we 
should try to seek a satisfactory justification of the existence condition 
of justice. 
It seems then that a plausible answer is the distinctively social 
egalitarian thesis that injustice (as well as justice) is a relational 
notion. In this sense, injustice can only arise when people interact in 
some morally important way, for injustice has to do with how people 
relate to each other. When no such relationships exist, then no 
injustices can arise. I accept the claim that the way we interact with 
each other may be fair/just or unfair/unjust. I do not, however, accept 
the further claim that where no interaction exists there can be no 
injustice. First, the fact that justice is relational does not entail that 
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justice demands arise only when there are existing social relations. It 
is one thing to say that justice concerns the way we conduct our 
relationships, and quite another that we should already relate to each 
other in order to relate in a fair or just way. Secondly, the fact that 
justice is a relational notion does not mean that injustice is relational 
in the same sense that justice is. By this I mean that from the fact that 
justice requires that we relate to each other in the proper way, it 
doesn’t follow that injustice results only from not relating to each 
other in the proper way, which certainly implies that there is an 
already existing relationship that is not conducted in the proper way. 
Injustice may result by not relating at all to each other, either by 
avoidance of or by ending a relationship. 
However, my argument so far does not suffice to show that 
the social egalitarian claim on the existence condition of justice is 
false. For, I would also have to take into account how social 
egalitarians interpret what it means to relate to each other as equals 
to make my case against the existence condition. So, on the most 
widely accepted account of social egalitarianism, relating to each 
other as equals means that we relate to each other in a non-
dominating way. Non-domination is what justice requires. And 
however we interpret domination, one thing seems certain; that 
domination necessarily requires that there is a relationship within 
which domination takes place. It would then seem that the existence 
condition is in this way rendered plausible. For, if no social interaction 
exists then domination certainly cannot take place. So, justice 
demands that, where social interaction exists, it should be arranged in 
a way that everyone is free from domination. And accordingly where 
social interaction does not exist, justice demands do not arise. There 
are two objections that can be raised against the claim that 
domination presupposes an already existing relationship.
274 
 
The first invokes Pettit’s conception of liberty as non-
domination.29 Pettit maintains that a person is free not merely when 
he is not subject to actual interference. A person may not be actually 
interfered with, yet he may still be unfree in the domination sense. 
Pettit defines domination as the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with 
one’s actions. Having the capacity to do X, does not mean that one 
actually does X, but that he can potentially do it. If that is so, then the 
absence of social relationships cannot plausibly mean that one does 
not have the capacity to dominate another. Domination is possible in 
the absence of a relationship, because domination exists where A has 
the capacity arbitrarily to interfere with B’s actions/life. In this sense, 
injustice does not require actual arbitrary interference. Being 
potentially dominated is as well an injustice,30 and as we have seen 
potential domination does not presuppose an already existing social 
relationship. 
However, non-statists could argue that the capacity to 
dominate X can be regarded as sufficient for one to have a social 
relationship to X. If this is so, then my objection against the existence 
condition is misplaced. I accept the plausibility of this claim. However, 
it does not render my objection misplaced. This is so, for, as I said 
above, my objection points to the fact that justice requires us to relate 
to each other in the proper way, namely in a non-dominating way. It 
 
 
29 See also Forst (2012; 2014), who endorses a conception of justice as non-
domination, grounded in the idea that certain kinds of power relationship trigger a  
right of justification. 
30 Or alternatively we could say that when a person is in a position such that others 
have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in her actions, she is unfree, but she is not  
treated unjustly unless they actually do interfere in some way that gives insufficient 
weight to her interests. Yet this would not affect my argument, since what matters 
for republicans is that for people to be free from domination, others should not have 
the capacity to treat them unjustly, even if they do not actually treat them in this 
way. 
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does not tell us that we should relate to each other in a non-
dominating way only when there is an already existing social 
relationship, even if we take such social relationships to include cases 
not only of actual domination but of potential domination. In other 
words, it would still be the case that we should relate to each other in 
a non-dominating way, even if there were no actual relationship 
between people and no one had the capacity to dominate others. As 
we have seen, it is one thing to say that justice concerns the way we 
conduct our relationships, and quite another that we should already 
relate to each other in order justice demands to be triggered. 
Moreover, if non-domination is important, it is not for its own 
sake, but because we suppose that it secures our freedom, autonomy, 
dignity and so on. Seen in this way, we cannot simply say that where 
there is no relationship, our autonomy or freedom is not threatened 
by domination, thus justice demands do not arise. If non-interference 
is a condition of autonomy, it is only one condition. As discussed above 
and as I shall later argue, autonomy, freedom or dignity require 
certain relationships, political ones specifically, to be meaningful. In 
this sense, when one is denied those conditions, he is treated unjustly. 
And to the extent such conditions depend on certain relationships or 
to the extent that certain relationships are constitutive of a person’s 
dignity, freedom, autonomy and so on, refusing to relate with another 
in the first place is an injustice. 
My view then is that there is certainly injustice involved in the 
exclusion of some people from certain forms of relationships that not 
only are necessary for the pursuit of one’s life, but it is also an insult 
to the self-respect of those denied the possibility of becoming equal 
members of the relationship. Some kinds of relationships are not like 
friendship, which may create certain kinds of obligation, but only once 
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one chooses to enter it.31 Political association is the sort of 
relationship that bears those special characteristics necessary for 
human flourishing, both because it provides the means for creating a 
good life and because it provides the basis of self-respect. And it 
certainly cannot be the case that we may rightly refuse to relate 
politically to others without at the same time imposing an injustice on 
them. 
Having said that, the following point seems relevant. 
Analogous to the objections raised by non-statist egalitarians against 
those who justify equality on account of coercive state power, is my 
objection against the necessary existence condition of justice, namely 
that egalitarian obligations are owed only in the presence of already 
existing relationships. According to non-statist egalitarians, if coercion 
needs justification to those subject to it in order to be rendered 
legitimate, so does coercion against outsiders.32 Justification is 
required to legitimate coercion, which is one form of domination. In a 
parallel way, we can think of social interaction as requiring 
justification both to insiders and outsiders and not only because of the 
threat of potential domination (as noted above) but precisely because 
the refusal to interact may indeed be an impairment to moral agency 
by not providing those enabling conditions of autonomy, dignity, etc. 
To the extent then that the refusal of social interaction can be an 
impairment to moral agency by not making available those enabling 
conditions of autonomy, dignity, etc., it as well needs justification. To 
claim that I do not need to justify my refusal to be related with you, 
 
31 Although friendship is indeed one of the most important factors for one’s life to 
go well and though it is desirable that it is voluntary (otherwise it would lose much 
of its essence) there are certain choosing criteria that rightfully seem immoral, such 
as choosing friends according to one’s skin colour. Similar is the case of sexual 
relationships. 
32 For such an argument see Abizadeh (2008), and his replies to Miller (2010). See 
also Miller’s initial article (2009) and his reply to Abizadeh (2010). 
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because I am not actually related with you simply begs the question. 
If this is so, then it seems that the existence of social interaction, 
though sufficient, cannot be a necessary condition for justice 
demands to arise. 
To sum up, I have maintained that existing interaction or 
relationships are not a necessary condition for justice demands to 
arise, as non-statist egalitarians suggest. This is so, for, first, if certain 
relationships are necessary, in the sense of being instrumentally 
necessary or more demandingly of being constitutive of people’s 
dignity or freedom or autonomy, then it seems that relating to each 
other as equals is a demand of justice even when there is no existing 
social relationship or interaction. If that is so, then the existing 
interaction/relationship condition may be sufficient but not necessary 
for egalitarian duties to be triggered. 
The necessary existence condition in the pervasive 
impact theory 
According to the pervasive impact theory, the basic structure 
comprises those institutions that have pervasive impact on people’s 
lives. If that is so, then it seems plausible to assume that such 
institutions should already exist, if they are to have pervasive impact 
on people’s lives. Moreover, social egalitarians maintain that if 
pervasive impact is of moral significance then all forms of impact 
should fall under the purview of justice, institutional and non-
institutional acts. In this sense, certain forms of interaction or 
relationships or practices should already exist for impact to obtain. 
Yet, if we accept that certain forms of relationship, interaction or 
practices are constitutive of people’s dignity, autonomy, freedom etc., 
why should we think that these should already be in place for justice 
demands to be triggered? Moreover, if it were the case that certain 
forms of interaction or relationship or practices should already exist 
in order for justice demands to arise, then we could escape the 
burdens of justice-based duties by avoiding (either through choice or 
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luck) to interact or relate to each other. But this would have perverse 
consequences. 
Suppose, for example, that there are two communities neither 
of which affects the other in any way. One of them is wealthy enough 
to be self-sufficient and its citizens can lead a decent life. The other 
consists of people most of whom are disabled due to a genetic 
mutation that makes them unable to sustain a decent life through 
production (I shall leave aside the quality and quantity of external 
resources available to this community, since their presence would not 
make much difference to their poor productive skills since that is due 
to their innate lack of abilities). If impact needs to exist for justice 
demands to arise, the pervasive impact theory has nothing to say to 
those unlucky people. So far as the wealthy society refrains from 
interacting with the unlucky society or does not in any way affect it, 
then no justice demands arise, but maybe only a duty to humanitarian 
aid. This, however, seems to me not only unjust but insulting as well.33 
The problem as I see it is that the pervasive impact theory does 
not properly account for why impact is of moral significance for the 
generation of duties of justice. Once we have answered this question, 
we will also be able to explain what is morally wrong in the above 
example. So, for the pervasive impact theory to be forceful, it needs 
to identify the factors that are morally significant to how people’s lives 
go since it is these that we should care about when we are considering 
impact on people’s lives. The political order one lives in, her social 
environment, her intimate relationships, the level of wealth of her 
society and so on strongly affect how her life goes. Political association 
does not simply affect people’s lives but is constitutive of their dignity, 
autonomy etc. This means that absence of political association can 
constitute a great harm to people. This is true, to a lesser or greater 
 
 
33 (Some forms of) secession could as well qualify as a pervasive consequence of the 
theory so interpreted. 
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degree, of other forms of relationships, interactions or practices. If we 
consider that certain forms of impact require moral consideration, we 
do so because of the moral significance that certain relationships, 
interactions or practices have on people’s lives. Not every form of 
impact has that moral relevance. But if the moral relevance of impact 
depends upon the significance that certain forms of relationship, 
interaction or practices have, then what matters is not whether the 
latter exist but whether they should exist. In other words, certain 
forms of relationships, interactions or practices are significant for how 
people’s lives go and this is so independently of whether they already 
exist or not. If they are morally significant then justice demands that, 
if absent, they should be established. If this is so then existing 
relationships, interactions or practices are only sufficient not 
necessary for justice demands to arise.    
Summing up, I have maintained that existing relationships, 
interaction or practices have not been shown to be a necessary 
existence condition for justice demands to arise. If certain forms of 
relationships or interaction or practices are of moral significance due 
to the pervasive impact they can have on people’s lives, then this is so 
even if they are absent and so justice demands that they should be 
established. 
 
             b. Political association as a demand of justice 
Throughout the chapter, I have argued that for justice 
demands to arise certain forms of social interaction, relationships, 
practices or impact more generally need not already exist. I have 
argued this on the basis that if certain forms of relationship, and more 
specifically political association, are constitutive of people’s dignity, 
freedom, autonomy, self-respect and so on, then we have a duty to 
form political associations. In what follows, I shall make my view more 
explicit by arguing that we should appeal to the ideal of the good 
polity, to the goods of which all people should have equal access. 
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As we have seen, social egalitarians support the view that the 
ideal of equality properly understood commits us to two aims: to erase 
or eliminate oppression and domination and conduct our relationships 
in a non-hierarchical manner. Such a view understands inequalities to 
be socially created and supposes that they are created when people 
live under hierarchical relationships. In this respect, people have 
strong egalitarian duties to each other to eliminate or erase such 
hierarchies. Brute bad luck is not itself a reason for strong egalitarian 
duties to be generated, unless it places people in a position where they 
cannot act as social and political equal members of their society. This 
points to the plausibility of the social egalitarian claim that inequalities 
or injustices are social, because they are generated by our acts and 
omissions. It is our moral agency that is involved in how our 
relationships are constructed, so that we are in a sense responsible for 
acting according to justice. Natural differentiation cannot itself be just 
or unjust; nature is not a moral agent. So our egalitarian duties are 
generated in virtue of our interaction not in virtue of how luck is dealt 
to us. 
Yet, as we have also seen, the social egalitarian view, to the 
extent it takes injustice to be created due to existing hierarchical social 
relationships, is committed to the view that such relationships should 
be in place so that justice-based duties to be triggered. Although I 
agree with the social egalitarian claim that where relations of 
oppression and domination exist, we have a duty to undo such 
injustices, I disagree that injustices result only from the way we 
already interact with each other. I think this is an incomplete view of 
the ideal of social and political equality, for it cannot properly account 
for the intrinsic value of certain forms of relationships and especially 
of political association that social egalitarians often try to highlight. If 
the ideal of political and social equality is restricted to the aim of 
regulating existing interaction or relationships in the proper way, then 
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it partly loses sight of what is distinctly important in our duty to relate 
to each other as political equals. 
Background political institutional arrangements are distinctly 
important not only because they regulate existing social relationships 
in a fair way, but because they settle political relationships by way of 
fixing the impact that factors that affect our life chances have, such as 
the socioeconomic class into which we are born, our upbringing, 
education, the resources available for use, our religious and 
ideological commitments, the natural and cultural environment, our 
health, our outlook, our natural abilities and talents, our psychological 
development, the technological progress of our society, other 
people’s preferences and so on. In other words, political institutional 
arrangements are important because they both determine and settle 
people’s relationships to each other. More importantly though 
political association is not simply required to ensure that the 
necessary conditions of human flourishing are available to all on equal 
terms, but it is itself the ultimate form of human flourishing. Such a 
view developed in Greek ancient thought finds an important, still less 
noticed, place in Rawls’s Theory of Justice, and to my mind there is 
room to think of Dworkin’s theory in similar terms.  
Rawls develops the ideal of social union in his Theory of Justice 
(1971: § 79). He asserts that human sociability cannot be understood 
simply as a basic human condition for the survival of the human 
species or as a means for the development of speech and thought and 
for acquiring interests and needs that urge them to join forces for 
mutual advantage. These are certainly important facts about human 
life, but they are only instrumentally important (Rawls 1971: 522). 
Social relations do not have merely an instrumental role in people’s 
lives. “[H]uman beings have in fact shared final ends and they value 
their common institutions and activities as good in themselves” (Rawls 
1971: 522-23). This is so, since “one basic characteristic of human 
beings is that no one person can do everything that he might do; nor 
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a fortiori can he do everything that any other person can do…Different 
persons with similar or complementary capacities may cooperate…in 
realizing their common or matching nature. When men are secure in 
the enjoyment of the exercise of their powers, they are disposed to 
appreciate the perfections of others” (Rawls 1971: 523). Thus, it is 
“through the social union founded upon the needs and potentialities 
of its members that each person can participate in the total sum of 
the realized natural assets of the others” (Rawls 1971: 523). So, we 
cannot reach our own good, we cannot become eudaimon in 
Aristotelian terms, if we do not recognise our good as part of a wider 
common project. That wider common project is the political society— 
the well-ordered society—the ultimate aim of which —the shared end 
of its members—is “the successful carrying out of just institutions” 
that “are prized as good in themselves” (Rawls 1971: 527). Principles 
of justice, then, are related to human sociability in that human beings 
have a sense of justice (it is a condition of human sociability, Rawls 
1971: 495), that is, a desire and capacity to act according to mutually 
recognised rules of justice. People’s sense of justice is not just what 
people want as rational self-interested beings. It is through justice that 
they can best express their nature. But their nature is not just their 
human instincts or feelings. Compassion is just one such feeling and 
may be a necessary stage of moral development,34 but it is not what 
is distinct in human nature.35 Human nature is distinctively moral, that 
is, human beings want to “express their nature as free and equal moral 
persons” (Rawls 1971: 528, cf. 251-7). And they can only do so if they 
act from principles of justice that they collectively choose and publicly 
affirm. 
 
 
 
 
34 See Rawls’s three principles of moral psychology (1971: 490-1). 
35 It is common knowledge nowadays that some non-human animals are as well 
capable of compassion.
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Moreover, people do not only have a sense of justice, but they 
want to further cultivate it within the social context. The Aristotelian 
Principle speaks for it.36 Within political society people can advance 
more complex lives by adjusting their plans to the plans of others 
through principles of justice that all affirm and act upon (Rawls 1971: 
528). Citizenship is the most complex form of life, one that free and 
equal people want as good in itself, since it fully realizes their nature. 
Citizenship instantiates the form of life according to mutually 
acceptable principles of justice. “It follows that the collective activity 
of justice is a preeminent form of human flourishing” (Rawls 1971: 
529). Just institutions are not just instrumental to the end of realising 
justice. They are constitutive of justice. Public institutions regulate the 
common life of citizens according to public rules. Institutions are the 
“public system of rules” (Rawls 1971: 55), as these are decided by the 
members of civil society. The co-operative endeavour of the political 
society is the collective activity of justice; and as a collective activity, 
justice can only be realised through public institutions, that is, through 
a public system of rules. 
As I said at the outset, throughout the chapter I have argued 
that if certain sorts of relationships, and more specifically political 
association, are constitutive of people’s dignity, freedom, autonomy, 
self-respect and so on, then we have a duty to relate to each other in 
the relevant sense, no matter whether there are existing social 
interactions, relationships or impact. 
I think it must by now be evident why political association is 
uniquely important to people’s lives. It is through it that people can 
fully realise their nature as free and equal moral persons. Only in their 
 
 
36 The Aristotelian Principle states that “other things equal, human beings enjoy the 
exercise of their realised capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this 
enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity” 
(Rawls 1971: 426).
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capacity as citizens can they flourish. Citizenship is not just being a 
member of a political society, but being the co-author of public rules 
of justice. It also follows that a political society is a just society so that 
not any society satisfies the criteria of being political.37 But, if political 
association is uniquely important to people’s lives, then relating to 
each other as political equals is a demand of justice, irrespective of 
whether there are already existing social relationships, interaction or 
impact. This makes existing social interaction only a sufficient 
condition, not a necessary one, for justice demands to arise. Political 
association is constitutive of justice. 
The Dworkian context can also provide a similar reading of the 
good of citizenship. In discussing the conception of community that is 
consistent with liberal principles, Dworkin defends liberal civic 
republicanism, a form of civic republicanism, in which the individual’s 
critical interests and the citizens’ identification with the life of the 
political community are integrated. Such a person sees the success of 
her life as ethically dependent on the success of the political 
community. The common life of the political community consists of its 
formal political acts (legislation, adjudication, enforcement, and 
executive powers of government) (Dworkin 2000: 231). The person in 
her capacity as a citizen should act according to mutually recognised 
principles of justice, she should make her best efforts so that her 
community shows equal concern and respect for her co-citizens. In 
such a political community the common endeavour of its members is 
to live together in justice, where this means that each can pursue her 
own conception of the good with her fair share of resources on equal 
terms with everyone else. In such a community people do not only 
 
 
37 Rawls’ discussion of what constitutes a people in his Law of Peoples (1999) speaks 
to this direction. As is known, Rawls does not characterise as a people those living 
under burdened or outlaw states, nor do these societies are political ones. On this 
see also Pettit (2006). 
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have a sense of justice, that is, they try to act as citizens according to 
principles of justice, but they identify with the community’s success or 
failure to bring about justice (Dworkin 2000: 233). In this sense, the 
republican community, so understood, is one where stability and 
legitimacy are achieved, that is, one in which its citizens have a shared 
understanding of politics as a common enterprise that embodies 
equal concern and respect for all, where each knows that all have that 
kind of understanding of politics and where disagreement over the 
best conception of justice is not about “what sacrifices are required 
from each, but about how to serve the common interests of all in 
securing a genuinely just solution” (Dworkin 2000: 234). A person then 
has reason to accept the ethical priority of the political community 
understood as a liberal civic republic over her individual life in that the 
good life is possible within a just society. Justice is, in Dworkin’s terms, 
a soft parameter of the good life (2000: 263-7). 
It would, I think, be faithful to Dworkin’s theory to say that the 
political life is a life of integrity. The political life ultimately integrates 
ethics and morality. Ethics tells us what it means to have a good life; 
morality how we should treat others. These two are fully integrated in 
our conception of the good polity, where citizens can each pursue her 
own conception of the good life in the light of the requirements of 
justice. In the good polity each person can affirm herself as free and 
equal. However, unlike Rawls, Dworkin does not take the political life 
as the most complex activity that human beings seek in expressing 
themselves as free and equal. On Dworkin’s account, the political life 
should be understood as ultimately integrating ethics and morality, in 
the sense that, in line with Kant’s principle, people cannot rationally 
affirm the objective importance of their life if they do not at the same 
time affirm the objective importance of all people’s lives. This is not 
necessarily entailed by the fact that Rawls diagnoses, namely that 
human beings have complementary capacities that in common can 
realise their human nature. I don’t think Dworkin would disagree with 
 
286 
 
this diagnosis, but I think he states something more than this. Namely, 
that persons cannot think of their lives worth pursuing if they do not 
think that their life has objective importance and they can only think 
that their life has objective importance, because everyone’s life has. 
We can even assume that the Rawlsian diagnosis about people having 
shared final ends in fully realising their distinctly human nature, 
presupposes that each recognises that other people’s lives have equal 
objective importance to her life. 
So, the political life is one in which integration of ethics and 
morality takes a more concrete form, by way of providing the 
framework within which the political virtue of justice, the ultimate end 
of a political community, is realised. People can affirm both their 
special responsibility for their life and the objective importance of all 
people’s lives by each accepting the collective responsibility to act 
upon principles of justice. In the good polity people can live in full 
dignity.38 
Having said that, my main claim is that the political association 
properly understood provides the framework within which people can 
realize their moral nature as free and equal, by way of each living 
according to her own conception of the good according to common 
principles of justice, principles that accord each equal concern and 
respect. I shall call this the ideal of the good polity. The ideal of the 
good polity requires that all people should have fair access to the 
goods of citizenship and justice. This is so, since 1) no one has any prior 
right to the world’s natural resources, so that members of distinct 
existing political communities do not have a special claim to the 
resources found within their territory; 2) all are entitled to 
 
 
38 Dworkin does not assume that dignity is an all-or-nothing concept. In this sense, a 
person can have a good life, without having lived well, or one can have a less good 
life, although he has lived well (2011: 200). Justice is a matter of degree as living a 
good life is. 
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“participate in the total sum of the realised natural assets of others” 
that is possible “through the social union founded upon the needs and 
potentialities of its members” (but note that here the ideal of social 
union cannot be used to define a specific political community neither 
does it presuppose one. The social union can be thought of as any 
community that can have the relevant characteristics of being 
political, and this can be either states as we know them or a world 
state, for example. In this sense, the ideal of the polis cannot inform 
us of what the right demos is); 3) “the collective activity of justice is a 
preeminent form of human flourishing”, to which all human beings are 
entitled; 4) we each recognise the objective importance of the life of 
each person by living according to principles of justice with them. 
Taking the requirements of the good polity seriously, 
egalitarian duties cannot be supposed to depend on any pre-given 
context, but they define the context. If this is so, then it is not so 
obvious why we should take existing social relationships or interaction 
or impact as a necessary condition for egalitarian justice. Neither is it 
so obvious why certain associative duties, that is, political obligations, 
arise in virtue of membership in existing political communities. The 
value of equality, properly understood, regards how we should relate 
to each other as moral, social and political equals. This means that the 
value of equality defines properly structured relationships, but it does 
not presuppose any existing relationships. The ideal of the good polity 
can then be used to provide a critical perspective on existing 
relationships of domination and oppression, but it can also be used as 
our guiding ideal in setting up properly constructed relationships, 
when this is required (and is possible). 
 
Summing up, in this chapter my aim was to examine and 
undermine the social egalitarian claim that certain kinds of 
relationship are a precondition for demands of justice to arise. 
Instead, I have argued that there are duties of justice to establish 
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political associations of a certain kind, according to the ideal of the 
good polity. As I said in the introduction, however, there are 
interesting questions that I shall not tackle here, that regard what the 
implications of the ideal of the good polity are with respect to our 
duties to members and non-members, or how we should make sense 
of our duties as these are required by the ideal of the good polity. So, 
the ideal of the good polity can provide the proper moral framework 
from which considerations over the specification of the kinds of duty 
the ideal requires to proceed. This is a distinct (though related) 
enterprise, which I shall not pursue here. However, let me make some 
preliminary remarks about how the ideal of the good polity can help 
us theorise the kinds of duty that it generates. 
The ideal of the good polity seems to imply that if a) justice 
and the good life is properly realised within political community, and 
if b) each person should be able to live according to her own 
conception of the good with her fair share of resources, c) as this is 
specified by the political community’s institutions through the equal 
liberties and opportunities it provides, then the political community 
should extend to include all human beings. This is a strong view 
against which the following objection can be raised. 
Although, the ideal of the good polity requires that all people 
are entitled to the goods of citizenship and justice, it is not obvious 
why it should be understood that it requires that the political 
community should extend to include all human beings. Instead, it is 
plausible that we can understand it, in a weaker sense, to require a 
duty to enable all individuals to be members of a political association. 
The weaker view is less demanding in that it proposes that to the 
extent all people are entitled to the good of citizenship, we have a duty 
to provide to them those conditions that will enable them to form just 
political associations. The familiar Rawlsian ideal of the international 
society of well-ordered people could fit into this weaker view, which, 
although it is not conditioned on existing relationships or 
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interaction, entails that strongly egalitarian duties are owed to our co-
citizens. So, those adopting this weaker view would insist that the 
good polity does not need to be global to provide the goods it 
promises, but it can be realised within distinct well-ordered political 
communities. If we aim at making existing states well-ordered, then it 
is not obvious why we owe strongly egalitarian duties to people from 
other well-ordered societies. All we need is to invoke a duty to help 
non-well-ordered societies become well-ordered ones. This is 
consistent with our duty to respect each person’s life as equally 
objectively important by way of providing the conditions to all to form 
well-ordered societies. I think most social egalitarians take this view. 
Notice, however, that luck egalitarians could as well insist that 
although we have strong egalitarian duties to the members of other 
societies, this does not entail that we should have a shared political 
membership, where this includes, more primarily equal political 
rights. In this sense, they would agree that we may have a weaker duty 
to enable people to form a good polity, although they would disagree 
with the view that we don’t have strong egalitarian duties to 
strangers. I think both views are mistaken, though, from the point of 
view of the ideal of the good polity. 
With respect to the luck egalitarian view, I think that luck 
egalitarians are right to maintain that existing social relationships or 
interaction or impact are not a necessary condition for justice-based 
duties to be triggered. However, such duties need to be specified 
against certain social arrangements giving rise to strong forms of 
relationship where this is possible as a demand of the requirements of 
non-arbitrariness and fairness and of publicity. The requirements of 
non-arbitrariness and fairness should be understood to demand that 
people’s fair shares should be determined in a non-arbitrary and fair 
way and for this to be so certain institutional background is required. 
The requirement of publicity should be understood to demand that 
principles of justice should be publicly known and publicly affirmed by 
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all people if we are to respect their dignity. These requirements 
together point to the fact that if distributive justice should apply 
universally, certain shared institutional structures should be 
established. Moreover, as I have throughout argued, the just political 
association is constitutive of people’s dignity. The good polity consists 
of just social and distributive arrangements. If that is so, then we 
cannot simply assume that distributive justice duties are independent 
of shared political membership, for we cannot make sense of them 
independently of each other. Certainly, there is a further question 
about the kind of shared political association that would respond to 
the demands of distributive justice. Although this would certainly be 
an interesting task and indeed necessary, we can still take up the task 
of finding reasons, if any, for why a universal political association is 
justified from the point of view of justice and of morality more widely, 
leaving the specification of universal political association aside. So, my 
point here is to give some preliminary answers to questions regarding 
this more basic task (though not more important, since the two tasks 
seem to be complementary). 
Finally, the Rawlsian view that the ideal of the good polity can 
be better realised through a limited duty to provide to all people those 
conditions that will enable them to form just political associations is 
question begging. How we are going to make sense of our duty to 
provide to all the goods of citizenship and justice will depend on how 
we can best realise the demands of the good polity. This requires that 
we can justify our position through both moral and empirical 
argumentation. We cannot say in advance whether the demands of 
the good polity can be better realised through universally shared 
political membership or through distinct political communities. 
Moreover, we should notice that universally shared political 
membership does not necessarily imply a world state with similar 
powers to those that existing sovereign states exercise. So, the ideal 
of the good polity may require either a world state or some other less 
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strong forms of association, such as a federal system, for example, or 
indeed the Rawlsian ideal of the international society of well-ordered 
peoples. But we cannot dismiss or accept either form without 
evaluating their relative advantages and disadvantages with respect 
to bringing about the goods of justice and citizenship for all. There 
have been several reasons offered against a form of world state with 
similar powers to those that existing sovereign states exercise. Such 
reasons mainly point to the fear of despotism39 or secession related 
with stability issues,40 transition costs,41 and lack of a shared political 
culture necessary to make a just political regime—the world state in 
this case—efficient and stable and would provide a basis for 
motivating agents to act according to public principles of justice.42 
 
 
39 See, for example, Christiano who maintains against the prospect of global 
democracy that “[t]he larger the constituency, the larger the chances are that 
particular minorities would simply get lost in the democratic decision making” 
(2006: 103). Moreover, “the greater size of the constituencies combined with the 
even greater complexity of the issues at stake suggests that citizens are even less 
likely to vote in an informed way about matters connected to global institutions than 
they are in national democratic decisions” (Christiano 2006: 104) and this may lead 
to “the danger of complete elite control of governmental institutions…when we 
consider global or transnational institutions” (Christiano 2006: 105). 
40 See, for example, Rawls’ often cited contention, following Kant’s thought, in 
Perpetual Peace (1795), that a global state ‘‘would either be a global despotism or 
else would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as various regions 
and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and autonomy’’ (1999: 36). 
41 Theorists pointing to transition costs often cite Rousseau’s treatment of the 
possibility of a Commonwealth of Europe, who concludes that although the latter 
would be perfectly rational for Europeans to realise, it could— given people’s 
imperfect human nature to deliberate over their real interests—become possible 
only through revolution so that we cannot really know whether the expected good 
would be greater than the harm imposed (Rousseau 1917: 91-112). 
42 This argument as well has its roots in Rawls’ thought. In his Law of Peoples Rawls 
constitutes people as possessing three basic characteristics, one of which is that 
citizens are “united by what Mill called ‘common sympathies’” (1999: 23). See also 
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There may be several ways for a cosmopolitan to address such 
issues.43 My view, stated very briefly, is that the ideal of the good 
polity requires strong distributive egalitarian duties across members 
of distinct political communities, as well as the establishment of 
certain global social and political institutions that generate strongly 
egalitarian duties between members of distinct political communities. 
This does certainly not imply a world state, but neither does it favour 
the Rawlsian ideal. As such, it would have significant implications for 
the world as it is, with respect to distributive justice, border policies, 
trade practices, legitimation of supra-national institutions as well as 
the establishment of global democratic institutions. 
Certainly, more needs to be said so as to defend my view, but 
this is a project I shall not pursue here. My aim in the last few 
paragraphs was to show how we should proceed in order to settle for 
answers to the question over the kinds of duty required by the ideal 
of the good polity, that is, whether it requires strong duties to relate 
politically or more weakly a duty to provide to all the enabling 
conditions to be members of distinct well-ordered societies. This way 
of approaching the problem has the advantage that it distinguishes 
between the significance of political association as a good in itself 
which every person should enjoy and the best institutional framework 
necessary to promote this good, be it nation-state as we know it, a 
 
 
 
Political Liberalism where Rawls contends that people in a well-ordered society have 
shared beliefs “in the light of which first principles of justice themselves can be 
accepted, that is, the general beliefs about human nature and the way political social 
institutions generally work, and indeed all such beliefs relevant to political justice” 
(1993: 67). Common sympathies, however, are based on a more comprehensive 
conception of background culture than shared general beliefs. See also the 
distinction between public political culture and background culture in Political 
Liberalism (1993:13-4). 
43 For a recent attempt, see Nili (2015). 
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world state or some other institutional form. This remains to be 
answered. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In her “What is the Point of Equality”, Elizabeth Anderson 
argued that luck egalitarianism “can…be seen as an attempt to 
combine the best of capitalism and socialism” (1999: 308). In this 
sense, Anderson seems to imply that luck egalitarianism is an 
improvement over capitalism and socialism in some important 
respects because it avoids some of the worst aspects of each taken 
separately. On the one hand, luck egalitarianism seems to be an 
improvement over capitalism, because— for example—it doesn’t 
leave those who are unable to meet their own needs through no fault 
of their own to starve. On the other hand, it seems to be an 
improvement over socialism, because—for example—it isn’t wedded 
to a centrally planned economy. However, a few lines later she asserts 
that “the counterintuitive judgments that luck egalitarians pass on the 
cases discussed above suggest a more dismal judgment: equality of 
fortune appears to give us some of the worst aspects of capitalism and 
socialism” (Anderson 1999: 308). This is a strong claim. But most 
importantly it is an unfair claim. And it is unfair not only regarding 
Dworkin’s theory, which I partly try to defend here, but regarding 
Cohen’s and Arneson’s views as well. This is so, since in asserting such 
a claim, Anderson fails importantly (and this is true of most social 
egalitarians) to take into consideration in her evaluation of what she 
calls luck egalitarianism the overall theoretical commitments of its 
representatives. Intellectual responsibility, to use Dworkin’s language, 
requires, among others, to take seriously what was mentioned in the 
introduction as Mill’s dictum, namely that “[a] doctrine is not judged 
at all until it is judged in its best form”. 
This is not to say, however, that the social egalitarian critique 
has been pointless. As I have argued in chapter 1, I share the social 
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egalitarian understanding of equality as a relational value and I think 
this is one of the most valuable contributions social egalitarians have 
made in the debate about equality, namely that they have re-
orientated it to the question about what equal social and political 
relationships should look like; a question that until then was more or 
less neglected or had not been given the proper attention within the 
literature. That said, the social egalitarian critique exposed gaps in luck 
egalitarianism that required careful thought, such as that it has not 
always been as attentive to various ways in which individuals may fail 
to be treated with respect, or be denied equal status, within practices 
and institutions. This has forced friends of luck egalitarianism to try to 
respond to the challenge of making it compatible with the social 
egalitarian requirement of equal relationships by proposing ways to 
modify luck egalitarian accounts. This, in turn, led social egalitarians to 
try to provide more nuanced defences both of their critique to luck 
egalitarianism and of their positive project of explaining what a society 
of equals looks like. 
Although the social egalitarian critique has not been pointless, 
it has nevertheless not been successful in offering a strong case 
especially against Dworkin’s theory of equality. To my view, for the 
social egalitarian criticism to be forceful against luck egalitarianism 
more generally, three things are required. First, the fundamental 
differences between the main luck egalitarian accounts need to be 
identified and then the critique needs to be addressed against the best 
form of each. Secondly, the social egalitarian criticism itself should be 
developed in its best form. Thirdly, it needs to provide a better 
account of equality than the best luck egalitarian account does. My 
dissertation has focused mainly on the social egalitarian critique of 
Dworkin’s account, while I have not addressed the social egalitarian 
critique of other forms of luck egalitarianism. In the light of the above 
requirements, I suggested how we should best make sense of 
Dworkin’s equality of resources given his wider 
theoretical
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commitments, I proposed what the best form of the social egalitarian 
criticism is against it and then I went on to present social egalitarians’ 
suggested accounts of equality in their best form. 
However, I further argued that they fail to give us an attractive 
account of non-domination. I then argued that Dworkin’s theoretical 
context provides us with the theoretical tools to understand why 
consequential responsibility is constitutive of non-domination, rather 
than an enemy to it, as social egalitarians have maintained, and I 
suggested how we should best make sense of consequential 
responsibility. Finally, I questioned the social egalitarian and 
Dworkinian commitment that strong egalitarian duties are generated 
in virtue of existing morally significant forms of relationships and 
instead proposed that the scope of social equality properly 
understood is universal, a proposal that can be understood to suggest 
a way of integrating the universalist luck egalitarian view and the 
relational social egalitarian view that makes each more plausible. 
I said in the introduction that by the end of my dissertation, I 
hope to have provided a significant and original contribution to the 
literature by offering a better understanding of the demands of social 
and political equality. Both of the two main claims that I tried to 
defend in my dissertation, namely that responsibility is constitutive of 
non-domination and that the scope of social egalitarian justice is 
universal, are meant to fulfill this aim. I would now like to conclude 
with a note about where my project leaves us with regard to the 
debate between social and luck egalitarians. In one sense, it could be 
said that it points to its end. If the main disagreement between social 
and luck egalitarians has been over whether responsibility conflicts 
with respect for persons, then it might be said that efforts to reconcile 
the two values consequently resolve that disagreement, or, at least 
they minimise it. 
Note, however, that my project should not be understood as a 
reconciliatory one, if by this we mean one that shows that the luck 
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egalitarian requirements do not conflict or do not fundamentally 
conflict with the social egalitarian requirements. In general, a 
reconciliatory project—as I understand it—takes two strands to have 
different commitments that are independent of each other and tries 
to provide reasons, if any, for why each is important in its own respect 
and then suggest ways to attend to both. In this sense, one can be a 
value pluralist and argue that to the extent both values matter 
morally, namely responsibility and respect for persons, there should 
be a way of making a fair compromise between them. For example, 
we may restrict the range of choices open to people, within which 
people can be held consequentially responsible. Or, we may set a 
certain minimum threshold below which no one should be permitted 
to fall, while hold people consequentially responsible once they satisfy 
this minimum. Others may set forth their reconciliatory project by 
approaching the disagreement between social and luck egalitarians in 
somewhat different terms. They may say that luck and social 
egalitarians are in fact concerned with different aspects of the same 
value, economic and status equality, both of which are important and 
as such we have reason to attend to both qua egalitarians. Based on 
this, their suggestions may be similar to those who hold that respect 
and responsibility are different values and not important aspects of 
the same value. There have indeed been several suggestions, 
especially from those who find luck egalitarianism congenial, about 
how to reconcile the social and luck egalitarian commitments. Most 
social egalitarians, on the other hand, resist such proposals insisting 
that a society of equals is not one governed by luck egalitarian 
principles of justice. 
That said, my aim has not been to reconcile the distinct 
commitments of the two egalitarian camps. Instead, my project aims 
at showing that what the reconciliatory project regards as 
independent commitments are in fact interdependent, that is, we can 
make best sense of the one in the light of the other. In the light of this, 
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I argued that the commitment to non-domination can be better 
understood in the light of the commitment to responsibility-sensitivity 
and that our commitment to the social and political ideal properly 
understood commits us to the view that the scope of social egalitarian 
justice is universal. As such then, my project aims at re-interpreting 
the values of respect and responsibility in what—I think—is the best 
way, not to reconcile the two values as each has been traditionally 
understood by the relevant camps. In this sense, what I suggest is that 
the best way of understanding the demands of equality competes with 
the conception offered by both social and luck egalitarians; and, as I 
have argued throughout this thesis, it is a better conception. This does 
not mean that it is not open to further improvements or more 
nuanced elaborations of certain concepts, such as that of authenticity. 
But I think that it provides the proper theoretical framework for an 
egalitarian to tackle significant questions. 
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